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ABSTRACT
Struggle over Macedonia: Fiorina 1906, According to the Records of Rumeli
Inspectorship.
Kayalar, Anil.
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof Oktay Özel
The Macedonian Question was one of the diplomatic problems that statesmen and 
the international public opinion were mostly concerned with at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The expansionist and 
irredentist desires of the Balkan states Greece, Serbia, and especially Bulgaria lied at 
the core of the problem. These states encouraged, and even organised terrorist 
activities in Macedonia. The Great Powers -Austria-Hungary, Russia, Great Britain, 
France, Germany, and Italy-, meanwhile, viewed the issue in terms of their own 
political and economic interests. These powers, while supporting this or that Balkan 
state in various ways and pressurising the Sublime Porte to conduct reforms so as to 
improve the lives of Christian communities in the European lands of the empire, 
also wanted the Ottoman Empire to preserve its territorial integrity. Under these 
circumstances, during the first decade of the twentieth century life in Macedonia 
was highlighted by anarchy, terror, insecurity and disorder.
This thesis deals with certain aspects of the Macedonian Question. The 
activities of the influence agents of the states that considered Macedonia within their 
national boundaries and aspired to annex the land, and put forth claims accordingly, 
such as the bands of Macedo-Bulgarian organisations or the Greek bands, are 
studied. In addition, the Greek and Bulgarian activities in the kaza of Fiorina, which 
is in the vilayet of Manastır, in 1906 are examined in particular with reference to the 
documents of Rumeli Inspectorship; attempting to construct a micro-history of the 
region.
Key Words: The Macedonian Question, Irredentism, Terror, Macedo-Bulgarian 
bands, Greek bands. Reform, Fiorina, 1906.
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ÖZET
Makedonya Üzerine Mücadele: Florina 1906, Rumeli Müfettişliği Belgelerine Göre.
Kayalar, Anıl.
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü.
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Oktay Özel.
Makedonya Sorunu 19. yüzyıl sonu ve 20. yüzyıl başı itibariyle devlet adamlarını ve 
uluslararası kamuoyunu en fazla meşgul eden diplomatik sorunlardan bir tanesi idi. 
Sorunun temelinde Balkan devletleri Yunanistan, Sırbistan, ve özellikle de 
Bulgaristan’ın Makedonya üzerinde ki yayılmacı ve irredantist emelleri yatmakta 
idi. Bu devletler Makedonya içindeki terörist faaliyetleri teşvik ediyorlar, ve hatta 
örgütlüyorlardı. Aynı zamanda Büyük Güçler -Avusturya-Macaristan, Rusya, Büyük 
Britanya, Fransa, Almanya, İtalya- de konuya kendi siyasi ve ekonomik çıkarları 
açısından yaklaşmaktaydılar. Bunlar, bir yandan şu veya bu Balkan devletini değişik 
şekillerde desteklerken ve Bâb-i Âli’ye imparatorluğun Avrupa topraklarındaki 
Hıristiyan topluluklarının yaşamlarını iyileştirmek üzere reformlar yürürlüğe 
koyması için baskı uygularken, öte yandan da Osmanb İmparatorluğu’nun toprak 
bütünlüğünü korumasını istemekteydiler. Bu koşullar altında Makedonya’daki 
hayata, 20. yüzyılın ilk on yılının büyük bir bölümünde anarşi, terör, ve artan bir 
güvensizlik ve düzensizlik ortamı damgasını vurmuştur.
Bu tez çalışması Makedonya sorununu belli açılardan ele almaktadır. 
Makedonya’yı milli sınırları içinde gören, burayı ilhak etmek isteyen ve bu 
doğrultuda iddialar ortaya atan devletlerin Makedonya içerisindeki Makedon-Bulgar 
örgütlere bağlı çeteler veya Yunan çeteleri gibi etki ajanlarının gerçekleştirdiği 
faaliyetler özellikle gözden geçirilmektedir. Ayrıca Makedonya Sorunu 
çerçevesinde, özellikle Manastır vilayetine bağlı Florina kazasında 1906 senesinde 
gerçekleşen Yunan ve Bulgar çete faaliyetleri ilgili Rumeli Müfettişliği Belgeleri 
üzerinden incelenerek bir mikro-tarih oluşturma denemesine girişilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Makedonya Sorunu, İrredantizm, Terör, Makedon-Bulgar 
çeteler. Yunan çeteleri. Reform, Florina, 1906.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
One of the most challenging, intricate and prolonged problems for the Ottoman 
administration was the Macedonian Question. The matter occupied Ottoman, 
Balkan, and European policymakers in the period between the Berlin Congress and 
the World War I. The population in Macedonia was amalgamated elaborately with 
Slavs, Greeks, Albanians, Turks, and some minor elements such as Vlachs or 
Gypsies. There were both Christian and Muslim elements amongst these groups, as 
well.
Macedonia had an outstanding strategic significance. Any Balkan state 
would acquire the power necessary to dominate the region through controlling 
Macedonia. Thus, every single Balkan state had its own calculations. Macedonia 
meant not only command over the route along the valleys of Vardar and Morava, 
and a substantial agricultural wealth for all the protagonist Balkan states, but also a 
critical outlet to the sea for Bulgaria and Serbia, and Austria-Hungary as well. 
Furthermore, every single Great Power was supporting one claimant of Macedonia 
or the other according to its own scheming. For the Ottoman state, Macedonia meant 
not only rule over a large number of Muslims, but also a strategic security zone 
against the expansionist and irredentist ambitions of the Balkan states -  Bulgaria, 
Greece and Serbia. The European provinces of the Ottoman Empire were also
generating substantial tax revenues. Moreover, these provinces were also important 
for the security of the imperial capital, Istanbul.
Until the end of the 19*'’ century, the competition for Macedonia by and large 
took place in the international relations scene. However, starting with the last decade 
of that century, the Balkan nationalists formed terrorist organisations to publicise 
their messages both in and out of Macedonia. The three vilayets (provinces) Selanik, 
Manastır and Kosova entered the 20“' century in an escalating reign of terror. Thus, 
the first decade of the 20"’ century meant violence and insecurity for Macedonia. 
Actions taken against this, all schemes of reforms, all precautions and new 
regulations proved futile, although some progress was achieved occasionally.
This dissertation is an attempt to conduct an analytical micro history of 
insecurity in a kaza -Fiorina- in a specific year -1906- within the context of the 
Macedonian Question in the light of the records of Rumeli Inspectorship. The 
activities of Greek and Macedo-Bulgarian bands in Fiorina are selected because the 
region was one of the hotbeds of the battle between the Greek and Macedo- 
Bulgarian bands that constituted the core of the problem; and 1906 was the year 
when the fight in Macedonia was at its peak. In this dissertation, it is put forth that 
although it is generally presumed that the Ottomans tolerated and turned a blind eye 
on the activities of Greeks and Greek armed bands, in Fiorina in 1906 this was not 
the case at all as the Greek bands suffered heavy casualties.
The general context will be presented through a survey of the Macedonian 
Question in the first chapter, and then in the second, the story of the struggle in the 
field will be given with accounts of rival organisations. Finally, in the third chapter, 
which is almost exclusively based on archival sources, the deeds of the bands and 
the activities of the authorities will be recounted. In addition, some conclusions
about the Greek and Macedo-Bulgarian movements are drawn within the context of 
their particular histories. In the last chapter, also various data will be provided not 
only on activities of violence, but also on a different aspect of the struggle in 
Macedonia, that is, the transactions of the immovable, based on a report of an 
official in Fiorina. In this report, the kaimmakam of Fiorina draws attention to the 
increasing scale of land purchases by the Christians, and points out that this was a 
considerable problem for the Muslims and the Ottoman administration.
In this dissertation the records of the Rumeli Inspectorship constitute the 
primary sources. The records include documents about Manastır, Selanik, Kosova 
vilayets and the sancaks (subprovinces), kazas (districts), nahiyes (subdistricts, 
communes) and villages of these vilayets. These records are generally about band 
activities, tax issues, the religious conflict between Bulgarian and Greek churches, 
ordinary crimes, misuses of administrative authority, matters of gendarmerie reform, 
construction activities, the activities of consulats, and religious personalities. I have, 
in particular, examined the documents about Fiorina for the year 1906. Then, the 
documents, which are particularly on the activities of Greek and Bulgarian bands 
have been selected and I have attempted to construct an analytical history of the 
activities of these bands in Fiorina in 1906. These documents put forth only the 
official point of view; yet, I believe, it is of crucial importance to utilise this hitherto 
rarely used collection of documents in the Turkish archives in order to widen the 
perspective in the literature.
The documents about Fiorina, for the year 1906, contain mainly telegrams 
and letters incoming to the centre in Thessalonica. As they are official documents, 
they present an official viewpoint. Hence, one should always bear this point in mind 
while making comments. Nevertheless, as they were prepared not with the aim to
publicise but for purposes of internal communication, they do possess a certain 
degree of credibility. Therefore, I do believe, the records of Rumeli Inspectorship 
contain a good deal of data, especially on the activities of the Bulgarians, Greeks, 
and others.
At this point, it might be useful to give a brief account of some other primary 
and secondary sources that have been of utmost use in my study. Apart from the 
archival sources, I have also used to some extent two collections of published 
documents. One of them is a collection of Austro-Hungarian documents edited by F. 
R. Bridge and was published by the Institute for Balkan Studies in Thessalonica in 
1976'. The documents in the book, which are diplomatic reports, cover the period of 
1896 -  1912. The emphasis in the book is on Greeks. Although one might expect a 
certain bias as this book was published in Greece by a Greek institution, the 
compilation is not totally biased in favour of the Greek arguments on the 
Macedonian Question, and it also contains documents that are on Greek acts of 
violence against the population.
This compilation, without doubt, has great academic importance for the 
students of the field. The documents are all diplomatic documents; thus, they are of 
official quality, and they cover a wide scope of issues, including the attitude of the 
Turkish government, as well as attitude of the European press, from all sorts of 
bands’ activities to international relations .
The second published compilation of documents is Macedonia, Documents 
and Material·'. This compilation was published by the Bulgarian academy of
' Ausiro-Hiingarian Documents Relating to the Macedonian Struggle, 1896 -  1912, ed. bj' F. R. 
Bridge (Thcssalonica: Inslilute for Balkan Studies, 1976).
■ The documents are published in Gennan. I ha\’e used the documents related to Fiorina in 1906, 
w'hieh Prof. Turhan Tiizemen kindly translated for me.
 ^Macedonia, Documents and Material, ed. by Voin Bozhino\' and L. Panayatov (Sofia: Bulgariim 
Aeademy of Sciences, 1978).
sciences in 1978, and edited by Vein Bozhinov and L. Panayatov. It covers an 
extensive period from 6‘'’ century to 1940. Documents related to the subject of this 
study are in the third section of the book under the heading ‘National-Liberation 
Struggles (1878 -  1918)’. This compilation includes not only Bulgarian documents 
but some western documents as well. All the documents are translated into English. 
Hence, this book offers the researchers, who do not know Bulgarian or German, the 
opportunity to reach at least some Bulgarian or Austro-Hunagarian documents, and 
for that reason it is an important and helpful book for researchers. However, there is 
a certain lack of objectivity, as it seems that the selection of documents seems to 
endeavour proving the rightfulness of the Bulgarian claims over Macedonia, 
principally against Greeks and Serbians. Nonetheless, this is a valuable work that 
ought to be present in all research libraries, and that ought to be inspected by the 
students of the field.
Books by several contemporaries have also been looked into during the 
process of undertaking this work. Of these, Brailsford Macedonia is the most 
prominent one"*. Published in 1906, Macedonia contains the observations of its 
author who had been in Macedonia, and was interested in its state of affairs for some 
time. .Apart from an obvious bias it contains in favour of the Bulgarians, this book is 
a good contemporary popular source.
Another contemporary work that ought to be mentioned is Durham’s Twenty 
Years o f Balkan Tangle^. Published in 1920, this work is another significant 
contemporary source. It contains the memoirs of its author who had spent almost 
twenty years in the Balkans during the first two decades of the 20"’ century. The 
seventh and eighth chapters are especially important for the subject of this study, as
H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia. Its Races and their Future (London: Melhuen, 1906; repr. New York: 
Arno Press & The New York Times, 1971).
M. Edith Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle (London: Allen & Unwin, 1920).
these two chapters particularly deal with Macedonia in years 1903 and 1904. 
Durham’s opinions are less prejudiced towards Turks and Muslims than the 
prevailing western opinion of the era. She bitterly criticises Bulgarian and Greek 
religious figures*’ and she open heartedly explains the nature of the perception of 
Macedonia in western circles.
John Foster Fraser’s Pictures from the Balkans also deserves to be cited 
here^. It is again the memoirs of a person who spent some time in the field, 
observing the events face to face. Fraser is also less biased against the Ottoman 
administration and the Muslims. He narrates the ferocities of Bulgarian and Greeks 
bands without trying by any means to justify these or taking one side or the other.
Arthur D. Howden Smith’s Fighting the Turk in the Balkans, on the other 
hand, is openly supportive of the Bulgarian claims**. In his book, published in 1908, 
the author, ‘embedded’ with a Bulgarian band like the ‘coalition’ journalists of the 
second Gulf War, recounts his memories with the bandsmen. As the title of his book 
also implies, he has no sympathy for the administration of the day. He actively 
wandered in Macedonia with a Macedo-Bulgarian band that took off from Bulgaria, 
and observed its activities in the field. Despite Smith’s obvious biases, this book is 
nonetheless a good source for the historian, who needs to grasp what a band was and 
who a bandsman was in order to comprehend the issue more completely.
Tahsin Uzer’s memoirs also provide valuable information on the matter and 
a vivid picture of the day**. Tahsin Bey acted as local civil administrator during the 
most critical phases of the Macedonian question, in different districts of the three
Durham, p. 95.
Jolui Foster Fraser, Pictures from the Balkans (LowdiOn·. Cassell. 1912).
 ^ Arthur D. Howden Smith, Fighting the Turk in the Balkans (New York and London: The 
Knickerboeker Press. 1908).
Tahsin Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyahk 'Tarihi ve Son Osmanh Yönetimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 
1979).
provinces. Furthermore, being a Young Turk, he does not defend in his memoirs the 
administration of Abdiilhamit blindly. On the contrary, he bitterly criticises not only 
Abdülhamit but also the local administrative echelons as well. He does not hesitate 
to disapprove the maladministration and misuse of state authority. Uzer’s work is 
certainly an indispensable source for any student of not only the Macedonian 
question but also the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey.
Fikret Adanır is one of the most important scholars, especially on the history 
of Macedonian Question. His doctoral dissertation Die Makedonische Frage is 
certainly a significant study. It was also translated into Turkish and published in 
2001 '°. In his dissertation. Adanır uses mainly German, Austro-Hungarian, 
Bulgarian and Macedonian sources. Thus, his emphasis is on the Macedo-Bulgarian 
movement. It is also an analytical work in which the author approaches his sources 
with a critical eye, and this certainly increases the value of the book.
Adanır has also written quite a deal of articles, in German and in English 
mostly. Four of his articles have been referred to in this dissertation, and have 
contributed immensely to my grasp of the Macedonian Question. In his 1984-85 
article, he fervently criticises the western and Balkan historiography on the issue” . 
Adanır endeavours to expose some weaknesses in the historiographic analysis of the 
socio-economic phenomena in nineteenth centuiy Macedonia. He provides some 
excellent examples of how the importance of these phenomena for political 
developments has been exaggerated.
Fikrel Adanır, Makedonya Soruini, Oluşumu ve 1908'e Kadar Gelişimi, trans, b}’ İhsan Cataj', 
(Islanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınlan, 2001).
" Fikrel Adanır, ‘The Macedonian Question: The Socio-economic Reality and Problems of its 
Historiographic Interpretation’, International Journal of Turkish Studies, 3 (1984-85), 43-64
In another article'^, Adanır examines the formation of the national elite 
among the Macedonian Slavs. He uses the term ‘elite’ to denote the activists at the 
forefront of the Macedonian Slav movement. He tries to set forth how an elite 
formation took place under the ‘powerful influence of social, economic and political 
forces in the country ; and information about the social and geographic origins of 
leaders, the education they received, the professions they pursued, the organisational 
structures they created and the channels of communication they utilised, all 
contribute to a better understanding of the forms as well as of the outcome of the 
political struggle’*''.
Adanır’s 1994 article'^ on socialism in Macedo-Bulgarian movement is also 
an important work. Here, he tries to make clear the connection between the national 
question and the development of socialism in Macedonia. Adanır gives some 
examples of socialist involvement in the nationalist struggle in Macedonia and tries 
to determine the consequences of such participation. He also discusses the relations 
between the Young Turks and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation 
(IMRO) and the Balkan socialists after 1908 revolution.
The context of Adanir’s 1998 article is much wider in scope'* .^ This is 
equally an invaluable contribution to historiography on the area as are his other 
articles. He examines the crucial determinants of nationalism and nation building in
Fikret Adamr, ‘The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1912’, in The Formation of 
National Elites, ed. by Andreas Kappeler and Fikret Adamr and Alan O’Day (Darmoutli: New York 
University Press, 1992). pp. 161-191.
An interesting article is Roudometof s in tliis respect. See Victor Roudometof, ‘The Social Origins 
of Balkan Politics: Nationalism, Underdevelopment, and tlie Nation-State in Greece, Serbia, and 
Bulgaria. Iü^0-1920\ Mediterranean Quarterly, 11 (2000), 144-163.
Adamr, ‘The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire’, p. 175.
Fikret Adanır, ‘The National Question and tlie Genesis and Development of Socialism in die 
Ottoman Empire: the Case of Ottoman Macedonia’, in Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman 
Empire, ed. by Mete Tunçay and Eric Jan Zürcher (London: British Academic Press. 1994). pp. 27- 
48.
Fikret Adanır. ‘The Socio-political Enviromnent of Balkan Nationalism: the Case of Ottoman 
Macedonia 1856-1912’, in Regional and National Identities in Europe in the XIXth and XXth 
Centuries, ed. by Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Michael G. Müller and Stuart Woolf (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1998), pp. 221-254.
Macedonia. He comments on certain historical biases concerning Ottoman rule, 
which are:
Ottoman rule was a ‘dark age’ of Islamic domination over Christianity; 
secondly, that this isolated the Balkan countries from the general course 
of development of European civilization; thirdly, that Ottoman rule 
represented a backward feudal system of socio-economic and political 
exploitation, which intensified under conditions of Ottoman decline 
from the eighteenth century onwards'^.
Then, an analysis of developments in Macedonia is presented and some definite 
characteristics of the national question there are discussed.
Another Turkish secondary source is Giil Tokay’s Makedonya Sonmu^^. In 
this book, which is published in 1995, Tokay deals with the Macedonian Question 
and the Young Turk movement, and examines the Macedonian issue as a cause of 
the Young Turk movement. According to her, the developments in Macedonia in the 
period of 1903 -  1908 shows three characteristics: firstly, European powers 
interfered in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire behind the façade of 
pressuring for ‘reforms’; secondly, those ‘reforms’ accelerated the local struggles, 
battles in the field; and thirdly, the events in Macedonia, in the three vilayets, 
induced the formation of a Muslim opposition, which would culminate in the Young 
Turk revolution of 1908. While, recounting general points of the Macedonian 
question, she also gives details concerning the Ottoman security establishment 
structures in Macedonia, such as the third Army and Gendarmerie. Apart from 
examining a wide range of secondary literature, Tokay also utilised Austro- 
Hungarian, British, and Ottoman archival material. Her work, therefore, is a sound 
analysis of the Macedonian Question, and her contribution to the literature in 
Turkish on the subject is immense.
”  Adanır, The Socio-political Environment’, p. 221.
Gül Tokaj', Makedonya Sorunu. Jön Türk İhtilalinin Kökenleri, {1903 -  1908), Türkiye Üzerine
Araştırmalar: 15 (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996)
A standard reference for any student of the Macedonian question is Douglas 
Dakin’s The Greek Struggle hi Macedonia, 1897 -  1913^^. The Institute for Balkan 
Studies has first published this work in 1966 in Thessalonica. Dakin asserts that the 
Greek movement in Macedonia was based upon Hellenism as ‘a way of life that 
existed in Macedonia among the more substantial Christian population, much of it 
(though not all of it) Greek by race and language and (what is more important) all of 
it fervently orthodox and conservative’^ ®. He continuously refers to the Exarchate as 
‘the Schismatic Church’, and to the adherents of the Exarchate as ‘schismatic’ in his 
book. Hence, on the grounds of tendenciousness. The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 
does not fulfil academic requirements. Therefore, one could easily classify this work 
as a ‘semi-official Greek history’ of Macedonian ‘struggle’, as the productive 
historian Basil Gounaris does in his highly enlightening article on the Greek 
historiography on the ‘struggle for Macedonia’ .
Dakin uses mainly Greek and British sources. However, he does not 
approach his source with an investigating eye and takes them at their face values. He 
does not use any Turkish or Ottoman primary or secondary source at all. 
Nevertheless, it is the most extensive history of the Greek movement in Macedonia, 
and for a reader, who can approach the book with a certain degree of reserve, it is an 
important secondary source in English language.
Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913 (Tliessalonica: Society for 
Macedonian Studies and the Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966; repr. Thessalonica: Museum for the 
Macedonian Struggle, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993).
Dakin, p. 474.
■' Basil C. Gounaris, ‘Reassessing Ninety Years of Greek Historiography on tlie “Struggle for 
Macedonia” (1904-190^)', Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 14.2 (1996), 237-251 (p. 242). In tliis 
article Gounaris puls forth that the large Greek historiography on the ‘Greek struggle for Macedonia’, 
and ils evolution during the 20''' centuiy' is a clear refleclion of the diplomatic aspects of the 
Macedonian Question.
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Another important book I would like to refer to is Nadine Lange-Akhund’s 
The Macedonian Ouestion^^. This book is originally written in French, and 
translated into English and published in 1998. Lange-Akhund’s work covers the 
period of 1893 -  1908. She emphasises the role of Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian 
movements within the Macedonian question. She also examines the establishment of 
reforms in detail, and pays particular attention to the gendarmerie reform. Lange- 
Akhund has used diplomatic archives of France along with Austrian diplomatic 
archives, and she has complemented these primary sources with recent publications 
on the topic from Germany, Austria, Britain, and the US. Although Lange-Akhund 
cannot free herself from the jargon o f ‘Ottoman (or Turkish) yoke’^^  throughout her 
study, she has nevertheless created a firm study on the subject, which is useful for 
the students of the area.
One should never fail to check Duncan Perry’s The Politics o f Teiror' '^ ,^ 
published in 1988. This book is the history of IMRO and its Bulgarian 
correspondent Supreme Macedonian committee, and covers the period of 1893, the 
year when the IMRO was founded in Thessalonica, to 1903, the year of the Ilinden 
uprising. Perry states in the preface that he intends to remain away from any sort of 
bias as regards the Macedonian Question. He sets his goal as ‘to present a balanced 
rendering of the history of the Macedonian movements based on the available 
evidence, without regard to contemporary political or nationalistic considerations’“^  
It might be asserted that he has reached his goal by and large throughout the book.
■■ Nadine Lange-Akhund, The Macedonian Question. 1893 -  1908, From Western Sources, trans. by 
Gabriel Topor (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1998).
The following passage from ihe Encyclopedia of Británica illustrates an e.xample of what I mean 
by saying ’jargon of Ottoman yoke’: ‘ ...The best lands in the plains were distributed among tlte 
Turkish chiefs (after the complete conquest of Macedonia) and a system of feudal tenure was 
de\'eloped. The Christian peasants were either were dri\'en to the less fruitful regions or remained on 
the lands assigned to the Muslim lords, to whom they paid a tithe’, p. 511, volume 14.
“ ' Duncan M. Perr)·, The Politics of Terror, The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 1893 -  1903 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988).
Periy, The Politics of Terror, p. .xiii.
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He has used Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, American and Yugoslavian primary 
sources. Although he has not used any Ottoman primary source, he is not unaware 
of some of Adamr’s and Kemal Karpat’s studies. The Politics o f Terror provides a 
comprehensive history of the Macedonian revolutionary movements during a critical 
period in Balkan affairs.
The main body of this study is intended to have a deductive structure. The 
first chapter deals with the general features of the Macedonian Question. First of all, 
the background of the Macedonian Question is presented, and the developments 
after the Russo-Turkish war of 1878 are briefly recounted. Secondly, some 
information about the land and peoples is given. This part of the first chapter 
contains information on the geographic, administrative, strategic, economic and 
demographic characteristics of Macedonia. The chapter ends with a brief account of 
the actor states of the issue where their intentions are also described. To sum up, this 
chapter tries to present a general picture, and acquaint the reader more deeply with 
the Macedonian Question.
In chapter 2, the actual actors in the field are presented. The rival Macedo- 
Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, and Vlach movements are examined. The emphasis is 
laid upon the Macedo-Bulgarian paramilitary organisations inasmuch as they were 
the earliest actors in the Macedonian scene of terror. The histories of these 
organisations, their intentions, the 1903 Ilinden uprising, the developments after the 
failure of the Ilinden uprising, the divisions and animosities within the Macedo- 
Bulgarian movement, and a social anatomy of this movement are discussed. The 
Greek and Serbian movements are included in the picture for the period after 1903 
since until 1904 the stage was almost completely dominated by the Macedo- 
Bulgarian movement. Particular attention is devoted to the Greeks among these
12
three, as they were the most important opponents of the Macedo-Bulgarian 
organisations.
Chapter 3 constitutes the essence of this dissertation. Here a history of the 
activities of the Macedo-Bulgarian and Greek bands in Fiorina in 1906 is presented. 
Based on primary sources completely, an analysis of the state of affairs in Fiorina in 
1906 is thus constructed. The final section of the chapter includes a summary of 
conclusions drawn after the scrutiny of the particular records of Rumeli 
Inspectorship.
Few words ought to be said briefly on the origins of my interest in this 
subject. There are mainly two reasons. Firstly, I believe the phenomenon of the 
Turkish Republic and its history can be understood more effectively by evaluating 
the Macedonian Question soundly since the founders of the Republic of Turkey 
were originally from among the Young Turks or circles close to them, who had to 
deal with the Macedonian Question either actively or passively. Thus, this work 
might also be seen an endeavour to understand the past and present better so as to 
produce more accurate and fruitful ideas in the future. The second reason is of more 
personal nature. My paternal ancestors are originally from Macedonia. They were 
bom in Kayalar and came to Bursa in the population exchange of 1924 between 
Greece and Turkey. Hence, this study may also be considered as part of my 
endeavour to come to terms with my personal history.
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CHAPTER TWO
MACEDONIAN QUESTION AT THE END OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
I. The Roots of the Macedonian Problem
The Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878), which ended the Russo-Turkish war of 
1877-1878, made Bulgaria fully autonomous within the Ottoman Empire and most 
of Macedonia was given to Bulgaria. Russia had territorial gains in the Caucasus 
and Bessarabia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia were granted independence from 
Ottoman suzerainty. Moreover, all three states gained some territory. Only Bosnia, 
Albania, Epirus, Thessaly, and a small portion of Macedonia and a small piece of 
Thrace remained as Ottoman lands.
However, this treaty created great disturbance amongst other great powers 
since this treaty presented Russia with a secure outpost in the Balkans; and thus, 
equipped him with a significant advantage over his European competitor, Austria-
See Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Sha\ ’^, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. 2 
vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni\'ersity Press, 1977; repr. 1997). II, pp. 187-191; and Enver Ziya 
Karal, Osmanh Tarihi VIII. Cilt, 5th edn (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000). pp. 57-78.
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Hungary in terms of hegemony in the Balkans. Moreover, Russia became more able 
to penetrate to the eastern Mediterranean basin. Furthermore, Greece and Serbia 
were furious about the Greater Bulgaria on their very borders. The fragile peace 
between the Great Powers -France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Russia, 
Germany, Italy- was threatened. It was German Chancellor Count Bismarck who 
was very anxious to preserve European balance of power and took the initiative of 
convening a congress at Berlin.
The Congress concluded on July 13, 1878. The agreement that was reached 
as a result of the Berlin Congress represented a compromise between British, 
Austro-Hungarian, and Russian interests. The independence of Montenegro, 
Romania, and Serbia was reconfirmed. Montenegro received an Adriatic port and a 
small piece of land. Serbia gained some territory but remained landlocked. Romania 
acquired the Dobruca. Greece had the support of the powers to negotiate 
acquisitions from the Ottoman Empire, and it obtained most of Thessaly and part of 
Epirus in a separate treaty signed in 1881. Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and established a garrison in the Sancak of Novi Pazar.^ Great Britain 
occupied Cyprus and France was promised Tunis. In 1881 France put Tunis under 
its military control. The most outstanding of all was that Greater Bulgaria, as it was 
designed by the treaty of San Stefano, was broken into three parts, with autonomous 
Bulgarian Principality extending only from the Danube to the Balkan Mountains and 
remaining under Ottoman suzerainty, with a Christian prince, an army, and Christian 
administrators. The remaining portions of Great Bulgaria were divided into two 
sections. The area south of the Balkan Mountains remained under Sultan’s rule, with 
special regulations, as the province of East Rumelia, which was annexed by
■ Arthur J. Mity ‘The Novibaziir Railway Project’, The Journal ofhiodern History. 10 (1938), 496- 
527 (pp. 498-499).
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Bulgaria in 1885. Macedonia remained under direct Ottoman rule, with Article 23 of 
the treaty, which required major reforms for such Ottoman lands as Macedonia. 
Hence, as result of the Congress of Berlin, the Sultan lost significant amount of 
territory, population and revenue. Austria-Hungary’s occupation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and the Sancak of Novi Pazar obstructed any attempt by Serbia to 
claim the region and any hope of direct access to the Adriatic Sea. Hence, Serbia 
had to direct its attention to the south.
As a result of these developments, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia were sharing 
borders with Macedonia; and, the provisions of Berlin Treaty led to a struggle 
among Balkan countries to establish control over Macedonia instead of bringing 
them together towards a united policy for their common good. It also aggravated the 
time-honoured contest between Austria-Hungary and Russia for influence over the 
Balkan peoples.
Geographical presentation of Macedonia
Harsh mountains, rocky landscape, and wooded areas are mixed together with 
regions of arable land and greenery. Lakes, rivers and brooks, and canyons are 
everywhere. The region is cut across on a generally northwest to southeast axis by 
mountains that extend along both sides of the Vardar River. There were also the 
Struma and Karasu (Mesta) river valleys farther east. The Pelagonian plain lies in 
central Macedonia. Shepherds and their flocks used to wander at certain mountains 
for pastoral purposes in appropriate times of the year, while other mountains were 
stony, rough and steep. In summer Macedonia is hot and dry, in winter it is cold and 
wet.
 ^ See Adanır, Makedonya Soruini, p.2; Perrj'. The Politics of Terror, pp. 12-13; Makedonya'daki 
Osnianli Evrakı, ed. by Orhan Sakin and Uğurhan Demirbaş (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet 
Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 1996). pp. .3-4.
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It has been accepted that Macedonia is roughly the territory that lies between 
the Shar and Osogov Mountains in the north, the Pindus Mountains, the Aliakmon 
River, and the Aegean Sea in the south, the lower Mesta River and the Rhodope 
Mountains in the east, and the Albanian highlands in the west.
Macedonia in administrative terms
Macedonia was more or less divided between the two eyalets or pashaliL· of Rumeli 
(or Manastır) and Selanik, until the early 1860s. The former consisted of the sancaL· 
of Manastır, Görice (Korytsa), and Ohri (Ochrida), the latter consisted of the 
sancaks of Selanik, Serez, Drama, and Tirhala in Thessaly.'* Macedonian territories 
also belonged to the sancaks of Üsküp (Skopje) and Prizren. With the administrative 
reform of 1864, the Manastır eyalet lost the Adriatic districts but the two sancaks of 
Üsküp and Prizren were incorporated into it. In 1867 the eyalet of Manastır was 
attached to Thessalonica as a sancak, but only for few years.^ Due to the 
administrative reform in 1864-67 all eyalets were renamed vilayets and they were 
divided into sancaks, kazas, and nahiyesf and Kosova was also made a vilayet. 
Every vilayet was governed by a vali, who was appointed by the Sultan. He had a 
hierarchy of officials under his command with the mutasarrifs heading the sancaks, 
the kaimmakams supervising the kazas, and the miidiirs supervising the nahiyes 
(groups of several villages)”^. After the Berlin Congress and the incorporation of 
Thessaly into Greece, the boundaries of the three vilayets were fairly established. 
Macedonia encompassed 12 sancaks, divided into 71 kazas, of which 26 belonged to
'' Tirhala was detached from Thessalonica in 1861.
Basil C. Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, 1870-1912 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 
1993). pp. i.\-.\.
Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908’. International Journal of 
Middle Last Studies, 3 (1972), 243-281 (p. 275). See also liber Ortaylı. Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanli 
Mahalli İdareleri (1840-1880) (Anluıra: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000). ’
’ For detailed information on nahiyes see Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde, pp. 99-106.
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the Thessalonica vilayet, 22 to Manastır, and 23 to Kosova.* It should be noted that 
the term Macedonia was not being used by the Ottoman administration. Instead, the 
region was called "vilâyâi-i seläse\ that is, the three provinces.
Strategic Importance of Macedonia
Through Macedonia runs the route, which had become a key trade route by the 
eighteenth century, from central Europe along the Morava to the Vardar River 
Valley and from there to Thessalonica. Also, the Struma Valley runs through 
Macedonia as a secondary north-south connection with the Morava. Via Egnatia, 
which runs from Dürres on the Albanian coast through Thessalonica and across 
Thrace to Constantinople, renders travelling east to west across Macedonia 
relatively easy.
The increasing scale of railway construction after 1869 was another factor 
that contributed to the importance of Macedonia. The railway construction during 
the period 1873-1896 enabled a link between the Thessalonica harbour and the 
interior parts of the country.^ As a result, trade was facilitated, and railways led to 
various economic and social· consequences. The railway construction and schemes 
were subjects of heated debates and negotiations between the Ottoman State, the 
Great Powers, particularly Austria-Hungary and Russia, and the Balkan states 
throughout the period under consideration.
Nadine Lange-Akluind, The AJacedoiiian Question, 1893-1908, From Western Sources, trans, by 
Gabriel Topor (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1998). pp. 13-14.
See Erol Çetin. 1878-1908 arasında Makedonya Sorunu’ (unpublished M. A. thesis, İstanbul 
Uni\'ersity. 1995). pp. 24-29; and, Gotınaris, Steam over Macedonia.
For railways in Macedonia see Arthur J. May, ‘Trans-Balkan Railway Schemes’, The Journal of 
Modern History, 24 (1952). 352-367; and also May. T he Novibazar Railway Project’; Gounaris. 
Steam over Macedonia·, and Basil C. Gounaris, '-Greco-Turkish Railway Connection’, Balkan 
Studies, 30 (1989), 311 -332.
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The extensive Aegean coast, the plains, and most importantly, the harbour at 
Thessalonica, made Macedonia an attractive land. It was a region with economic 
potential, and an essential military value.
Economy
The majority of the population lived in the countryside* ^  Although there were 
regions where sharecropping was relatively widespread, commercial agriculture on 
çifüiks (large estates) played merely a secondary role in the economy. Adanır asserts 
that at the turn of the twentieth century, probably about ten per cent of the peasant 
households still lived as sharecroppers on çifiiiks. ~ The vast majority of 
Macedonian peasants were, therefore, independent small farmers. Their villages, 
generally, were located on the hillsides or in mountain valleys. In many regions “the 
higher the villages were situated, the more numerous and prosperous were their 
inhabitants”.'^ The main taxes, which the Ottoman peasantry had to pay toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, were: 1) the tithe, 10 per cent of the crop yield in
" There were 59 towns. .30 of them being in the Salónica ’^ila '^et, with a population of 598.319 in 
Macedonia in the period of 1888 -  95. See Michael Palairet, The Balkan Economies, c. 1800 -  1914, 
Evolution without Development (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni\'ersib,' Press. 1997), pp. 26-27. 
Palairet's source for this figure is Kmcho\·. According to his source, die population dial was residing 
in towns constituted 26.6 per cent of the total populadon in Macedonia.
'■ Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, pp. 38-42. Adamr summarizes the general descriptions on diese large 
estates in the liistoriography of Balkan countries and west in general as follows: ‘ih e larger 
proportion of the culth-ated land, especialh· the land in fertile plains, liad by about 1830 been 
appropriated by Muslim beys, and die expropriated Christian peasants lived and labored as 
sharecroppers in miserable circumstances on the new çiftlik farms, their lot being comparable to that 
of the serfs of mediaeval Europe; only the inliabilants of mountain villages had managed to remain 
freeholders, apparentl}’ only because their tinj’ fields on mountain slopes were of such poor quality as 
not to have attracted the greed of Ottoman landlords”, in Fikret Adamr, ‘Tlie Macedonian Question: 
The Socio-economic Reality and Problems o f its Historiographic InterpreUition’, International 
Journal o f Turkish Studies, 3 (1984-85), 43-64 (p. 45). One can trace signs of diese perceptions; for 
example, in Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, pp. 15-23; Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle in 
Macedonia, 1897-1913 (7'hessalonica: Society for Macedonian Studies and die Institute for Balkan 
Studies. 1966; repr. Thessalonica: Museum for the Macedonian Struggle, Institute for Balkan 
Studies, 1993). pp. 23-25; Lange-Akhund. pp. 17-19; Traitman Stoianovich, ‘Land Tenure and 
Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800’, The Journal of Economic History, 13 (1953), 
398-411 (pp. 406-407); Traianan Sloianovich, ‘Factors in the Decline of Ottoman Society in die 
Balkans’, Slavic Review, 21 (1962), 623-632 (pp. 628-630). Adanır puls forth counter arguments in 
‘The Macedonian Question’, pp. 44-52.
Adamr, ‘The Macedonian Question’, p. 49.
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kind; 2) a tax for the support of education and public works, 1.5 per cent of the crop 
yield in kind; 3) a sum paid for exemption from military service by non-Muslim 
male subjects, 37 piasters (approximately 0.33 sterling); 4) a tax on small livestock, 
2.5 piasters per animal.’"* As İlkin and Tekeli point out the mode of tax collection 
was the chief cause of complaint'^, especially in the case of tithe, rather than the 
amount of produce due to be delivered. The government was farming out the taxes 
to the miiltezims, usually to the highest bidder. Then these miiltezims were farming 
out their dues to sub-contractors, and these did the same'^*. Perry states that the 
collection agent became the major point of contact with the state for the vast 
majority of peasants . Moreover, the peasants could not begin the harvest without 
the permission of the mültezim. This system was open to malpractices, and it was a 
major source of distress for the population as recounted by Tahsin Uzer through 
related examples in his memoirs.”* John Foster Fraser, a contemporary writer, has 
labelled the way the taxes were collected as ‘pernicious’.'^ Paying off European 
operated railway tariffs also caused additional burdens. Railway investments
20necessitated intensive taxation of farmers’ income.
The production in Macedonia was largely based upon agriculture. The major 
exports of the port of Thessalonica at the end of nineteenth century were cereals 
such as wheat, barley, maize, oats, rye, and millet. Cotton, tobacco, cocoons, opium, 
and poppy seed were the other agricultural exports from the port.^' Products such as
Adanır, ‘The Macedonian QueslioiT. pp. 49-50.
' ’ See İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, ‘İttihat ve Terakki Hareketinin oluşumunda Selanik’in Toplumsal 
Yapısııun Belirleyiciliği’, in Social and Economic Hi.story of Turkey, {1071 -  1920), ed. by Osman 
Okyar and Halil İnalcık (Ankara: Metcksan Limited. 1980). pp. 351-382 (p. 363).
k û .< \ Y ü X , Makedonya Sorunu, pp. 39-40.
'' Perrj', The Politics of Terror, p. 26.
Tahsin Uzer, Makedonya E.'şkiyalık Tarihi ve Son Osmanlı Yönetimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Yayınları. 1979).
John Foster Fraser. Pictures from the Balkans (London: Cassell, 1912). pp. 156-158.
Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, pp. 74-130.
Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, pp. 87-134; Adaiur. Makedonya Sorunu, pp. 42-44..
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sugar, coffee, beer, petroleum, domestic wares, furniture, bed-steads, glassware and 
clothes were the major import items.^^
Industrialisation could be observed on a very modest scale in relatively 
developed centres such as Selanik, Kavala, Gevgili or Vodina. There were some 
modern flourmills; breweries, textile manufacturers and ship repair yards, and these 
were owned by Jewish entrepreneurs. Tobacco pressing plants were controlled by 
foreign capital.
There was also the phenomenon of migration. Periodic migration of labour 
was a traditional practice in the highlands of Macedonia and Albania.^"* Migrant 
workers, tens of thousands of them, mostly from Western Macedonia, left every 
year for Istanbul, Asia Minor, Egypt and the neighbouring Balkan countries, and 
returned to their villages in late autumn. Between 1880 and 1900 200,000 migrants 
went to Bulgaria; in 1889-90 the annual rate of emigration from the vilayet of 
Manastır was 30,000.^^ These migration cycles also created first seasonal and 
eventually permanent urbanisation. Local peasant urbanisation was more significant 
than emigration within or outside the Ottoman Empire. The Christian proportion of 
the urban population rose notably in towns like İştip, Köprülü (Veles), Üsküb, and 
Kumanovo, throughout the nineteenth century. Emigration abroad, outside the 
Balkans, primarily to North America, played a role as well. Between 1902-1906 
about 25000 persons emigrated overseas, which constituted 10 per cent of the male 
labour force.^ *" The peasants escaped bankruptcy and a new class of returned
■■ Basil C. Gounaris, ‘From Peasants into Urbanities, from Village into Nation: Ottoman Monastir in 
the Early Tvventietli Century’, European History Quarterly, 31 (2001), 43-63 (p. 47).
■^Fikret Adanir, ‘The National Question and tlie Genesis and Development of Socialism in tlie 
Ottoimm Empire: the Case of Ottoman Macedonia’, in Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman 
Empire, ed. by Mete Tuu9ay and Eric Jan Zürcher (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 27- 
48 (p, 30). See also Palairet, pp. 346-356.
Gounaris, ‘From Peasimts into Urbanities’, p. 46.
Steam over Macedonia, p. 263.
Adamr, Makedonya Sorunu, p. 44.26
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emigrants emerged with enough cash to buy lands and start businesses in towns. 
Remittances kept the market going well. 'I'hey also acquired a wider political 
outlook abroad. Hence they were important agents of change in Macedonian 
society.^^
Because of widespread labour intensive production, and constant emigration, 
there was a labour shortage in Macedonia. Real wages tended to increase after 1900. 
Wages started to rise in about 1905-6 particularly'*^. This also resulted in labour 
immigration, as well. For instance, in the 1890s, up to 30 per cent of the labour force 
working in the railway construction was from Italy, chiefly from central and 
southern Italy, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and even Russia. Yet, it is 
controversial whether the presence of foreign labour was the cause of emigration of
29natives or vice versa.
Economy in general was not promising at the turn of the century. The 
downward tendency in prices that appeared in the 1880s turned upwards starting 
from 1894 in the Ottoman Empire on the whole. It has been argued that this 
situation contributed to the economic backdrop for the Young Turk revolution of 
1908.·*° In Macedonia, there occurred from 1897 to 1910, except for 1904, a series 
of low harvests; and commercialisation of crops was not so successful. Moreover,
Fikrcl Adamr, ‘The Macedonians in the Ollonian Empire, 1878-1912’, in The Fomation of 
National Elites, ed. by Andreas Kappeler and Fikret Adanır and Alan O’Day (Darmoulh; New York 
University Press, 1992), pp. 161-191 (p.l65).
Palairel, p. 353. Issawi provides some dala (hat suggests ihc same. Sec Charles Issawi, ‘Wages in 
Turkey, 1850-1914’, in Social ami Economic History of Turkey, (1071 -  1920), cd. by Osman Okyar 
and Halil İnalcık (Ankara; Mclcksan Limiled, 1980), pp. 263-270.
■'* Sec Gounaris, Steam over Macedonia, pp. 261-269; Adanır, ‘The Nalional Question’.
See Carter Vaughn Findley, ‘Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman 
Empire’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 28 (1986), 81-106; and Donald Quataert, ‘The 
Economic Climate of the “Young Turk Revolution’’ in 1908’, The Journal of Modern History, 51 
(1979), D1147-D1161.
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1902 earthquake was a serious blow and the turmoil of 1903 Ilinden uprising was of
no positive use at all. 31
The Churches
The conflict between the two churches, that is, the Patriarchate and the Exarchate, 
lies in the background of the Macedonian question. In the Balkans, the Serbian 
Patriarchate of İpek (Pec) and the Bulgarian archdiocese of Ohri (Ohrid) existed 
until 1766 and 1767 respectively. But, from then on until 1870, nearly all Balkan 
Christians, including Bulgarians, Greeks, the Slavs of Macedonia, Vlachs, and the 
majority of Christian Albanians, were under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the 
Greek patriarch in Constantinople. Throughout the 19 ’^ century, during the Tanzimat 
period, the influence of the lay element had increased in church and school affairs. 
Moreover, since the end of 18^ '' century, there had been a recognisable increase in 
the number of Bulgarian tradesmen, which meant the formation of a Bulgarian 
middle class with a hunger for national consciousness . The separatist Bulgarian 
and Romanian clergies, together with a newly formed Bulgarian bourgeoisie, 
accelerated the anti-patriarchate development, which was, by definition, against old
'I  O
structures that favoured the hellénisation of the population ’, as Greek was used in 
both schools and churches. The population, or at least some of the population, 
demanded that Bulgarian should replace Greek. The conflict over this issue led to a 
confrontation with the Greek Orthodox patriarchate. As Elisabeth Barker asserts, 
Russia, who had seen Bulgaria as the best channel for expansion of its influence in 
the South-eastern Europe, was also putting pressure upon Istanbul to allow the
' ‘ Gounaris. 'From Peasants into Urbanities’, p.46; and Findley. ‘Economic Bases of Revolution’.
See Tekeli and İlldn. pp. 356-366.
For hellénisation policies of the Patriarchate and a brief account of the rise of Bulgarian 
nationalisms see Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve 
Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi, 1943; repr. İstanbul: Eren, 1992), pp. 17-24.
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formation of a separate Bulgarian church, with extending its authority over 
Macedonia.
In 1860, Bulgarians de facto separated themsdves from the Greek 
community. In 1870, the Sublime Porte acknowledged the already existing situation. 
As a result, in 1870, a ferman was issued establishing the Bulgarian exarchate, an 
autonomous Orthodox church under the Greek patriarch's jurisdiction, and so 
ending the Greek monopoly in matters of faith. The sultan’s decree provided that the 
new church would have spiritual jurisdiction over most of Bulgaria and districts as 
far west as Veles in Macedonia and Niş and Pirot. Accorcfing to article 10 of the 
ferman the residents of the areas that were not specifically mentioned and remained 
under the Greek patriarch’s direct control, were given the right to choose the 
Exarchate if two-thirds of the population of a particular region voted for the 
incorporation. Between 1872 and 1875 plebiscites were held, and consequently, 
most Slavic districts voted to adhere to the new church. Thus, at the beginning of the 
1890s the influence of the Patriarchate had declined in favour of the Exarchate. 
Moreover, the Greek Patriarchate had lost a great deal of revenue to the Exarchate^^
The Greeks viewed the Exarchate as a political creation. For them, the goal 
of the Exarchate was to replace the patriarchate in the Ottoman European provinces, 
and to block the expansion of Greece into Macedonia and Eastern Thrace.
By the turn of the twentieth century there were 1,854 churches in the fifteen 
dioceses of Macedonia, 1,232 of which were Exarchist^*’. The remainder were 
chiefly patriarchist. The rivalry between churches for devotees in Macedonia was a
Elisabeth Barker. Alaceclonia, Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1950). pp. 7-15.
İnalcık sa>'S that all the important sees in Bulgaria were held b>' the Greek clergy. He claims, ‘this 
clergy, who obtained those positions b>’ bribeiy, did tliink nothing but to squeeze out from the 
community’, İnalcık, Tanzimat, p. 19.
Peny, The Politics ofTerror, p. 17.
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reflection of national competitions for the possession of Macedonia itself The 
rivalries rendered collective action for a common cause against the Porte impossible, 
and kept Macedonia on a ‘downward spiral of violence’.
The population
Ottoman Macedonia had a mixed population where different ethnic groups and 
religions co-existed. It was an agricultural region, with more than 80 percent of its 
population consisting of peasants. Ottoman statistics indicate that there were 
2,505,503 people living in the Macedonian provinces by 1895, and the figure by 
1904 is 2,911,700. The Ottomans divided the subject people according to 
confession, and all Christians were classified by the authorities as ‘Greeks’ until 
1870, no matter what their native language or ethnic background was. This approach 
was the result of the miUei system.
Greeks inhabited major trading centres in Macedonia, also the Thracian 
coast, and in Southern Macedonia as far north as Monastir.
Vlachs (also identified as ‘Kutsovlachs’ and ‘Aromun’) lived mostly in the 
Pindus area and in trading centres such as Manastır, Krushevo, Görice, Moskopole, 
and Vodina (Edessa). Many were nomadic shepherds. Some others were sedentary 
farmers and merchants and craftsmen. Vlachs had been linguistically and
Pern*', The politics o f Terror, p. 17.
In tJie Olloman Empire the population was divided into autonomous communities, tliat is tlie 
millets, under their respective religious leaders. The scope o f the millet included all individuals 
confessing a certain faitli wlierever they were, regardless of territoiy. Hence, a person n'as subject to 
the jurisdiction of his own religious community in civil matters, not considering locality. Millets 
enjoyed other important pri^'ilcges. One of them w'as their jurisdiction in school matters. See 
Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, The Functioning of a Plural Society, ed. by Benjamin 
Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1982); and Kemal Karpat, 
Inquiry Into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State : From Social Estates to 
Classes, From Millets to Notions, Research Monograph No. 39 (USA: Center of International 
Studies, Princeton University, 1973). pp. 31-40; Adanır. Makedonya Sorunu, pp. 4.3-53; and Kemal 
H. Karpal. The Social and Political Foundations of Nationalism in Soutli East Europe after 1878: A 
Reinterpretation’, in Der Berliner Kongress von ¡878, Die Politik der Grossmachte und die 
Probleme der Modernisierung in Südosteuropa in der Zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhundrets 
(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1982), pp. 385410 (p. 389).
25
historically tied to Romanians. Yet, some Vlachs were Hellenised and often were 
impossible to differentiate from Greeks linguistically or otherwise.^^ For instance, in 
1905 the British Consul in Monastir claimed that, albeit in approximately 70 per 
cent of the houses the spoken language was Vlach, most of them had received ‘their 
instruction entirely in the Greek language and have come to regard themselves 
almost as belonging to that nationality’.'*“ Still, at the turn of the century, a separate 
Vlach movement, which was backed by Roumania, was increasingly becoming 
active and made the Greeks utterly furious. And, Vlachs were closer to the Ottoman 
government as the Bulgarians, Serbians, and Greeks refused to recognise the Vlachs 
as a different ethnic group and endeavoured constantly to assimilate them."*'
Jews inhabited the urban areas, primarily Thessalonica. As many as 80,000 
lived in there during the period under consideration, and they were the dominant 
community in Thessalonica. In addition to Thessalonica, they were also located in 
Monastir, Üsküp (Skopje), i§tip, Kesriye (Kastoria), and a few other towns.
Gypsies were a small minority in Macedonia. They lived mostly on the 
outskirts of the cities and towns. They did not have any political aspirations.
Christian Slavs of Orthodox confession lived in most parts of the 
Macedonian provinces, generally in completely Slavic, but sometimes in mixed 
ethnic and religious communities. They were by and large illiterate peasants. 
Beginning with the late eighteenth century Slav peasants began to move to cities. 
The national identity of these people has been the subject of a heated debate. Studies 
using linguistic, cultural, historical, and religious criteria yield different results, with
39 Goiinaris, 'From Peasiints into Urbanities’, pp. 44-50. 
ibid., p. 45.
Kcinal H. Karpat, ‘The Memoirs of N. Batziiria: The Young Turks and Nationalism’, International 
Journal o f Middle East Studies, 21G-199 (pp. 287-288).
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each conclusion being motivated by the prejudices and preferences of the 
individuals, who conducted the research.
Muslims also had a large population. Shaw suggests that they formed the 
largest single millei in Macedonia"* .^ The two main groups were Turks and 
Albanians. Although there were Christian Albanians, it is generally accepted that 
two-thirds of the Albanians were Muslims. They were mostly residing in western 
Macedonia, particularly in Kosova vilayet. In essence, the Muslim population was 
generally not against the Ottoman administration. Still, as Somel notes, ban over 
instruction in Albanian, the increasing political tensions in the western Balkans and 
the inability of the Ottoman state to counter interventions of the Great Powers led to 
its loss of control over the Albanian population"* .^ There were also concentrated 
Muslim communities in the cities in western Macedonia, and both in towns and rural 
areas of Salónica, Kozani, Kayalar, Drama, Seres, and Kavalla"*"*. Furthermore, 
Brailsford states that the region between Drama and the Bulgarian border was purely 
Muslim"*'*'. There were also a lot of refugees from lands to the north.
Statistics are over and over again used to put forth the predominance of one 
group over another in Macedonia. The statistics available on the numerical strength 
of the individual ethnic groups in Macedonia are of no reliability. Most figures are
Shaw and Shaw, p. 209.
Selçuk Akşın Soinel. The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908, 
Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline. The Otloman Empire and ils Heritage: 22 (Leiden: Brill, 
2001), pp. 214-215.
According to Brailsford the Muslims of Kayalar, Serez and Drama were ‘genuine Osmanli Turks’. 
For him the rest of the Muslims elsewhere were either Albanians or Slavs, ‘converted by force or 
allured by self- interest to Islam’. He adds that tliese are generally known as ‘Pomacks’, and Üıey 
formed a solid population in the ‘purely Muslim belt’ between Drama and Uie Bulgiman border. 
Brailsford, 87-88. The Muslims in Salónica. Kozani, Kayalar, Drama, Seres and Kavala were sent to 
Turkey in 1924 e.xchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. See Raoul Blanchard, ‘The 
Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey’, Geographical Review, 15 (1925), 449-456 (p. 
449).
Somel notes that in three reports compiled in 1886 and submitted to the Sublime Porte, Mustafa 
Radovişi observ'es the existence of Bulgarian-, Vlach-, and Greek-speaking Muslim village 
communities in the kazas and nahiyes of Tikveş. Gevgili, Yenice-i Vardar, Vodina, Nevrekob, 
Kesendire and Razhk. Somel, pp. 216-217. For Mustafa Radovişi see Fazlı Necib, Rumeli'yi Neden 
Kaybettik. Hayal Tarih Mecmuası İlavesi, ([n.p.]: Hayal Tarih, 1972), pp. 25-31.
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based upon the estimates of politically motivated parties who used them as “an 
exercise in numerical manipulation for political ends”.'**' For example, as Perry 
notes, the research of J. Larmeroux clearly demonstrated this situation, in which the 
researcher systematically collected available statistics on the ethnic categorisation 
and national identity of the Macedonian population. He has found out that the 
Bulgarians of Macedonia were said to number anywhere between 120,000 and 
1,200,000; Serbs ranged from 210,000 to 900,000; Greeks were estimated at 
between 50,000 and 1,000,000; and Vlachs numbered between 24,000 and 
1,200,000'* .^ Another researcher has reveals that Turks were numbered between 
none to 550,000 according to western and Balkan statistics."*  ^ These researches 
demonstrate that statistics are of little objective worth in attempting to grasp the 
question of numbers and national identity of any group lived in Macedonia before 
World War 1.
Nevertheless, it may still be useful to present some statistics here to give 
some idea to the reader:
Table 1: The official statistics^’, 1906-7®®
Vilayet Muslini Greek Bulgarian Vlach Jewish Others Total
Selanik 419,604 263,881 155,710 20,486 52,395 9,283 921,359
Manastır^* 204,587 203,976 185,566 2,356 4,583 1,315 602,383
Perr}’, The politics of Terror, p. 19. See also Juslin McCarlliy, ‘Greek Statistics on Ottoman Greek 
Population’. International Journal o f Turkish Studies, 2 (1980), 66-76.
■’ Pcriy. The Politics of Terror.^. 19.
Allan Deliorman. ‘Birinci Cihan Savaşı’mn sonuna kadin Miikedonya’da Türk Nüfusu Meselesi’, 
Türk Kültürü, 33 (1965). 589-593.
Peny asserts that the Ottoman statistics are the most credible. Perr3\  The Politics of Terror, p. 17.
Kemal H. Karpal Ottoman Population, 1830 -  1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics 
([Wisconsin]: The University of Wisconsin Press. 1985). pp. 166-169. McCardiy stales tliat 
generally, Ottoman population numbers were recorded 20% lo\\' on the average due to undercounting 
of women and children, see McCarthy, p. 66.
Only the data pertaining to the prefecture of Üsküb have been considered.
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Kosova^^ 113,603 8,604 144,545 1,198 778 268,728
Total 737,794 476,461 485,821 22,842 58,176 11,376 1,792,470
Table 2: Kinchov®^’s figures',54
Ei/mic
Grottp
Christians Muslims Jews Total ln %
Bulgarians 1,032,533 148,803 1,181,336 52.31
Turks 4,240 494,964 499,204 22.11
Greeks 214,329 14,373 228,702 10.13
Albanians 9,510 119,201 128,711 5.70
Vlachs 77,267 3,500 80,767 3.58
Jews 67,840 67,840 3.00
Gypsies 19,500 35,057 54,557 2.42
Others 13,570 3,337 16,907 0.75
Total 1,370,949 819,235 67,840 2,258,024 100.00
And finally, the figures of 1905, ■which were the result of the count that was 
undertaken under the supervision of Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa^^, who was the Inspector- 
General at the date, should also be mentioned here, as Hilmi Paşa’s figures were
Exclusive of tlic districls of Gorce and Elbasan, which are situated in Albania.
Vasil Kinchov is the author of \\vi Makedonija. Etnografla i stat istika, Sofia, 1900. Adanır labels 
Bulgarian etluiographer’s figures as a scientific work that can correct false figures for the Turkish­
speaking portion of the population. He also states that Kinchov’s work was well appreciated by the 
Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, “which generally had the best information on Balkans”. Adamr, 
Makedonya Sorunu, p. 7. Palairet also uses Kmchov’s work.
Adanır,‘The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire’, p. 164.
Turgut İşıksak ‘Makedonya üzerinde oynanan oyunlar ve bilimneycn bir nüfus sayımı’. Belgelerle 
Türk Tarihi Dergisi. 43 (1971), 13-19.
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generally held reliable by the foreign diplomats.^'" Beydilli affirms that this counting 
was undertaken by special commissions, which consisted not only of Ottoman 
officials but also of persons chosen by local communities.^^ The result was that there 
were 2,911,700 souls living in Macedonia. The number of Muslims and non- 
Muslims was relatively equal with 1,508,507 Muslims, 896,497 Bulgarians, 307,000 
Greeks, 100,717 Serbians, and 99,000 Vlachs.^^
Many Slavs that were living along the border with Bulgaria tended to 
identify themselves as Bulgarians, and some of them, who were living alongside the 
Greek frontier considered themselves to be Greek. For majority, this was a religious 
affiliation, not an ethnic identity. It is by and large accepted that the Slavs of 
Macedonia did not use the term ‘Macedonian’ in an ethnic sense. Foreign diplomats, 
travellers, and scholars who visited or lived in Macedonia at the turn of the century 
labelled the Slav inhabitants of Macedonia as Bulgarian. Writers and journalists 
such as A. H. Smith, M. E. Durham, J. F. Fraser,^^ the Austrian vice consul to 
Manastır, August Kral,*’'^  as well as the compositors of the Carnegie Report,'’' took 
this position. In sum, it is rather difficult to speak about a separate Macedonia 
nationality for the period under consideration, and it can be concluded that the 
Macedonian Slavs, who wanted to assume some nationality, referred to themselves 
as Bulgarian at the given time period.
Aiistro-Ihmgarian Documents Relating to the Macedonian Struggle, 1896-1912, ed. by F. R. 
Bridge (Thcssalonica: Inslitule for Balkan Studies, 1976), p. 29.
Kemal Bej'dilli. 'll. Abdiilhaiiiil Devrinde Makedonya Mes’elesine Dair’. Osmanli Araştırmaları. 
9 (1989), 77-99 (p. 79-80).
Yusuf Hikmet Banir, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 4lh edn. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlan, 1991). 
p. 164.
Alrhur D. Howden Smilh. Fighting the Turk in the Balkans (New York and London: The 
Knickerbocker Press, 1908); M. Edilh Durliam, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle (London: Allen & 
Unnin, 1920); William LeQueux. Pictures from the Balkans, An ohser\>er in the Near East (London: 
Unwin, 1907)
Macedonia, Documents and Material, ed. by Voin Bozhinov and L. Panayatov (Sofia: Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences, 1978), pp. 505-507. 
ibid. pp. 658-659.
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One could support the arguments that the Slavs of Macedonia were 
Bulgarian, Serbian, a separate nationality, or perhaps Greek, using one or more of 
linguistic, cultural, historical, or religious criterion. There were Muslim Slavs for 
instance, who were taking side by the Muslims naturally. It is not easy to decide 
whether the peasants of Grebene to whom Bekir Fikri made a speech in the eve of 
the 1908 revolution, were Muslim Greeks or Greek speaking Muslims^^. In 
actuality, linguistic, cultural, historical, or religious factors had only superficial 
value in establishing nationality. The actual resolution was based on different 
considerations. The feelings of most of the peasant Slav population of Macedonia 
and their identity were determined by local, regional, socio-economic, and religious 
dynamics. They did not see themselves generally as a part of a distinct nationality. 
Their self-image was formed by what they were not -  not Muslim, not wealthy, not 
members of the ruling castes. The following incident narrated by Brailsford 
demonstrates this situation. Brailsford questioned some boys from a remote 
mountain village near Ohri:*^ ^
1 took them to the ruins of the Bulgarian Tsar’s fortress which 
dominates the lake and the plain from the summit of an abrupt and 
curiously rounded hill. “Who built this place?” I asked them. The 
answer was significant-“The free men.” “And who were they?” “Our 
grandfathers.” “Yes, but were they Serbs or Bulgarians or Greeks or 
Turks?” “They weren’t Turks, they were Christians.” And this seemed 
to be about the measure of their knowledge.
Survival and protection of one’s own land and family were the major 
concerns of the peasant masses at the turn of the century Macedonia. As Mazower 
states, it was often considerations of education, personal advancement, economic
Bekir Fikri spoke in Greek in his speech. See Bekir Fikri, Balkanlarda Tedhiş ve Guerilla, 
Grehene (Istanbul: Beige Yayınlan, 1976), p. 21.
H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia. Its Races and their Future (London: Methuen, 1906; repr. New 
York: Arno Press & New York Times, 1971), pp. 99-100.
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advantage that led individuals to move in a particular direction.*"'* Brailsford again 
presents an example:*"^
I was talking to a wealthy peasant who came in from a neighbouring 
village to Monastir market. He spoke Greek well, but hardly like a 
native. “Is your village Greek,” I asked him, “or Bulgarian?” “Well,” he 
replied “it is Bulgarian now, but four years ago it was Greek.” The 
answer seemed to him entirely natural and commonplace. “How” I 
asked in some bewilderment, “did that miracle come about?” “Why,” 
said he “we are all poor men, but we want to have our own school and a 
priest who will look after us properly. We used to have a Greek teacher.
We paid him 5 pounds a year and his bread, while the Greek consul paid 
him another 5 pounds; but we had no priest of our own. We shared a 
priest with several other villages, but he was very unpunctual and 
remiss. We went to the Greek bishop to complain, but he refused to do 
anything for us. The Bulgarians heard of this and they came and made 
us an offer. They said they would give us a priest who would live in the 
village and a teacher to whom we need pay nothing. Well, sir, ours is a 
poor village, and so of course we became Bulgarians.
As it is observed in this instance, national consciousness in general was outside the
peasantry’s interest and wholly irrelevant in its impact on the business of the day
that was survival. Moreover, the Balkan peasantry outside Macedonia was not zealot
irredentists at all as the urban strata of the Balkan countries. Its political parties most
often wrangled with the officer corps, which was the group most strongly associated
with irredentism 66
Education
Until the establishment of the exarchate, the Greek Orthodox Church had a 
monopoly over the education of Christians in the European provinces. After the 
exarchate was founded, there was a considerable increase in the number of 
Bulgarian schools. The education of most Christian Slavs was placed under
Mark Mazower. 'Inlrocluclion lo the Study of Macedonia’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 14.2 
(1996), 229-235 (p. 233).
BrJiMord, Macedonia, p. 102.
See Victor Roudoniclof, ‘The Social Origins of Balkan Politics: Nationalism, Underdevelopment, 
and the Nation-State in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 1880-1920’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 11 
(2000), 144-163.
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Bulgarian Church. This was a very significant development in terms of the spread of 
Bulgarian national consciousness, since, as Durham states, ‘when you have an 
ignorant peasantry to deal with, a National Church is one of the best means for 
producing acute nationalism’.E d u ca tio n  was the most important weapon for the 
protagonists to produce zealots for their respective claims. The exarchate was an 
engine of propaganda for Bulgarians as the Patriarchate had been for the Greeks. 
The Bulgarian schools increased from 150 in 1885 to more than 400 in 1894. This 
educational work cost the Bulgarian government between one and two million 
francs annually.*’* Moreover, the Serbs also demanded religious and educational 
autonomy, and they were granted the right to open schools in 1896, which were to 
be non-religious establishments. Around 1900, different schools were producing 
Bulgarians, Greeks or Serbs. The prelates were divided between faith and national 
aspirations of the states on which they depended financially to some extent.
A number of Patriarchist teachers in Macedonia became Exarchist and others 
that came to the region from Bulgaria were already Exarchists. Big sums of money 
for these schools and for student stipends were sent from Bulgaria into Macedonia. 
According to exarchist figures there were 781 exarchist schools, 1,221 teachers, and 
39,973 students in 1900. Greek sources indicate that there were 613 Greek schools, 
951 teachers and 32,476 students by the early 1900s. Their greatest successes were 
in the south of Macedonia, around Fiorina and Vodina. According to their own 
figures, there were 260 Serbian schools in Macedonia by 1900, while the Romanians 
had only around 30.^^
Through religion and education, the Christians of Macedonia were to acquire 
a national identity depending upon one’s religious affiliation and the school a child
Durliain, Tweriiy Yeans, p. 94.
William L. Langer. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890 -1902 (New York: Knopf. 1968), p. 305. 
Perr>', The politics o f Terror, p. 27; Lange-Akhund, The Macedonian Question, p. 33.
attended. Once large numbers of people adopted an identity coincident with one 
church, then the state with which the church was affiliated would seek to save its 
portion of Macedonian lands for its people. And the schools themselves were 
breeding grounds of national programmes.
II. Actors in the International Arena
As narrated earlier, Macedonian Question as a diplomatic issue was a product of the 
balances in the international relations scene. It was not a problem that could be 
explained and understood solely by the internal dynamics of Macedonia and the 
Ottoman Empire. In order to grab the essence of the problem few words should be 
said on Great Powers and the Balkan States. Their attitude towards the Ottoman 
Empire and the Macedonian Question was affected by their interrelations, rivalries 
and alliances amongst them, and domestic political developments, particularly in the 
case of the Balkan States. The developments in the international relations scene 
directly affected the approach and the ways of operating of the central 
administration in Istanbul, which was headed effectively by Abdülhamit II. 
Accordingly, one ought to have some awareness of international relations of the 
period in consideration, as well as knowledge of internal dynamics of Macedonia, so 
as to comprehend and appreciate fully the fundamental nature of the Macedonian 
Question.
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70The Great Powers and the Macedonian Question 
The European powers had pursued two controversial policies with regard to the 
Ottoman Empire. The first policy was of interventionist nature. This policy had 
accelerated the disintegration and collapse of the empire, by supporting the national 
movements in order to encourage the creation of states. The other policy contributed 
to the maintenance of the sultan’s sovereignty over the integrity of its territories, 
hoping to exercise a major influence there and defend their economic and political 
interests^', and avoiding a full-scale war by preserving the Ottoman Empire’s 
territorial integrity. This had to be maintained so as to guarantee order and peace. 
By the end of the nineteenth century the Empire was one of the most important 
pillars of European stability as the Powers competed to spread their influences and 
controls in the Balkans. The intervention of the Powers in Macedonia was felt in 
two ways: firstly, they attempted to advance their economic interests, particularly on 
the subject of railways and mining, then again, they were worried about the fate of 
the Christians, whom they saw as ‘victims’ of the Ottoman administration, suffering 
Christians under ‘Turkish yoke’.
Six powers, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and 
Russia, had the right to intervene in Macedonian affairs to oversee the application of 
the reforms to make better the lives of the Christian populations, mentioned by 
article 23 of the Berlin Congress, which was held in 1878. Austria-Hungary and
For a general picture see The Great Powers and the End o f the Ottoman Empire, ed. by Marian 
Kent (London: Cass, 1996); Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism', M. S. Anderson, The Eastern 
Question, 1774 -  1923. A Study in International Relations (London: Macmillan, New York: St. 
Marlin’s Press, 1966); Barbara Jelavich, The Ilahsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814-1918 
(Chicago: McNalh'. 1969); Barker. Macedonia', Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements. 
/6'f^6-y977 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
'' Anderson stales that no major European stale depended on the Ottoman Empire for more tlian a 
marginal contribution to its national wealth. Still, international competition for railway and other 
concessions, for trade with the empire and investment opportunities there influenced the nations 
im oh ed 'quite disproportionate to the real value of what was at slake’, Anderson, p. 263.
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Russia were directly interested in vilayai-i selase, while each had opposite 
objectives.
The Austrians obtained the right to administer the two Ottoman provinces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the right to maintain a garrison in the saiicak of Novi- 
Pazar in 1878. Since then, Austria-Hungary was a major operator in the Balkan 
Peninsula. Vienna was aspiring to have a maritime outlet in the Mediterranean and 
to control the Morava and Vardar valleys to reach the Thessaloniki port. 
Furthermore, it had supported the Serbians since 1878 in their attempt to expand 
toward Macedonia^^, as it feared of the programs that called for the unification of all 
of the South Slavs. Austria-Hungary did not have conquest objectives for 
Macedonia since it already had a multinational empire in which Slavs were a 
notable minority.’'^  It followed a policy of gentle diffusion by means of 
strengthening its commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire. Austrians also 
feared that Albanians might get under Italian influence.^'' Hence, it supported the 
demands of Albanians as well, as the official protector of the Catholics.
Russia had endeavoured to establish its dominance on the Balkan Peninsula 
by supporting the claims of the Slav states against the Ottoman Empire. The Tsar 
had proclaimed himself as the natural protector of all Slavs, and had the ambition to 
control the eastern Mediterranean. Russia had pursued a policy of founding vassal 
states on the road of the straits. However, its policies failed above all in the
Langer. p. .306.
There were Germans, Ilalians. Czechs. Croats and Serbs. Slovenes. Romanians. Hungarians 
(Magyars). Slovaks. Ruthenians. and Poles in Austria-Himgaiy·. For the national problem in Austria 
see Barbara Jela\'ich, Hiaiory of the Balkans, 2 vols. (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. 
1984). II. pp. 51-79.
Nura>’ Bozbora. Osmanli Yöneliminde Arnavutluk ve Arnavut Ulusçuluğunun Geliçinii dİstanbul]: 
Boyut Yayın Grubu, 1997). p. 238.
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Bulgarian Principality. Moreover, Russia was extremely antagonistic to the idea of 
an autonomous Macedonia.
Austria-Hungary was at odds with the Russian policy of expansion in the 
Balkans, Macedonia in particular. But, the desire of both states to maintain the status 
quo led them to act in accord, beginning in 1897, so as to prevent any unpleasant 
incident that could jeopardise European stability. In addition, Russia was already 
entangled in the Far East. In April 1897, the rulers of these countries agreed on 
some principals of a common policy in the Balkans. These principals were briefly 
maintaining the status quo as long as possible, not interfering in the affairs of the 
Balkan states, cooperating on diplomatic levels to evade intrigues against each 
other, and acting in concert in a case of an unavoidable change. With this 
understanding, the Russian government was free to focus its attention on the Far 
East. It considered this pacifist attitude as an insurance of peace, and Austria- 
Hungary was quite satisfied with the agreement as by that it could act more 
unreservedly. As a result, two powers acted in harmony to solve all the crises in the 
three vilayets between 1897 and 1908.
Germany, on the other hand, was defending openly the territorial integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire’ ’^. Throughout the period 1890-1900, the Ottoman Empire was 
a necessary outlet for the commercial products of the Reich, and a space for 
economic expansion. Germans were helping in the modernisation of the Ottoman 
Empire. Wilhelm von der Goltz supervised the German military mission to Turkey 
between 1893 and 1896. He advocated a strategy that emphasised the role of the
75
' For Russian influence in the inlenial affairs of Serbia and Bulgaria in tlie period 1879-1886 sec 
Charles Jela\'ich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism (Westport, Comiecticut: Greenwood Press, 
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ground forces rather than the navy/^ The presence of German troops contributed to 
the Turkish victory against Greeks in 1897. Important financial concessions were 
granted to German firms in exchange, such as the Baghdad railway line. In 1881, 
German holdings amounted to 5 per cent of the Ottoman public debt, whereas they 
accounted for 20 per cent of it in 1914.’  ^Apart from its economic activity, Germany 
supported Austrian policies in the Balkans in general, where its action was compact 
except for the Thessalonica-Manastir railway line. The Germans did not take any 
great initiative in the Balkans. Instead, they endorsed all initiatives that were carried 
out by Austrians in agreement with the Russians. And, “through very astute 
diplomatic manoeuvring” in Macedonian question particularly, Germany obtained 
a very strong position in Istanbul. Ortaylı states that one of the reasons for 
Germany’s increasing prestige among the Ottomans was its policies, which were 
smoother and less pressurising than those of the other powers on the issues of 
reforms^°.
French policies in Macedonia could be explained as defending and 
increasing its economic interests^*, and preserving its traditional cultural ties. In 
addition, there was a strategic interest in the geographic position of the Balkan 
Peninsula. The French wanted to prevent Austro-German influence to increase. 
France also wanted to preserve peace in the region. Paris considered the Ottoman 
presence in Macedonia more desirable than a territorial partition whose only
”  Shaw and Sliaw, p. 45.
Still, the economic importance of the Ottoman Empire for the Germans should not be exaggerated. 
Anderson says that just about 10 per cent of Germany’s foreign investment in 1914 was in tlie 
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beneficiaries would have been Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. France also 
assumed the role of negotiator and referee.
Great Britain did have no direct political or economic interests in the 
Balkans comparable to those of Russia or Austria. London conducted a policy of 
observation. Its main objectives were centred on issues such as Africa, Egypt, the 
Red Sea area, and especially India. It also defended the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire, so as to hold back Russian expansionist desires.
On the other hand, a new current of ideas arose in English public opinion
that was sensitive to the Armenian and Macedonian events since the mid-1890s.
Both of the British foreign secretaries of the first decade in the 20“' century,
Landsdowne' and Grey were obliged to press Macedonian reform on the Sultan
under pressure from public opinion and particularly from the Balkan Committee, a
group of political, religious and academic humanitarians, though this was harming
Britain’s own interests, and the efforts were by and large ineffectual. Kent quotes
from a letter of Gerald Fitzmaurice, a famous British Dragoman, dated April 1908:
During the last few years of our policy, if I may so call it, in Turkey has 
been, and for some time to come will be, to attempt the impossible task 
of furthering our commercial interests while pursuing a course (in 
Macedonia, Armenia, Turco-Persian Boundary etc.) which the Sultan 
interprets as pre-eminently hostile in aim and tendency. These two lines 
are diametrically opposed and consequently incompatible with one
another. 84
After 1905, London turned itself again toward the Balkans and reconciled with 
Russia.
Henry Charles Landsdovvne was secretary for foreign affairs in tlie period 1900-05. He was a 
liberal.
Edward Grey was secretary for foreign affairs from 1905 until 1916. He was a liberal, too.
Marian Kent, 'Great Britain iuid the End of the Ottomim Empire’, in The Great Powers and the 
End o f the Ottoman Empire, ed. by Marian Kent, 2nd edn (Norwich, Norfolk; Cass, 1996), pp. 172- 
205 (p. 178).
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Italy was also interested in the Balkan Peninsula, chiefly because of its 
geographical position. It was not so much opposed to a total or partial disintegration 
of the Ottoman Empire. In 1900, with the ascendancy of Victor Emanuel III to the 
throne, Italy turned toward the Balkans from its daring policies in Eastern Africa. 
Although Italy had some designs on the Albanian coast, it could take no decisive 
action because of Trentin and Trieste questions. Moreover, Austria-Hungary, with 
its military base at the end of the Adriatic, Pula, was strongly opposing any Italian 
plans on Albania that would result in the makeover Adriatic an Italian sea.
Italy was not directly interested in the three provinces. Nevertheless, there 
was still an important Italian community in Thessalonica with schools that were 
competing with the French ones. Furthermore, the Italian government was not put 
into effect any real influence over the Catholics in Macedonia or in the Albanian 
vilayets as it had disputes with the Pope, and this was an advantage for Austria- 
Hungary.
The Balkan States
The Serbian independence was recognized during the Congress of Berlin in 1878. 
Nish and Pirot districts were given to Serbia in 1878, and a border contact with 
Macedonia was established. In addition, Austrian administration of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina induced any hope of enlarging Serbian Kingdom to the west 
unattainable. Moreover, the Austrian government encouraged the Serbs to 
concentrate its attention on Bulgaria and Macedonia.*^ Hence, the Serbians 
attempted to bring to the surface their claims of rights in Old Serbia, that is, the
85 Longer, p. 306.
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Kosovo vilayet, which was the seat of the Dushan’s empire in the fourteenth 
century.
Of the three Balkan states, Serbia had the weakest position. The Serbian 
claim did not advance in Macedonia first to the reason that the Serbians had been 
primarily interested in the west, toward Bosnia and Herzegovina until 1878,^ *^  and 
secondly, the Serbian government did not have religious institutions unlike the 
Bulgarian or Greek governments.
The Obrenovich dynasty was in rule in Serbia. Between 1890-1900, the 
policies of the king’s government were marked by instability. This was because of 
the personality and the youth of Alexander, and the fierce fight in the internal 
political arena among the three rival parties, namely, the Radicals, the Progressives, 
and the Liberals. The Serb Kingdom had been subject to influences from Russia and 
Austria-Hungary since its very independence. The rivalry of these two powers was 
reflected in the country’s internal politics as the Radical Party was supported by 
Russia, whereas the Liberal Party was traditionally Austrophile. Until 1885 Austria 
had been the more influential power in Serbia, but after 1889, with the Radical 
government, the relations with Austria-Hungary were strained, and Russian 
influence increased gradually. In sum, the conditions for Serbia were not 
favourable.
The weakness of the government, and the lack of financial means^ *^  held 
back the development of an ambitious nationalistic program toward the vilayet of 
Kosovo. Still, the diplomatic mission was active in Constantinople. According to
Jelavich, Tsarist Russia, p. 174. 
Langer, pp. 306-307.
Financial means were of utmost importance in tlie educational competition in Macedonia, as a 
result of which zealots for respective rival currents were produced. For example, Brailsford narrates 
that a sharp French Consul once spoke out that witli a fund of a million francs he would undertake to 
make all Macedonia French; “he would preach tliat the Macedonians are tlie descendants of the 
French crusaders who conquered Salónica in tire twelfth century, and tlie francs would do the rest”; 
Braihiord, Macedonia, p. 103.
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instmctions from Belgrade, the policy pursued by Serbian diplomats was defined as 
an attitude of anticipation, of neutrality, but observing the events in Kosovo with 
aw areness.The Serb minister was constantly putting out the demands of opening 
of new schools or churches. Serbia’s target was to obtain the Serbian community in 
Kosova recognised as separate millet. This tactic, of which a similar one had been 
conducted more or less successfully by Stambolov, gained more and more 
supporters in Serbia as the negotiations with the other Balkan states on the partition 
of Macedonia proved futile. The Serbian representative in Constantinople was also 
frequently complaining about the violence and extortions of the Albanian Muslims 
against the Serb populations in Kosovo. In spite of various regulations and 
intervention of Serbian government, the constant conflict between the two 
communities remained unchanged.
Bulgaria had been reigned by Ferdinand of Saxe-Goburg-Gotha since 1887. 
During the first years of his reign Stambolov was the prime minister.^” Ferdinand 
left him to rule the country. Stambolov ran an anti-Russian policy, maintaining good 
relations with Constantinople at the same time*·^ '. He had established an authoritarian 
regime and a repressive system. He had pursued a policy that let a quiet penetration 
into the three vilayets by using the administrative structures of the Bulgarian church. 
He obtained the nomination of exarchist bishops by negotiating with Abdülhamit, 
the opening of schools with teachers under the authority of the Bulgarian clergy 
were achieved. Hence, a network to develop the influence of Sofia progressively
Lange-Akliund, The Macedonian Question, p. 75.
Stefan Stambolov was the leader of the anti-Russian national-liberals. He was minister-president 
from 1887 to 1894, mid was assassinated in 1895. For Stambolov’s story see Duncan Perry, Stefan 
Stanibolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870 -  1895 (Durhmn: Duke University Press, 
1993); see also, R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria, 1878 -  1918, A History (Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 1983).
It is suggested that tlie intrasion of Imperial Russia in Bulgarian politics provoked Stambolov to 
pursue a decidedly “pro-Turkish” policy, and even propose a political union with tlie Ottomans witli 
tlie Sultmi as Bulgarian Tsm·; Mary Neuburger, ‘Bulgaro-Turkish Encounters and the Reimaging of 
tlie Bulgarian Nation, lSlS-1995', East European Quarterly, 31 (1997), 1-20 (p. 3).
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was established, by teaching the Bulgarian language and culture, and by affecting 
the shift of villages from the Patriarchate to the Exarchate.
However, Stambolov was forced to resign in 1894 and a new government 
was formed under Stoilov. Stambolov’s policies were gradually abandoned, and a 
rapprochement with Russia was tried. Another issue in Ferdinand’s mind was the 
vassalage issue. He wanted to have the independence of his country recognised. On 
various opportunities, such as the war of 1897 Ferdinand tried to achieve this goal.
In the three vilayets Sofia had a much more voluntary policy than Belgrade 
during the last decade of the nineteenth century. Macedonia was extremely 
important for Bulgarians, particularly after the annexation of Eastern Roumelia in 
1885. Unlike the Greeks, who had aspirations for other parts of the Ottoman 
dominions, and unlike the Serbians and Romanians, who had hopes from the 
ultimate break up of the Habsburg Empire, Bulgarians had nowhere else to direct 
their irredentist energies and they wanted to reconstitute the Great Bulgaria of San 
Stefano Treaty that was signed on 3 March 1878. After 1895, Stoilov government 
allowed an increase in the formation of organisations that were defending the 
Macedonian cause. These organisations endeavoured to arouse a Bulgarian national 
conscience in Macedonia so as to provoke an uprising of Christian masses in the 
three vilayets that would result in their corporation in Bulgaria, as was the case in 
East Rumelia in 1885. The strength of the Supreme Macedonian Committee 
increased and its connection with the Bulgarian government was strengthened 
around 1900. Moreover, Ferdinand tried to use Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organisation’s (IMRO)^^ activities to serve his policies in Macedonia, through 
members of his government. Nonetheless, in January 1898, Stoilov ordered the
92 See Cliapter Tliree.
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commercial agents in Macedonia to stay away from IMRO, at the same time 
watching their activities and inform Sofia if the organisation was operating in 
accordance with Bulgarian policies.
The representatives of the Principality also undertook the mission of 
developing Bulgarian influence. These were commercial agents who acted as 
consuls, as Bulgaria was not independent. These agents established relationships 
with the villagers. They collected their complaints, and demanded the opening of 
schools wherever the number of children was sufficient enough.
Between 1890-1900, the Greek government did not follow such an active 
and enthusiastic policy in Macedonia as the one that Bulgarians conducted. Events 
were carefully watched as Bulgarian influence grew. And, the power of the 
Patriarchate had been continuously declining due to Exarchate’s increasing weight 
in the region. Furthermore, the Greek government was preoccupied with the affairs 
of Crete, and this was another reason that left to Bulgarians more open field for 
action.
Between 1893 and 1910, twenty governments rose and fell in Greece, with 
fourteen foreign ministers, which hindered the establishment of a coherent foreign 
policy. And, finally, in May 1897 the Ottoman army defeated the Greek army. 
Following this defeat, the Greek movement became quite reserved in Macedonia 
and in the Greek kingdom itself until 1904. The Greek representative in 
Constantinople regularly protested against the activities of Bulgarians, such as the 
nomination of Exarchist bishops, and the opening of Bulgarian schools.
Nevertheless, the three Balkan powers tried to reach an understanding on the 
areas of influence in Macedonia from time to time. In the last decade of the
Liinge-Akliund, The Macedonian Question, p. 81.
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nineteenth century various negotiations took place between Serbians and Bulgarians, 
Serbians and Greeks, and Greeks and Bulgarians. These negotiations, however, did 
produce no results but to some extent severed the animosity amongst these states.^ "*
9-t Langer, pp. 308-311; Qetin, pp. 57-63.
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CHAPTER THREE
TERROR IN MACEDONIA: THE FIELD
‘Ever-seething cauldron’. Karakasidou notes, this term belongs to Trotsky, who 
used it to describe the situation in Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth 
century'. Throughout most of the first decade of the twentieth century, turmoil 
reigned in Macedonia, the major source of which was the battle fought between the 
agents of different claimant states of Macedonia.
Hardman has defined terrorism as “the method (or the theory behind the 
method) whereby an organised group or party sought to achieve its avowed aims 
chiefly through the systematic use of violence”.“ This definition is especially true 
for the Macedo-Bulgarian'’ organisations, which used violence systematically so as 
to realise their declared objectives. Although the Greeks and Serbians, who entered 
the scene after 1903, did not have that well-defined structures and goals as the 
Macedo-Bulgarian organisations, their deeds were pretty much the same: murders, 
kidnappings, burning houses or entire villages. Thus, terror was the essence of the
' Anastasia Karakasidou, ‘The Burden of Balkans’, Anthropological Quarterly, 75.3 (2002), 575-589 
(p. 578).
" Walter Laqueur, ‘Interpretations of Terrorism: Fact, Fiction and Political Science’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 12 (1977), 1-42 (p. 3).
 ^ The tenn Macedo-Bulgarian is tlie most appropriate tenn to refer to the IMRO and tlie Supreme 
Committee. Tlie Ottoman sources, as well as the contemporary writes, always categorised tliese 
organizations as Bulgarians. Hence, I am going to use this tenn. Tlie term makes no claim as to tlie 
etluiic origins of the committees’ members.
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activities of different nationalist groups in Macedonia. Moreover, the term terror is 
the most objective term that can define the events in Macedonia at the given period 
of time"*.
The major party, especially before 1904, was the Macedo-Bulgarians. The 
IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation), and Supreme 
Macedonian Committee^ were the two main groups fighting for this side. IMRO was 
established by the Slavs of Macedonia to lead the people against the Ottomans and 
rival groups. As Shaw points out, IMRO was reflective of Macedonian points of 
view, demanding autonomy for Macedonia, whereas the Supreme Committee of 
Sofia was more Bulgarian in terms of its aims, promoting union with Bulgaria once 
the Ottomans were driven out.*" Starting with 1904, Serbs and Greeks had their own 
terrorist organisations in the field. The period between 1904 and 1908 was marked 
by constant reign of political violence.
The governments and consuls of the nations concerned were supporting 
these groups in and out of Macedonia. They provided not only financial support and 
encouragement but also arms and ammunition and at times legal protection to the 
terrorists. Internal dynamics in these countries also contributed their involvement in 
Macedonia, as there were irredentist urban circles constantly pressurising their
7governments.
During the decade many people were killed no matter whether they were 
Christians or Muslims. Macedonia became an expression of horror in the foreign
" Greeks call the period ‘tlie Greek struggle’, while for their rivals it can be completely a different 
tiling. For some others, tlie activities of IMRO and the others are struggles for salvation from tlie 
‘Turkish yoke”. Yet, one thing tliat is for certain is tliat terrorist metliods were being employed. 
Hence, terror is tlie most appropriate tenn.
 ^ It would later be labelled as tlie E.xtemal organisation.
Shaw and Sliaw, p. 209.
’ See Victor Roudometof, ‘The Social Origins of Balkim Politics: Nationalism, Underdevelopment, 
and tlie Nation-State in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgiu-ia, 1880-1920’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 11 
(2000), 144-163.
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press, especially when incidents involved foreigners or Christians. Durham gives the
ethics of murder in Macedonia as follows:
When a Moslem kills a Moslem so much the better. When a Christian 
kills a Christian it is better not talked about, because people at home 
would not understand it; when a Christian kills a Moslem it is a holy and 
righteous act. When a Moslem kills a Christian it is an atrocity and 
should be telegraphed to all the papers*.
Adanır and Faroqhi state another aspect of the terror in Macedonia and claim
that terrorists tried to bring out a violent response from the Ottoman administration,
and in most cases reprisals would be directed at non-Muslim subjects. As a result,
the victims would see little alternative to espousing the cause of some Balkan
nationality, and at the same time terrorism contributed quite a deal to the fears of
disloyalty in the minds of the Ottoman administrators.'"^
In this chapter, the Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, and Vlach movements in the
field will be examined to provide the reader with a better understanding of the
situation in Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth century.
I. The Macedo-Bulgariaii Movement in Macedonia 10
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation ('IMRO'i
IMRO was the secret society, which was founded in Selanik on 23 October 
1893” , which originally called itself the “Bulgarian Macedono-Adrianapolitan 
Revolutionary Committees (BMARC).’”  ^ It was founded by four teachers (Damyan
* Durham, p. 96.
 ^ The Ottomans and the Balkans, A discussion of Historiography, ed. by Fikret Adanır and Suraiya 
Faroqhi, The Oltoman Empire and its Heritage: 25 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 35. See also Adanır, 
Makedonya Sorunu, pp. 199-202.
Adanır, Makedonya Sorunir, Perry, The politics of Terror, Lange-Akliund; Crampton, pp. 229-287; 
Dakin, pp. 44-112.
' ' It has also been asserted tliat tlie place in where die IMRO was founded was Resne.
'· Adamr, ‘The Macedoniims in the Ottoman Empire’, p. 171.
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Gruev, Petır Pop Arsov, Dr. Anton Dimitrov, Hristo Bostanciev), a physician 
(Hristo Tatarcev) and a bookseller (Ivan Hacinikolov). Its aim was to prepare for the 
union of the territories with the Bulgarian fatherland, which is Bulgaria. Dr. 
Tatarcev was elected president of the Central Committee. During the summer of 
1894, local committees in İştip, Pirlepe and Manastır were created. In 1895, Goce 
Delcev*'  ^ joined the organization. Delcev and Gruev were sharing the common 
conviction that the liberation had to be accomplished from the inside by a 
Macedonia organization without any foreign intervention.
At first, only an ethnic Bulgarian could become a member of the 
organization. According to the statute that was accepted in the first convention'"' in 
1896:
Membership is open to any Bulgarian, irrespective of sex... who 
promises to be of any service in some way to the revolutionary cause of 
liberation; the aim of the Bulgarian-Macedonian-Adrianople 
Revolutionary Committees is to gain Hill political autonomy for 
Macedonia and the Odrin district. The BMARC are divided into 
regional, district and village committees and above them all stands a
Central BMARC... 15
By 1902, however, a new statute reformulated the ultimate goal of the organization: 
‘To unite in a whole all the dissatisfied elements in Macedonia and the province of 
Adrianople, irrespective of nationality, in order to acquire through revolution full 
political autonomy.’"’ Furthermore, the word ‘Bulgarian’ was deleted from the name
Macedonian revolutionary. He was defending a socialist revolution for Macedonians. He tliought 
Macedonians should rely merely on tlieir own powers, should not count on any foreign intervention. 
He was a student in tlie military school in Sofia, but dismissed from there because of his relations 
with socialist circles. When he joined the IMRO, he was a teacher in a Bulgarian school in İştip. See 
kâümr, Makedonya Sonmu, pp. 128-129.
' ^  The date of the convention and tlie content of the statute had been subjects of debates, particularly 
between the schools of Sofia and Skopje. The generally accepted view is the former one. See Adamr, 
‘The Macedonians in tlie Ottoman Empire’, pp. 171-172, Perry, The Politics o f Terror, pp. 44-47, 
Lange-Aklumd, p. 39.
Macedonia, Documents and Material, ed. by Voin Bozhinov and L. Panayatov (Sofia: Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences, 1978), pp. 419422.
Adanır, Fikret, ‘The Socio-political Environment’, p. 246; Tokay, Gül, Makedonya Sorunu 
(Istanbul: Afa Yayınlan, 1996), p. 38.
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of the organization; it was declared that the organization should struggle ‘to 
eliminate chauvinistic propaganda and national discordance which divide and 
weaken’ the population; any Macedonian and any inhabitant of the province of 
Adrianople could become a member of the organization.’^
The Macedonian territory was divided into seven departments, which in turn 
were divided into sectors. IMRO quickly covered Macedonia with a strong network 
of village committees. They put in place a hierarchical and centralised structure, 
based on cell organisation. Every member belonged to a group of ten men or 
‘comitat’, controlled by a leader. According to the article 4 of 1896 statute ‘each 
member knows only the members of his group and its chief, while the latter knows 
only the leader of the committee or his intermediary’.’  ^ At his admission into the 
organisation, the new member swore allegiance on a dagger and a revolver placed 
on the Bible.
In the beginning the band members were selected particularly from haidiiks 
or bandits, who were used to handling weapons and fighting against the soldiers. 
Later on peasants were drafted. The peasants were the most numerous. They formed 
the combat units and the officer corps was represented by teachers, who were 
originally peasants educated at schools.
Through its activities, IMRO attempted to bring into being an administration 
parallel to the Ottoman one in the three vilayets. It sought to put in place a popular 
government over the entire territory.
Until 1897, the Ottoman authorities were not aware of the organisation. 
After the murder of Kazım Aga in Vinitsa in the Kotchana kaza on November 27,
” Adanır, ‘The Macedonians in tlie Ottoman Empire’, pp. 171-172. In spite of all tirese democratic 
changes the Organization remained the political home of the Exarchist population.
Macedonia, Documents, p. 419. 
'®ibid., p. 421.
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1897, the existence of the IMRO came into realisation as the authorities discovered 
a load of weapons and ammunition. After that date, the IMRO moved into offensive.
The Supreme Macedonian Committee^^
This was the organisation of the Macedonian emigrants in Bulgaria. Toward 1900, 
18,000-20,000 of the 70,000 inhabitants of Sofia were born in Macedonia, and 430 
officers of a total of 1289 originated from the three vilayets.^^ These emigrants 
gathered in organisations such as “the Young Macedonian Association” or “the 
Brotherly Union” prior to 1895. In 1895, the Supreme Macedonia Committee came 
into being, in which the smaller organisations were united.
The Supreme Committee was the most outstanding revolutionary movement 
outside the three vilayets. It has considerable financial means, and Prince Ferdinand 
was supporting them. The Bulgarian government used the movement as a means of 
pressure on the Ottoman government and also on Western public opinion. With this 
significant support, the Supreme Committee was able to organise regular armed 
incursions into M acedonia.They demanded measures of administrative autonomy 
for the three vilayets.
Between the IMRO and the Supreme Committee, there was no cooperation 
or common action. However, contacts, which were necessary for IMRO on the 
grounds of material and financial reasons, were kept. IMRO was fairly busy in 
developing and consolidating its network of propaganda in Macedonia. Therefore, it 
did take no part in the events of 1895, when an attempt of uprising was tried by the ·
Vrhoven Makedonsku Koniitet.
Perry, The Politics of Terror, p. 35.Lange-Akliund, p. 44.
·· Sec Mahir Aydın, ‘Arşiv Belgeleriyle Makedonya’da Bulgar Çete Faaliyetleri’, Osmanlı 
Arattırmaları, 9 (1989), 209-234.
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bands originating from Bulgaria."^ Moreover, the Supreme Committee was ready to 
accept the involvement of IMRO, on condition that IMRO remained in an entirely 
subordinate position. Naturally, this was not acceptable at all by the Central 
Committee of IMRO in Thessalonica. Nonetheless, IMRO kept permanent 
representatives in Sofia.
In 1899, the relationship between the two organisations changed during the 
6“’ Congress, held in May 1899, and became more intermingled. Boris Sarafov, who 
was backed by Petrov, a member of the Central Committee, was elected president.
However, the relationship of the two committees deteriorated thereafter 
chiefly because of the election of General Tsonchef to the presidency in the 8*’' 
Congress. The revolutionary politics that was founded on the systematic utilisation 
of terror in Macedonia was severely criticised and condemned as being unworthy to 
the Macedonian cause. Relations further deteriorated, and in March 1902, IMRO 
denounced the activities of the Sofia Committee, which sought to rash the revolt on 
grounds of domestic politics: ‘We, Macedonian Slavs, fight against the disrespect of 
our rights, here in Turkey, as part of this state and not agents of Bulgaria’.·"*
Macedo-Bulgarian Terror
IMRO’s and the Supreme Committee’s strategy and tactics were intending to affect 
a great power intervention in European Turkey. Its activists assumed that Europe 
would not tolerate a bloody suppression of a Christian popular revolt in Macedonia. 
Hence, a European intervention on behalf of the Christians could be foreseen. That 
would culminate, if not in Macedonian statehood then for the union of the country 
with Bulgaria, which would come after autonomy, as was the case in East Rumelia.
káma,Makedonya Sonmu, p. 124. 
Lange-Akliimd, p. 112.
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The organisations intensified terrorism. They thought, Tf Europe does not help us 
we have to act in such a way as to attract its attention to our problem’."^  This was 
‘the politics of the worse’, equally used by Armenians to incite Turks towards brutal 
massacres so as to call in the Great Powers. Hence, the IMRO’s task now was to 
prepare the population politically and militarily for a general uprising.
Two important incidents, which drew attention of western public opinion to 
Macedonian affairs, ought to be mentioned here. One is the Ellen Stone affair. In 
September 1901, the American protestant missionary Ellen Stone was kidnapped for 
ransom, along with a Bulgarian woman by Yane Sandanski and Hristo Chernopeev. 
Stone and the Bulgarian woman remained hostages of IMRO for six months, and 
they were finally freed for 14,000 Turkish liras that was gathered by the 
ABCFM.·’ Later on Miss Stone joined the Macedonian cause and gave several 
conferences in favour of the IMRO in the United States.
The second of these significant events is the uprising of Cuma-yi Bâlâ 
(Blagoevgrad), which burst out at the beginning of October 1902. It was organised 
and prepared by General Tsonchef, who was the leader of the Supreme Committee 
of Sofia^ .^ He wanted to escalate events in Macedonia to allege for himself the 
direction of the Macedonian revolutionary movement. However, the timing proved 
to be utterly wrong, as winter was so close. Moreover, the IMRO was against such 
an action as it judged it premature, and thus, did not support it. The “insurrection” 
was conceived, planned, and controlled by the Sofia Committee, and the gangs that 
were sent by Sofia could not succeed in receiving the vital support of the Christian
Lange-Akliund, p. 94.
Sadık Poğdan, who was with the gang tliat undertook the kidnapping as tlie bandsman Stoianov, 
tells tluit the mnount paid was 500 liras more, 14,500, in liis memoirs. He also claims tliat Sandanski 
embezzled 2,000 liras of the money. M. Sadık Poğdan, Bulgar Sadık, ed. by M. R. Yalkm, 2nd edn 
(İstanbul: Gün Basımevi, 1944), pp. 40-41
See Randall B. Woods, ‘Terrorism in tlie Age of Roosevelt: Tlte Miss Stone Affair, 1901-1902’, 
American Quarterly, 31 (1979), 478-495.
He was also a friend of Prince Ferdinand.
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peasants. In conclusion, the attempt of uprising failed absolutely. However, it had an 
important result. The Great Powers asked Abdülhamit for reforms to improve the 
lives of the Christian population of Macedonia.“^
By 1903 two strong tendencies had crystallized within the Macedonian 
movement. The Bulgarian nationalist majority was convinced that if the IMRO 
would unleash a general uprising simultaneously in Macedonia and in the Edirne 
Vilayet, Ottoman power would collapse. The left wing, led by Goce Delcev, warned 
against the risks of such an insurrectionary course (he advocated instead the 
intensification of terrorism against selected targets -  sabotaging railways, 
kidnapping foreigners, assassinating prominent members of society)^“.
Apart from the major terrorist groups of IMRO and the Supreme Committee, 
there was a small group of anarchists, known as the ‘Gemicii’ in S e l a n i k . This 
group mainly consisted of high school students that were originally from Veles 
(Köprü lü ) . In 1900 a shop was rented across the street in front of the Ottoman 
Bank and they started to dig a tunnel in order to blow the Bank up. The tunnel was 
finished in 1903. Both Delçev and Gruev requested the postponement of the 
bombings but their requests were disregarded.
In April 28”', 1903, the French passenger liner “Quadalqivir” was sunk in 
noon. In the evening of April 29”’/30”' the Ottoman Bank was blown up. The 
neighbouring German bowling club was destroyed and bombs were thrown to the 
German school. Until May 3''” firefights occurred in the streets of Selanik” .
See reforms section.
'^'Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, pp.. 158-160; Adaiur, ‘Tlie National Question’, p.37; Tokay, pp.57-58. 
Çetin, pp. 68-73.
Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, p. 183.
See Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, pp. 183-192. Fazlı Necib, who was in Salónica at tlie date, also 
presents a vivid picture of those days; see Fazlı Necib.
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The anarchists, too, hoped by such terrorism to induce the powers to
intervene directly in Macedonia. But this was not to be the case. The deeds of the
members of Gemicii group raised quite a deal of anger in the western public
opinion^ "*. Adanır quotes from the Times, which wrote on 4 May 1903:
The calculation of the Committees is as stupid as it is nefarious. Their 
object, as they have all along acknowledged, is to compel Europe to 
intervene and liberate Macedonia from the Turks. They first sought to 
attain it by exasperating the Turks into wholesale massacres of the 
fellow Christians whom it is their professed purpose to deliver. They 
have hitherto failed, in spite of the many murders and other crimes they 
have instigated against the Muslims, in provoking retaliation upon a 
scale, which would lend colour to an effective ‘atrocity campaign’ in the 
European Press. They have therefore fallen back ... upon a second 
method of appealing to Europe, which they are now pursuing 
simultaneously with their original plan. They have determined to attack 
European life and property, and the dynamite outrages in Salónica 
inaugurate their efforts,'’^
As a result, two thousand arrests were made of those who had any contacts 
with IMRO. Local committees were scattered. Goce Delcev was killed while he was 
escaping from a possible arrest in Selanik.^ *^
The Selanik bombings forced IMRO to act prematurely. It advanced the date 
for a general uprising to St. Elias (ilinden) Day on August 2"‘*, 1903, although the 
preparations were still incomplete.
The ilinden uprising is the climax and a turning point in the history of 
Macedonian movement. The uprising had begun with insurgents, or çetniks, setting 
several Muslim villages on fire. Turks and Albanians resisted them. Moreover, the 
adherents of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in South Western Macedonia openly 
supported Ottoman troops. The insurgents gained short-lived victories in their 
stronghold, the mountainous Vilayet of Manastır. They succeeded in entering the 
small mountain town of Krushevo and in holding it for about a week.
Uzer, pp. 154-157.
Adanır, ‘The National Question’, p. 38.
36 kánxüx, Makedonya Sorurm, p. 187.
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However, the insurgents did not achieve the one essential goal: the unity of 
the popular masses against Ottoman rule. More importantly, the expected 
intervention by the great powers -  or at least by the principality of Bulgaria -  failed 
to take place. At the end of August, the Ilinden Uprising was virtually suppressed. 
The anticipated Great Power intervention failed to take place
At the beginning of 1904, the leaders of IMRO met in Sofia. Two tendencies 
were running high in the debates. Those, who had been against the Ilinden uprising, 
were sternly criticising the Central Committee. They were called the “Seres Group”, 
with Yane Sandanski being one of it;; most prominent members. They demanded a 
decentralisation in the organisational structures of the IIVIRO in favour of the local 
committees. The second group was dominated by Christo Matov. They were still 
contemplating a new general insurrection and the slightest change fo the structures 
of the Organisation was not considered at all.
After 1903 uprising, the Seres group, under the leadership of Jane Sandanski'* ,^ 
were the only ones who could protect and strengthen their position in the Seres 
Sancak in the Selanik V ilayet.Sandanski was close to the Bulgarian 'broad' 
socialists of Yanko Sakazov, and in Macedonian politics he let himself be guided by 
Dimo Haci Dimov. The IMRO congress of 1905 entrusted Haci Dimov with the 
editorship of its official organ, the ‘Revolutsionen List’. Dimov was also given the 
responsibility for the formulation of a policy paper on the future strategy of the 
organization. It is argued in this paper, namely “Principles Guiding the Future 
Activities of the Organization”, for a federal solution to the Macedonian question 
within the framework of the Ottoman State. Dimov realized that demanding political 
autonomy for Macedonia would mean asking for the partition of the province among
For Sandanski see Mete Çetik, 'Osmanli Solundan Bir Portre, Yane Sandanski’, Tarih ve Toplum, 
128 (1994), 13-17,
Tokay, pp. 155-156.
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the neighbouring states. The Macedonia he envisaged was not an autonomous 
Macedonia forming part of a socialist Balkan federation, but a Macedonia of 
federated peoples enjoying autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman State. 
Jane Sandanski publicly disowned Bulgarian nationalism.^^ A new political 
document was drafted which was later to serve as the program of the ‘People’s 
Federative Party’ under the leadership of Sandanski. The new document is 
concerned with:
•  D ém ocratisation o f  the political system
•  A dm inistrative autonom y for the provinces
•  A bolition  o f  national, religious and social priv ileges
• Separation of religious from state affairs
• Secular education in state schools
• Universal conscription“*®
Another important feature of the IMRO movement was the increasing 
cooperation with the Exarchate after the announcement of the Vlürzteg reform 
program. The article 3 of the program stipulated an administrative distribution 
dependent on the nationalities.“** And, the notion of national awareness was 
intimately linked with religious affiliation. Thus, the Macedo-Bulgarian movement 
became closely connected with the Bulgarian church question, as a result of the 
millet system.“*^ As the adherence to this or that church was the criterion of 
nationality, the bands now started to force patriarchist villages to convert to the 
Exarchate, in an increased scale. The movement was associated more with Bulgaria 
inevitably, henceforth.
Adanır, ‘The National Question’, pp. 38-44.
Adanır, ‘The Socio-political Environment’, pp. 250-252. 
See, reforms section.
Adamr, ‘Tlie Macedonian Question’, p. 56.
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As a result, after the failure of the ilinden uprising, the Macedonian organisation 
was torn by internal strife. At the end of 1905, three rival fractions could be seen 
within the IMRO: 1) the moderate conservatives, with the chiefs such as Tatarchev, 
Gruev and Matov. 2) The Radicals, the leftist group, in which the most prominent 
members were Sandanski, Petrov, Tchernopev and Pop Arsov. They rejected foreign 
aid, and refused to get under the influence or dependence of any Balkan state. And 
finally, 3) The Saratov circle. Sarafov was killed later on in 1907 by one of 
Sandanski’s men. Furthermore, the Greeks and Serbians were increasing their 
activities. The Ottoman official organs tolerated, even supported Greek armed 
bands.T he  cooperation of the State and Greeks and Patriarchists resulted in a more 
efficient struggle against IMRO. Consequently, IMRO found itself under increasing 
pressure from an effectively mobilized pro-Hellenic party, especially in the southern 
districts of the country. From 1904 onwards, Bulgarian movement was forced into a 
defensive position vis-à-vis the ‘armed propaganda’ of its rival Greek and Serbian
organizations.
■Social Anatomy of Bulgarian Nationalist Terror *^"*
Approximately 80 per cent of the leaders of Bulgarian national movement were born 
in a Macedonian district, and the rest originated either from Danubian Bulgaria or 
more frequently from Eastern Rumeli. More than 40 per cent originated from
southwestern Macedonia.'*^  In the prefectures of Manastır and Üsküp about two
thirds of the activists had an urban background. On the other hand, in the eastern
Süleyman Kaıü İrtem, Osmanli Devleti'nin Makedonya Meselesi, Balkanlar’m Kördüğümü, ed. by 
O. S. Kocalumoğlu (Ankara: Temel, 1999), pp. 248-257.
Adamr, ‘The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire’, pp. 175-178. Tlıe term 'terror' belongs to me.
A mountainous region of the country tliat became tlie centre o f the 1903 ilinden uprising.
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prefecture of Seres the situation was vice versa, as 80 per cent of the leaders had 
airal backgrounds.
The combined educational efforts of various national movements raised the 
literacy rate in Macedonia. Adanır notes that recent research assumes a literacy rate 
of 80 to 90 per cent among the Christians of Macedonia in the first decade of the 
20”’ century^ *^ . The literacy rate of the activists’ fathers was about 65 per cent. They 
were mostly merchants and priests.
The teachers played a very important role in the Macedonian movement. 
Durham writes, ‘each school was an active centre for nationalist propaganda. All the 
schoolmasters were revolutionary leaders’. '^  In the period of ilinden uprising about 
60 per cent of the IMRO activists were teachers. On the other hand, persons with a 
military background were the most influential group in the case of the Supreme 
Macedonian Committee of Sofia. More than a third of the Supremist activists were 
from army officer corps.
The IMRO central committee announced the formation of armed squads, that 
is, the tchetas (bands) at the end of ISOO."*** The purpose was to develop 
revolutionary terror in Macedonia. A tcheta was an armed group about 7 to 10 men, 
organised in the areas of each local revolutionary committee, and from that 
committee it received orders. The chief was called voivoda. Only he knew the 
contents of a mission his band was entrusted to do. The men in these bands were 18 
to 40 years old.“*^ The voivodas were often enrolled from among the brigands. 
Schools were established to train the voivodas. For example, as Perry writes, in the
Adanır, ‘The Macedonians in tlie Ottoman Empire’, p. 177. 
Durham.
46
47
See Perry, The Politics of Terror, pp. 155-163. 
Periy, The Politics of Terror, p. 157.
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Fiorina (Lerin) district in 1900 or 1901, a school was created by Marko Lerinski, 
who was known as the ‘pedagogue of revolutionary affairs’.
Tchetas were the paramilitary arm of the IMRO. Their main mission was to 
prepare the conditions in the three vilayets and Edirne for rebellion. Hence, they 
were to intensify the revolutionary propaganda in the countryside. They were also 
the main executors of terrorist actions. Revolutionary committees were chiefly in 
charge of winning the Macedonian masses over their cause and the tchetas 
constituted the active army of IIVIRO. A tcheta regulation, which was prepared by 
Delchev and Petrov, states an additional mission for the tchetas that all peasants, 
men, women, and children, will be mobilised either by persuasion or by force, to 
complain about the maladministration and crimes of the Ottoman officials and 
troops, to the consulates at the capitals of each vilayet, and to the valis. Moreover, 
according to the same regulation, damaging or useless Christians would be killed 
systematically so as to blame village guards, proprietors, and tax collectors in
courts 51
These gangs depended on peasants for the logistical and intelligence needs. 
The comitadjis had to move constantly and at n ig h t.T h ey  used four models of 
rifles. These were: the Martini-Tetovski rifle, the Gras rifle, the Krnka-Berdan II or 
Krinkov rifle, and the Mannlicher (the most valuable).W eapons were obtained 
from Bulgaria, and also bought from Greece and Albania, and some local Ottoman 
officials were ready to sell weapons. '^*
Perry, The Politics of Terror, pp. 157-158,
Кйшп, Makedonya Sorunit, p. 137.
See Artluir D. Howden Smith, Fighting the Turk in the Balkans (New York and London: Putnam’s 
Sons, 1908).
Perry, The Politics of Terror, p. 165-166. 
kditnir, Makedonya Sorunu, pp. 141-143.
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Also, the significance of priests in the Macedonian national movement 
ought to be noted at this point. It was by and large expected that a prospective 
member of the revolutionary organization at the local level would first join the 
Bulgarian exarchate. The exarchist priests in the countryside were sometimes 
leaders, and politically important as the village teachers. Brailsford writes in 
Macedonia'. Tt is notorious, for example, that most if not all of the Bulgarian 
bishops and their lay secretaries are involved more or less directly, and more or less 
voluntarily, in the rebellious activities of the Macedonian Committee.
II. The Greek Movement in Macedonia56
As Karakasidou asserts, Greek involvement in Macedonia and the dispatch of 
terrorist forces was a reaction to Bulgarian activities in the region as well as part of 
the Meghale Idea (Great Idea).^  ^ This was an irredentist ideology that considered 
Macedonia (along with Anatolia, Crete, Eastern Roumelia, and Thrace) as yet 
unredeemed territories of the ancient Greeks. The current of thought was called the 
enosis, proposing to regroup all the Greeks living outside the Greek Kingdom.
The Greeks of Macedonia did not found an organisation similar to IMRO. In 
1894, a group of officers founded the Ethniki Hetaria, that is the ‘National 
Company’, in Athens. The objective was to arouse Greek national feeling amongst 
the Christians living outside Greece. The Ethniki Hetaria organised several armed
Adanır, ‘The Macedonians’, p. 178.
The most detailed work on tliis subject is Dakin’s, wliich is labeled as “semi-official liistoiy” by 
Gounimis. See Basil Gounaris, 'Reassessing Ninety Years of Greek Historiography on the “Struggle 
for Macedonia’’ (1904-1908)’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 14.2 (1996), 237-251 (p. 242). See 
also Tokay, pp. 60-63, Adatur, Makedonya Sorunu, pp. 233-238.
Anastasia N. Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills o f Blood, (Chicago: Tlie University of Chicago 
Press, 1997), p. 89.
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incursions in Macedonia prior to the war of 1897. However, this war caused an 
interruption for these incursions that would last until 1904.
At the beginning of 1904, Greek gangs reappeared in Macedonia.
Nevertheless, the summer of 1904 was a period of establishing organisational
structures for an armed struggle in Macedonia. The Greek government was involved
in the armed conflict with the appointment of Lambros Karomilas as general consul
in Salónica, and things gained momentum. He created a new organisation, using the
consulate as the centre to direct offensives of gangs formed in Greece, therefore he
demanded gangs that were formed in Greece, and gangs that consisted mostly of
Cretans were formed.^ ** The organisation in Salónica also conducted an economic
warfare against the Exarchists. All Greeks were forbidden to buy goods in Exarchist
shops or to employ Exarchist workmen. Whereever possible Greeks bought up
“schismatic” land and houses, the organisation providing help in the form of
mortgages. All the Greeks were prohibited from selling or renting any house or land
to an Exarchist^ *·^ . The economic warfare was similarly organised in other towns and
large villages. Austro-Hungarian diplomats were well aware of the situation''^:
There are local Greek committees in many towns and large villages...
The duty of these committees is to strengthen the Greek party 
economically, and to weaken their rivals financially. For this purpose, 
committees demand their supporters to buy only from Patriarchists, and 
to boycott Bulgarian and Vlach tradesmen, and impose financial 
penalties on Greeks, who buy from them despite the ban. The situation 
is the same for insurance companies, banks, and commissioners.
This situation was also against the good of foreigners according to the diplomat
who conducted the report. For example, it says ‘Banque de Salonique lost quite a
However, the Cretans created various problems. They hated all Muslims and tliey were reluctant to 
fight witli other Cliristians.
Dakin, pp. 206-207.
^Austro-Hungarian Documents, doc. no. 214.
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deal of customers after Banque d’Orient has opened its Monastir branch’; Banque 
d’Orient was an Athens centred bank.
The Macedonian Committee of Athens was directing the activities in the 
Monastir vilayet and Germanos Karavangelis*’* was highly influential in that area in 
operational, material, and spiritual t e r m s . I n  1900, he was appointed to the 
Metropolitan see of Kastoria. He reorganized the schools in his diocese on Hellenic 
lines and founded new ones. Since the very beginning of his days in Macedonia, he 
had tried to form his own armed bands. The finances were coming from Grecophil 
circles in Europe and from Athens. In early 1902, he convinced Kota, an IMRO 
bandleader, to join the Hellenic movement. He converted some other IMRO 
militants^^ mainly by offering them higher payments. '^* The Macedonian Committee 
used his support and contacts in entering the vilayet and recruiting members for 
gangs.
Commencing in 1905, the Greek terrorist started offensive in Macedonia. 
The operations developed in the Southern part of Manastır and Thessalonica 
vilayets, to the south of Manastir-Gevgili-Demirhisar line. The main target of the 
Greeks was the Exarchists. In Manastır vilayet clashes developed mostly between 
the Greek border and the Vardar River. The men of the gangs were usually entering 
Macedonia from the Pindus Mountains, and some from the sea^ .^ The strength of 
gangs varied between 50 to 100 men. In Manastır, the Greek gangs were more 
successful than they were in Thessalonica. One reason for that situation was that
Karavangelis was born in 1866 in the village of Stipsi, Midilli (Lesbos). His father was a inercliant 
at Adrainitti. He went (for six years) to the Theological College of Chalclii in 1882. Afterwards, he 
went to Germany and took a doctorate of philosophy under Wundt in 1891. After some six montlis’ 
study under tlie liistorian Langen at Bonn he became professor of ecclesiastical liistory at Chalclii ,n 
September 1891. He remained there until February 1896 when he became the bishop of Pera. See 
Dakin, p. 119.
See Dakin, pp. 119-132.
Vangelis and Gulev.
Dakin, pp. 117-130.
See Chapter Four.
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Sandanski controlled Seres region in Salónica vilayet. At the end of December, the 
French ambassador reported that 200 murders took place in the three vilayets in 
November 1905 only.'^ '^
The Greeks changed their strategy in 1906. The power dualitybetween the 
Manastır and Selanik vilayets caused various inconveniences during the previous 
year. Therefore, Karomilas was made sole responsible for the entire Greek activities 
in Macedonia.
Greek terrorism was highly active in 1906. Various skirmishes took place 
between the Bulgarians and the Greeks. Moreover, in 1906, individual murders 
increased to a considerable extent^ *^
The Greek activities in 1907 can be summarised as follows: They attacked 
the Bulgarians, but fought particularly against the Ottoman forces and the Vlachs. 
Less numerously than the two previous years, they were concentrated between 
Kesriye, Fiorina and Morihovo in the west with eighteen gangs; between Gevgeli 
and Lake Ostrovo in the centre with ten gangs; and between Kavala, Serez and 
Drama in the east with seven gangs.
In 1908, the Greek bands were more active than they were in 1907. Hilmi 
Paşa^° counted eighteen gangs in the beginning of summer’*. Although a backward­
looking Austro-Hungarian report dated 18 April 1908 shows that the year March
^  Lange-Akliund, p. 215.
The activities in Monastir province were directed by the Macedonian Committee in Atliens, 
whereas Koromilas was the director in Salónica.
For more detailed information see Dakin, pp. 250-273.
Lange-Akliund, p. 248.
™ Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa was born in 1855 in tlie Sarlica village of Midilli. His father was a merchant, 
Kütalıyalızade Mustafa Efendi. He had been tlie Governor of Yemen for five years before he was 
appointed as tlie Inspector-general of Rumeli in 1902.
” Lange-Akliund, p. 249.
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1907-April 1908 had been more tranquil in terms of political terrorism than he 
previous year, crimes committed by the Greeks increased^^.
The Nature and Characteristics of Greek Activities in Macedonia in general"^  
‘Hellenism’, which was the concept the Greek bands claimed to be protecting in 
Macedonia, covered simultaneously the concept of nationality (Greece) and religion 
(the Patriarchate). Therefore, the Greek cause was guarded and fostered by the 
clergy, and by representatives of the government of Athens, the consuls, in the three 
vilayets. The bishop of Kesriye, as has already been noted, was the most outstanding 
figure in that context, not only spiritually, but fairly actively, as well. He warned the 
Ottoman authorities of the presence of comitadjis, or even suggested ambush.^’’ The 
metropolitans of Manastır, Drama, Fiorina, and Thessalonica were also other 
important religious figures, who carried on activities similar to Karavangelis’. As a 
result, the bishops of Kozani, Drama, Kesriye and Manastır were excluded from the 
discussions of the vilayet councils, where they sat until that time, in May 1907. In 
September, the bishops of Drama, Manastır, and Grebene, were suspended from 
their seats because of their participation in revolutionary activities.^^
The Greek consuls also played a decisive role, after 1904. The appointment 
of Lambros Koromilas as general consul in Thessalonica was a turning point. He 
was the major figure in organising the Greek movement in Macedonia. Still, the 
involvement of diplomatic agents in the conflict in one way or another was not 
particular to the Greek case. A French representative in Manastır reported, ‘The
^'Austro-Hungarian Documents, doc. no. 335.
See Dakin pp. 198-220, and Dimitri Livanios, ‘“Conquering Uie Souls”; Nationalism and Greek 
Guerrilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904-1908’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 23 
(1999), 195-221.
Brailsford says that the kaimmakam of Kesriye was dismissed in tlie autumn of 1903 because he 
luid fallen ‘too palpably and too publicly’ under tlie influence o f Karavangelis. Brailsford, p. 63. 
Lange-Akliund, pp. 247-248.
65
most necessary reform in this vilayet, principal source of agitation, would be the 
suppression of Greek, Serbian, and Rumanian consulates, and the Bulgarian 
agency’ The consulates, like the structures of the church, also served as 
intermediaries in recruiting men.
The nature of the armed struggle undertaken by the Greeks was dissimilar to 
that of IMRO, who was the chief opponent and the main target for the Greeks. 
Unlike the IMRO, whose main target was organising a general insurrection to 
‘liberate’ themselves from the ‘Ottoman yoke’, the main concern of the Greeks was 
to defend Greek interests and to establish Greek predominance in Macedonia. In 
other words, ‘the main aim of the Greek struggle was to ‘conquer the souls’ of the 
peasants and to check the activity of the Bulgarian bands rather than to liberate 
Macedonia from the Turks’. A s  a result, the Greek gangs fought against the 
comitacljis of IMRO and Bulgaria, and the Vlachs.
It is generally accepted in the literature of the field that until 1907 Ottoman 
authorities, who were ‘pleased to see the Christians slaughter themselves’^ ,^ 
condoned the Greek activities, and did nothing to stop Greek actions.’  ^ It has been 
asserted that the fear of a new insurrection by the Bulgarian committees or IMRO 
caused the Ottoman authorities to tolerate the Greek ac t ions .The  hatred against 
Bulgarians was widespread among the Muslims of the region. There were Muslims 
fighting alongside with Greeks^\ even Muslim leaders of Greek bands.^^ However, 
particularly after 1907, as the successes of the Greeks became too many, and with
Lange-Akhund, p. 243.
Livaiiios, p. 203. In liis article, what he means by the concept ‘conquering tlie souls’ is tliat keeping 
the peasant masses afTiliated to tlie Patriarchate.
Lange-Akluind, p. 213. This situation was one of the biggest advantages of the Greeks over 
Bulgarians. Still, the Greeks considered tliis alliance temporary. See Brailsford, pp. 192-194.
Tliis is not true for Fiorina in 1906. See cliapter Four.
Limge-Akliund, p. 218.
Adamr, p. 235.
Document 312 in Ausim-Hungarian Documents Relating to the Macedonian Struggle, ¡896-1912, 
ed. by F. R. Bridge, (Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), pp. 338-341.
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pressure from the Great Powers, the force that was directed on the pursuit of the 
Greek terrorists was increased by the Ottoman authorities^^. Therefore, the activity 
of Greek terrorists presented the following characters: they frequently were hiding 
in mountains or woods, and took offensive only when they were certain of victory.
The consulate of Thessalonica ordered assignments, such as attacking a 
particular village or a monastery,. The Greek gangs also undertook to force 
communities to convert to the Patriarchate. A French diplomat wrote, ‘the 
conversions were as frequent as they were insecure, the members of a same family 
call themselves Exarchist or Patriarchist and consequently either Bulgarian or 
Greek’. He added, ‘the villages that the gangs required successively that they adhere 
to the Exarchate or to the Patriarchate, did not know themselves anymore which was 
their religion of the d a y W h e n  a Greek band succeeded in .convincing the 
population of a village to return to the Patriarchate, it burned the holy books of the 
Exarchate in the presence of all residents. Sometimes the name of the village was 
changed .
The officers of the Greek army were quite numerous in the gangs, and the armed 
groups were organised from Greece by and large. Crete was also an important 
source of militants, until 1907.*  ^ In Macedonia itself volunteers for the Greek side 
were few. A reason for that was since 1893, the population was influenced and 
controlled widely by IMRO.^^ On the other hand, local brigands were recruited.**
The Greek bands were already suffering heavy blows from Ottoman troops in 1906 in Fiorina. See 
Chapter Four.
Lange-Akliund, p. 251.
For place names see Todor Hristov Simovski, Atlas o f the Inhabited Places of the Aegean 
Macedonia (Ankara: Türk Tiuih Kununu, 1999); Nuri Akbayar, Osmanh Yer Adlan Sözlüğü 
(İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınlan, 2001).
In 1907, there occurred a clumge in Greek strategy. Hencefortli, only officers, weapons, and 
financial aid would be sent to Macedonia, and no gang would be organised in Greece.
Livanios, p. 209.
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Mixed bands were formed, in which men from different regions of Greece, together 
with local Patriarchists and brigands were grouped in the same band.*^ ^
The strength of Greek gangs varied according to the sources between 1,000 
and 2,000 men throughout the period under consideration. Adanır, citing a German 
source, says that in autumn 1905, there were twelve gangs of 100 men each 
operating in M acedonia.Dakin, mentioning a British source, states that 1,500 to 
2,000 Greek militants in 70 to 80 gangs took part in battles throughout the summer 
of 1906.'-"
As the Greek gangs did not have an organised structure like the one of 
IMRO they could not develop a network like the IMRO’s because of the time 
shortage.'^  ^ This was both the reason and cause of the lack of popular support. 
Hence, they had to be on constant move only at night. The only Secured shelters 
were the monasteries, where they could acquire logistic support. The structures of 
the Patriarchate, like monasteries and churches, were centres of information as well.
III. The Serbian Movement in Macedonia
The ‘Macedonian Serbs’ did not establish an organisation such as IMRO. The 
fondness of the Serbs for Macedonia originated from outside, from Serbia. They 
were claiming that western Macedonia was the cradle of the Dushan’s empire of 14*'' 
century and the vilayet of Kosovo was right within the boundaries of ‘Old Serbia’. *
*** For the use of brigands in the Greek movement, see Giaimes S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a 
Cause, Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821 -  1912 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), pp. 
215-136.
Livanios, 211.
^  Adamr, Makedonya Sorunu, p. 235.
Dakin, p. 254.
They became active in 1904-1905, whereas IMRO had been present for more tlian a decade.
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As in both the other two Balkan countries that were bordering Macedonia, 
there also existed an irredentist current in Serbia. The Association of Saint Sava was 
founded in 1886.^  ^ Its chief purpose was the awakening a Serbian national 
consciousness in ‘Old Serbia’. In Vranja, a town right at the frontier, the Committee 
of Slavo-Macedonians and Old Serbia was established in the following year. Its goal 
was to prepare some raids into the Kosovo vilayet. In the same year, an official 
department in charge of supervision of the functioning of Serbian schools and 
Churches outside the Kingdom was established.
The royal government played a significant role in the development of 
Serbian faction in Macedonia. Their strategy was to expand the use of the Serbian 
language by asking the Sublime Porte permission to open schools, so as to let 
children ‘realize they were Serbs’ ’^*, to try for the election of Serbian metropolitans 
and bishops in Old Serbia (Raskoprizren, Skopje) and Northern Macedonia (Dibar, 
Veles [Köprülü], Ochrida [Ohri], and Bitolj [Manastır]), through the activities of the 
Serbian diplomacy in Istanbul and elsewhere as well as the ecclesiastical and 
educational propaganda^^ and to encourage the groupings of Macedonian emigrants 
in Serbia in associations to set up their demand in an organised fashion.
But, the outcome attained by the Department of Serbian Propaganda in 
Macedonia^^ was limited. The insufficient financial means, and the instability that 
reigned over in the domestic political scene, were the chief reasons. Moreover, the 
Progressive government by and large tried to preserve good relations with the
Serbians were active before, but in a less organized fashion. See Ivan Hadjinikolov’s passage in 
Macedonia, Doaiments, pp. 414-416.
Durham, p. 95.
See Athanasios Angelopoulos, ‘Relations Between tlie Ecumenical Patriarcliate and the Church of 
Serbia', Balkan Studies, 13 (1972), 119-127.
AH pro-Serbian organizations in Macedonia were reassigned to the Ministry of foreign affairs in 
1889.
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Sublime Porte so as to gain concessions in favour of the Serbs of Macedonia, 
particularly the nomination of Serbian bishops in Kosovo.
Serbians suffered from the lack of popular support as well as the Greeks. 
Thus, internal dynamics in both Macedonia and Serbia was not fairly favourable for 
the Serbians. Consequently, the results of Serbian propaganda was not quite 
successful vis-à-vis the Bulgarian efforts, by 1900.
The Ilinden uprising and its aftermath was a turning point for Serbian and 
Greeks movements, as well as it was for the Bulgarian and Macedonian movements. 
The Serbian movement increased its influence continuously after that incident.
As noted earlier, the Serbian movement was organised and controlled from 
Belgrade. Peter I Karadjordje was the King, who took power in 1903, following the 
murder of Alexander Obrenovitch. The Radical Party was the party in power, with 
Pasitch at the head of the government. The policy of Macedonia was also changed, 
beginning to have a more aggressive nature. Still, from the viewpoint of Belgrade, 
the status quo of Macedonia had to be preserved. Belgrade government was sternly 
against the idea of autonomy^^ that would benefit Bulgaria, as it had been in the case 
of Eastern Roumelia in 1885.
In the spring of 1904, the Serbs organised some incursions in Kosovo. 
According to a text that was supposedly a statute, the Serbian armed struggle was 
“not against the Turks but against Bulgaria or IMRO comitadjis"" Agitation 
reigned in the kazas of Kumanova, Kratova, and Pirlepe. The Serbs fought chiefly 
against the comitadjis. Pasitch issued the following instructions: ‘Protect our people 
against the exclusion tendencies of the Patriarchate, battle the agents of Exarchate, 
who, organized as armed committees, want to establish themselves in an area under
Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, p.239; Tokay, p. 64. 
Lange-Akliimd, p. 220.
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our influence like Porec, Kicevo, Drimkol, Dibra, Köprülü’. Moreover, although 
there were some initiatives of rapprochement between the IMRO and the Serbians, 
they proved to be f u t i l e , I n  the beginning of 1905, Serbs and the bands of IMRO 
and Bulgaria became engaged in a war in the vilayet of Kosovo and the north of 
Manastır. Furthermore, Serbs were also fighting against Albanians, and Greeks. In 
1905, there were 11 Serbian gangs with 62 men in Macedonia around Üsküb, and an 
additional 55 men were in Vranje,’'^ '
By the end of 1906, the Serbian terrorists were in a dominant position in the 
kazas of Preşova (Prechovo), Kumanova, Köpıtilü, Palanka, and the western slope 
of Morihovo Mountain as far as Ohri. According to German ambassador in 
Behmade there were around thirty Serbian bands, each consisted of twenty men, in 
Macedonia in February 1906.*°  ^ In 1907-1908 Serbs were successful in Kosovo and 
were active in the northern part of Manastır, In this period, the material and financial 
means’'^  ^ of the Serbians also increased significantly, and this gave them an 
advantage over the IMRO, which forced people to contribute financially to their 
cause. By the end of 1907, the Serbians had strengthened their grip in the kazas 
named above and broadened their area of influence across Kratova and Koçana to 
the north and to Tikveş and Pirlepe to the south. However, the progress of the 
Serbian movement was still limited comparing that of the IMRO or the Greek one.
As Adanır summarises, the Serbian movement was organised as follows: a
‘High Committee’ or ‘Central Committee’ was dealing with the recruitment and 
formation of bands, with its centre in Belgrade. Its president was Milorad Popovitch,
Lange-Akluind, p. 221.
Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, pp. 239-240.
ΙΟΙ Çetin, p. 90.
Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, p. 242.
Adanır, utilising German archives, states tliat Serbian Consulate’s annual budget for only 
propaganda \vas exceeding 300,000 francs in the middle of the first decade of tvventietli century. 
Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, p. 242.
'®·' Adamr, Makedonya Sorunu, p. 224-225.
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who was also the chief of staff at the War Department. Other prominent members 
were colonel Rasitch and lieutenant colonel Draga.’*^  ^ There was a local committee 
in Vranja, which carried out the task of helping Serbian bands crossing the border. 
In Macedonia, there was an organisation similar to IMRO with “Central 
Committees” in Üsküb and Manastır. A network of committees was created in 
Kumanova, Köprülü, Ohri, Pirlepe, Kichevo, Poretch, Drimko, Debre, and 
Kruchevo.’”*^ The Serbian committees were organised hierarchically like IIVIRO.
IV. Vlachs
The revolutionary actions of Vlachs in Macedonia were limited compared to the 
other nationalist movements. Although the Romanian (Vlach) activities were not 
comparable with the Greek or Bulgarian ones, there was an issue of Vlachs in 
Macedonia as a factor of unrest that contributed to the deterioration of the situation 
in Macedonia. Romania was the defender of Vlachs of Macedonia. Romania had no 
territorial claims because of the non-existence of any common frontier with the 
region. The Romanian government strove to get recognised the existence of a Vlach 
nationality in Macedonia, and the Romanian influence over them. On the other 
hand, Athens was utterly against the Romanian movement. The Greeks considered 
the Vlachs as Greeks already. Any success of the Romanian propaganda would 
weaken the Greek position in Macedonia. Thus, the main enemy of the Vlachs were 
the Greeks.
Adiuur, Makedonya Sorunu, p. 241. 
Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, p. 241.
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Between 1904-1905, the Romanian government convinced the Sublime 
Porte to recognise the existence and the rights of the Romanian community. In May 
1905, an irade was issued “carrying recognition of the equality among the Christian 
nationalities of European Turkey of all Vlachs of the Ottoman Empire, which will 
exercise their rights, especially using their language in churches and schools, 
appointing moukhtars in their communities and being represented in the council of 
their vilayet”. I n  general, the Ottomans were not as much against the Vlachs, who 
did not ha separatist aspirations, as they were against the other nationalist groups. 
For example, The Governor of Manastır, Reşit Bey, was known as favouring the 
Vlachs in accordance with the instructions of the Sublime Porte.
Vlachs lived a pastoral life in general, between the Pindus Mountains and the 
Gevgeli region. Yet, there were settled Vlach groups in towns like Manastır’®^, 
Seres, Kavala, Drama, and Köprülü, engaged in artisanship by and large. However, 
especially some of these urban settled Vlachs were to some extent assimilated to the 
Greeks. Nevertheless, after the Vlach aspirations came into being, especially after 
1904, increasing proportion of Vlachs pursued their national and religious goals.'*® 
Confessionally, the Vlachs depended on the Patriarchate. But, the relationships with 
the Patriarchate were not pleasant as the Patriarch banned the usage of Romanian 
language during religious ceremonies, in 1904. Hence, the Vlachs pursued their 
cause mainly on religious grounds. Romanian demands from the Patriarchate were, 
as Lange-Akhund notes;
Creation of Vlacho-Orthodox independent communities recognised by 
the Patriarch; the Vlacho-Orthodox communities may hire priests, arch­
priests, and archimandrites; liberty of saying the mass in Romanian; to
Lange-Aklumd, p. 229.
Uzer, p. 204. On tlie other hand, tliere were also some characters like tlie vali of Yanya, who was
favouring tlie Greeks against the Vlachs; Tokay, p. 68. 
See Gounaris, ‘From Peasants into Urbanities’. 
Brailsford, pp. 181-190.
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facilitate the relations between Patriarchate and Vlachs, designate an 
ecclesiastic representative who will be the interpreter of their wishes'
The Patriarch rejected all these wishes.
As pointed out above, Vlachs were strongly opposed by the Greeks. Greece
broke off its diplomatic relations with Romania in June 1906."^ On the field, Greek
bands were the main enemies of the Vlachs that pursued a national cause in some
way or another. Vlach villages were systematically attacked and burned, and Vlachs
were targets of many murders. Furthermore, as the religious demands of Vlachs
were not recognised by the Patriarchate, there were always disputes over religious
matters. For example, when the Greek Metropolitan of Monastir did not let Vlachs
to hold the death ceremony for their deceased in their own language and by their
own priest, tensions aroused considerably in Monastir in 1905. This was a
widespread source of dispute. In the end, separate cemeteries were designated for
Vlachs by local authorities."^ As a result, the Vlachs began to help the comitadjis of
IMRO or Bulgaria by supplying information or food. In August 1906 the first Vlach
gangs were noted by the Austrians."^ After 1907, the relations between the IIVIRO
and Vlachs were strengthened. Nevertheless, there was presence of Vlachs in the
Greek bands, as well."^
V. Reforms
Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty was promising for reforms and regulations for 
Macedonia similar to those in Crete. As at the beginning of the century the situation
Lange-Akliuiid, p. 228.
F. R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo (London: Routledge & Keagan, 1972), p. 280. 
Uzer, p. 204.
Documents 216-217 in Austro-Hungarian Documents.
Gounaris, ‘From Peasants into Urbanities’, pp. 45-46; Tokay, p. 68.
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in Macedonia had been deteriorated, the signatory powers of Berlin pressured the 
Ottomans to make ‘reforms’ in Macedonia. Shaw states that the powers were 
hoping that this might satisfy the terrorists and induce them to stop terror” .^ In 
réponse, some reform schemes were proposed by Istanbul.
Abdiilhamit issued an irade in 12 December 1902 that promised reforms in 
the European provinces of the Empire. This was to some extent an outcome of the 
pressure exerted by Austria and Russia. The text contained 18 articles arranged in 
four chapters regarding administration, justice, instruction, and public works. 
Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa” ,^ the former governor of Yemen, was appointed Inspector- 
General of the three vilayets Selanik, Üsküp and Manastır, which was organised as a 
new province. The regulation of this new province was to be determined by a 
special Rumeli Provinces Reform Commission on the basis of investigations 
conducted by Hilmi Paşa. He was put in charge of instituting the reforms and 
removing incompetent officials, including the valis.
However, since December 1902, the Great Powers had attempted to establish 
a common basis of negotiations so as to present to Abdülhamit a program that was 
better and more solid in their view than the issued document. As a result, in 21 
February 1903, an Austro-Russian project was presented to Istanbul. This project 
was swiftly accepted without any reservations as the so-called ‘Viennese plan’ 
merely completed the reforms of December 1902.
According to the Vienna scheme, a general inspector was to be appointed to 
Macedonia for a three-year term and could not be recalled without the agreement of 
the two Powers, Austria and Russia. The valis must obey rigorously to his
Shaw and Sliaw, p. 209.
For Hüseyin Hilmi see Meşhur Valiler, ed. by Harun Orhun and others ([Ankara]; İçişleri
Bakanlığı Merkez Valileri Bürosu, 1969), pp. 133-140. 
See Dakin, pp. 86-91.
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instaictions. If necessary, he might call in the army without any responsibility of 
consulting with the Sublime Port. The police and gendarmerie were to be 
established with foreign assistance. The gendarmerie force was to be composed of 
Christians and Muslims in proportion with the constitution of the local population. 
Hence, the rural guards would be Christians, where the bulk of population was 
Christian. A budget of incomes and expenses was raised in each vilayet. The 
provincial collections would be assigned to local administration. An amnesty was 
granted to all political defendants or convicts.
The announcement of these new reforms did not create a positive reaction in 
the region. Bulgaria and Serbia were not content at all. Moreover, turmoil reigned 
the Albanian populated regions, as Albanians sternly opposed these reforms’^ “. 
Hence, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa had to be preoccupied with the Albanian turmoil and 
this caused him not to implement the reforms in due course.
The ilinden uprising and its aftermath induced the Great Powers to 
contemplate and demand a more extensive program of reforms. In 30 September 
1903, Franz Joseph and Nicholas II met in Mürzteg, and decided on a new plan of 
reforms, which acknowledged their involvement in the adjustment of Macedonian 
question. The text of nine articles was presented to the Porte in 22 October 1903 and 
accepted in 25*'’ November. According to the Mürzteg program: 1) Two civil
agents, one Austrian and one Russian, were to be attached to the Inspector-General, 
Hilmi Paşa. 2) The task of reorganising the Ottoman gendarmerie was to be 
entrusted to a general of foreign nationality in the service of the Ottoman 
government. To him were to be attached military officers and, if thought necessary.
The immediate result of the amnesty was the influx of new forces to the insurgent groups of the 
ilinden uprising says the French diplomat Steeg; see Lange-Akhund, p. 138.
See Nuray Bozbora, Osmanli Yönetiminde Arnavutluk ve Arnavut Ulusçuluğunun Gelişimi 
([İstanbul]: Boyut Yayın Grubu, 1997), pp. 241-252.
Dakin, pp. 114-115; Lange-Aklıund, pp. 142-144.
16
assistant officers and non-commissioned officers. Zones were to be allotted to the 
officers of each of the Great Powers. 3) As soon as an appeasement of the country 
will be noted, the Ottoman government will be asked for a modification in the 
administrative division of the territory in view of a more regular grouping of 
different nationalities. 4) The administrative and judicial institutions were to be 
reorganised. Christians were to be admitted to them and the development of local 
autonomy was to be fostered. 5) Mixed committees were to be established in the 
principal centres of the vilayets to enquire into political and other crimes. Consular 
representatives of Austria and Russia were to have a place on these committees. 6) 
Due financial precautions were to be put into effect for the harmed and affected 
Christians. 7) Christian villages burned by Turkish troops and Bashibazouks were to 
be freed for one year from all taxation. 8)The implementation of the Vienna reform 
scheme. 9) The Haves (second-class redifs or reservists) were to be disbanded and 
bands of Bashibazouks were to be prohibited.
Graves, the British Consul in Salónica in the period of 1903-1909, remarks 
the reform deliberations and schemes in his memoirs as follows: ‘the statesmen of 
the rival powers whose interests were most involved were anxiously seeking, not a 
solution, for that was an impossibility by peaceful methods, but some form of 
compromise which might postpone indefinitely the arbitrament of the sword’.
Hasan Fehmi Paşa, the vali of Selanik, is said to have commented on the 
reform scheme: ‘rather than humiliate us in this way, it would be worth inciting us 
simply to evacuate Macedonia’.
After long debates, the zones of each Great Power, mentioned in the article 
2, for the reorganisation of the Gendarmerie, was determined in spring 1904.
Sir Robert Graves, Storm Centres o f the Near East (London: Hutchinson, 1933), p. 200. 
Lange-Aklumd, p. 144.
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Accordingly the sancak of Üsküb was given under the supervision of Austria; Seres, 
to France; Drama, to Britain; Manastır, to Italy; and Selanik, to Russia. Germany did 
not take part in this effort by its own will.
With the agreement of Mürzteg, the three vilayets became the object of the 
attention of six powers: Austria-Hungary and Russia, which preserved supervision 
rights with priority but were still forced to admit the intervention of France, Britain, 
Italy, and Germany. Internally, article 3 had very important conclusions. It was 
perceived by the rival nationalisms as a ground to enforce their respective causes. 
Hence, after the Mürzteg agreements Bulgarian current more actively associated and 
cooperated with the Exarchate, as the adherents of the Exarchate were accepted 
Bulgarian, and of the Patriarchate, Greek. As a result, although the Mürzteg program 
produced some positive results, it also spurred the nationalist terror in Macedonia.
The Issue of Financial Reform 124
In 17 January 1905, the Austrian and Russian ambassadors presented Tevfik Paşa, 
the minister of foreign affairs, the project of financial reform for the three vilayets. 
The idea of the project was to place all revenue under the supervision of the general 
inspector and the civil agents. The agencies of the Ottoman Imperial Bank (OIB) in 
Selanik, Üsküb, and Manastır would act as general paying treasurer and would be 
responsible for public expenses. A general budget would be prepared for each 
vilayet along with a separate budget for each sancak and kaza. Every budget would 
become definitive after being submitted to the general inspector, OIB, and the 
powers. The imperial bank would submit the nominations for financial inspectors 
that would be Ottoman citizens for the approval of the general inspector.
124 Çetin, pp. 81-82, Lange-Akliund, pp. 290-299, Tokay, pp. 100-105, Financial “Reglement”.
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The Sublime Porte did not react to the project but instead announced its 
intention of creating resources to meet the financial burden created by the events in 
Macedonia, and by the implementation of reforms. In effect, the Porte demanded an 
increase in the customs duties from 8% to 11%*^ .^
Austria and Russia accepted the demand on the condition of activation of the 
financial reform project that was prepared earlier. In response, the Ottomans created 
their own project, which was by and large in accordance with the Austro-Russian 
project except for establishing financial inspectors charged with the rigorous 
application of regulations. Abdiilhamit viewed the control implied by the financial 
reform in Macedonia as a violation of his sovereign rights. In reply Austria and 
Russia accepted the Ottoman project on the condition that the governments of 
Germany, England, France, and Italy name four financial delegates, who will act in 
harmony with the general inspector and civil agents. Thus, a commission was to be 
formed that would also supervise taxation, and, it would name an inspector for each 
vilayet, who would be charged with overseeing the tax collectors.
Between May and November, the Ottoman government continuously refused 
the project. At the end, in 26 November an international fleet that consisted of 
warships of France, Italy, Austria, Russia, and Britain seized first the isle of Midilli, 
then 5 December, it captured the customs offices at Limni. After that, following a 
few days of negotiations the Ottoman government accepted the nomination of a 
financial commission for two years. Then, late in December, the international fleet 
withdrew from Lemnos and Midilli. The international commission for financial 
control of Macedonia gathered officially for the first time in 23 December 1905. The 
Great Powers, who were uncompromising in the issue of financial reform, were not
Shaw and Sliaw, p. 211.
'-^Shaw, p.211.
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hasty at all in its implementation by allowing the 3 % increase of the customs duties. 
Only in 25 April 1907, the customs duties could be increased by 3 %.
The most important result of the creation of financial commission was that, 
from then on, Austria and Russia did not have the exclusive control in directing the 
Macedonian question, as France, Britain, Italy, and Germany had representatives in 
a permanent institution and rights in Macedonian affairs.
The Issue of Judicial Reform 127
The prospect of judicial reform was existent in the fourth article of the Mürzteg 
program. Towards the end of 1906 the Sublime Porte created a commission that 
would examine the condition of the judicial organisation and, accordingly put into 
effect the necessary measures. Esat Efendi and Hamit Bey were sent to Macedonia 
to examine the judicial situation. They prepared a report. Then a project was 
developed by the government, which surprised the Great Powers as it was beyond 
their expectations. According to the project, Christians, who fulfil certain criterion, 
could become judges. For that end, a law school was to be opened in Selanik. The 
wages of the judicial officials would be improved so as to prevent bribery. One 
Christian and one Muslim inspector would be appointed in Macedonia.
The Great Powers were not unanimously demanding a particular reform 
scheme in the judicial area. The most unrelenting power that demanded judicial 
reform was Britain. Although various schemes were presented to the Sublime Porte 
until 1908, Abdülhamit was not so anxious to put them into effect. On the other 
hand, Austria and Germany refused to pressurise the Ottoman government for 
judicial reforms.
127 Cetin, pp. 82-83, Tokay, pp. 100-105, Lange-Akliund, pp. 300-309.
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To sum up, the judicial reform was not implemented because of the 
divergence of opinion among the Great Powers and of the resistance of Abdiilhamit.
Finally, the king of Great Britain and the tsar of Russia met at Reval in 
Estonia on 9 June 1908, to arrange an alliance against Germany. As part of the 
program to settle all the differences between each other, they agreed that the 
governor of Macedonia would be an Ottoman subject and ought to be appointed 
only with the agreement of the powers and that he should be aided by a large staff of 
European administrators, who would be paid from the provincial revenues. 
However, this scheme could never progress as the Young Turk revolution broke out 
in late summer in 1908.
Comments
During the first decade of the twentieth century, especially until 1908 revolution, 
terror and chaos reigned in Macedonia. This turmoil was political in essence. 
Devotees of different nationalist claims endeavoured to dominate in Macedonia, and 
render their opponents submissive and ineffective. A blatant atmosphere of 
insecurity was prevailing in Macedonia as murders, burnings, kidnappings, threats, 
all sorts of violence were available. Furthermore, after sometime this situation 
creates a vicious cycle naturally, as people who had some sort of reason for revenge 
increased, given the lack of inefficient administration, which lacked necessary 
means to handle the situation and always had to reckon what the Great Powers 
would say. Moreover, the Ottoman administration was blamed for everything the 
terrorists did.
128 Shaw and Sliaw, p. 211.
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The Great Powers, on the other hand, pressured Istanbul to make ‘reforms’ 
in Macedonia, hoping this might stop the chaos. However, they requested for 
reforms as long as their interests remained intact. One good example of this situation 
is presented in the section of financial reform. The power, aspiring reforms provided 
that their own interests were not involved, agreed on the 3% raise in customs duties 
demand of the Ottomans so as to secure the populace of Macedonia from an 
additional tax burden only after they gained some additional commercial 
concessions elsewhere'"^. Hence, the Powers followed a hesitant and hypocritical 
policy vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and Macedonian issue.
On the other hand, the reforms that were implemented could not ease the 
state of affairs in Macedonia. It could satisfy neither the terrorists nor the irredentist 
circles in the Balkan states. As the reforms were viewed as concessions by the 
terrorists as well as some elements of the administration, they worsened the 
situation. Besides, the annexation of East Rumelia by Bulgaria had set a dangerous 
precedent. The third article of the Miirzteg agreement was particularly effective in 
accelerating the chaos, and added a extended dimension to the struggle in 
Macedonia as the Exarchate and the Patriarchate involved more actively afterwards.
Sliavv notes tliat the British gained an extension of tlie concession for tlie İzmir-Aydın railroad 
until 1940, while tlie Germans acquired an addition to the guarantee money paid by the Ottomans to 
their bankers for the Anatolian railroad. Shaw and Sliaw, p. 211.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FLORINA 1906
The war in Macedonia was at its peak in 1906*. It was also a decisive year in the 
conflict between the Greek and Bulgarian bands. This chapter examines the situation 
in the kaza of Fiorina during the year by focusing on the activities of the Greek and 
Bulgarian bands in Fiorina in 1906. I will attempt to evaluate the local developments 
within the context of the course of events at imperial level in the light of official 
documents produced by Rumeli Inspectorship^, on Fiorina in this particular year. 
Some published Austro-Hungarian documents will also be referred to in related 
sections. Moreover, an interesting report written by the kaimmakam of Fiorina, 
Tahsin Bey, on land and property purchases by Christians is particularly scrutinised 
in a separate section.
I. Fiorina
Fiorina was one of the fifteen kazas (subdistricts) of the Manastır vilayet (province). 
It was in the sancak (district) of Manastır. The town of Fiorina was 30 km south of
' According to Hüseyin Hilini Paşa’s records tliere occurred between troops and Bulgarian bands 56, 
Greek bands 32, and Serbian bands 10 skinnishes, in wliich 530 persons ¿ed. In 1907 tliere occurred 
in between troops and Bulgarian bands 46, Greek bands 24, Serbian bands 9 skinnishes, in which 
435 persons died. İlkin-Tekeli, p. 371.
 ^Rumeli Müfettişliği Evrakı
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Manastır, which constituted a six hours distance, situated at the east side of the 
Mount Nareçka^. A brook is passing through right in the middle of the town, 
running into Karasu River, which joins eventually to Vardar River. According to 
Şemsettin Sami’s KamusU 'l-AJam, the town had a population of ten thousand. In the 
central town of Fiorina, there were seven mosques, two tekkes, one medrese, one 
rii.^diye with forty-three students and two instructors in 1898-99. In 1903 the number 
of the students increased to eighty, while the number of instructors remained the 
same'*. In this year, we see one ibtidaiye, five Muslim, two Greek schools and one 
Bulgarian school for sibyciu, two churches, three hundred shops, nineteen bans (inn), 
and one hamam in Fiorina.
The kaza of Fiorina was bordered by Manastır central kaza and the kaza of 
Pirlepe in the north, Vlorihova nahiye of Pirlepe in the east. Kayalar kaza in the 
south, and Kesriye kaza in the west. Three nahiyes were attached to Fiorina kaza. 
These were Rodnik (Soroviç), in the east southwest, Noska in the south, and 
Veştoran in the north. There were eighteen villages in Rodnik, ten in Noska, and 
twenty in Veştoran^. Twenty villages were attached to Fiorina itself Soroviç was at 
eleven hours distance from the vilayet centre. Manastır, and Noska was twelve hours 
away from the centre.
According to the figures from Ottoman general census of 1881/83 -  1893 
total population of the kaza of Filorina was 43,379, of which 12,863 were Muslims, 
and 30,516 were non-Muslims with 3,354 of them being Catholics^. The Christians 
were Albanians, Vlachs, Greeks, and Bulgarians. Another official statistics, which
 ^ Ş. Sami, Kamusü'1-alam, 6 vols (Istanbul: Maarif Nezareti, 1306-1316; repr. Ankara: Kaşgar 
Neşriyat, 1996), V (1314), 3434.
 ^ Mucize Ünlü (San), ‘Manastır Vilayeti’nin İdari ve Sosyal Yapısı (1873-1912)’ (Unpublished 
master’s Tliesis, On dokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, 1996), pp. 160-161.
 ^Veştoran was made a nahiye in 1905. Ünlü, p. 60.
® Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Ottoman Population Records and tlie Census of 1881/82-1893’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, 9 (1978), 221-21A (p. 272); Karpat, Ottoman Population, p. 144.
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did not particularly segregate any religious or national groups, show that the total 
population was 46,641 souls in 1896-97. Although we do not have the particular 
statistics for Filorina for the year 1906, it might be safe to propose that there did not 
occur any major shifts in population figures as we have statistics of Manastır sancak 
that reveal no great changes. There were thirty-five mosques and forty-five churches 
in the whole kaza in 1887-88; ten of these mosques and ten of these churches were 
in the nahiye of Soroviç .
Although the land is rough in Fiorina, it is still productive, says Şemsettin 
Sami, and he states that as in the rest of Macedonia, the economic activity was 
principally of agricultural nature. The major products were wheat, barley, rye, corn, 
bean, millet, and chickpea. The melons of Fiorina were also famous. There were
O
four small lakes in the Fiorina kaza .
The kaimrnakam of Fiorina was Tahsin Bey^ for the most part of the year 
1906'°. He was an experienced official” . Before appointed to Fiorina, he had been 
in Pürsıçan, Çiç, and Alnus as nahiye nhidiirii, and was appointed to Razhk in 1902 
as kainmiakam. Thus, he was holding a critical position right in the heart of the 
ilinden Uprising. After Razlik, he was the kaimmakam of Gevgili between 1904 and 
1906. He started his new duty in Fiorina on 17 February 1321/2 March 1906'^. He 
held the office until 4 March 1324/17 March 1906. It seems that he was an energetic 
official who tried to do his best. There are plenty of occasions in which he *
’ Ünlü, p. 106.
* Şemseddin Sami, Kamusti 'l-Alam, 3434.
 ^Hasan Talisin Uzer.
He was appointed on 2 March 1906.
" His memoir is an invaluable source for tlie subject.
'■ A certain Refet was the kaimmakam before him. He did not have any significant deed in the 
documents.
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personally jo in ed  the p latoons in band chasing, and he w as at the scene o f  skirm ish  
in the B attle o f  istrebne right from  the b eg in n in g‘s.
Fiorina had alw ays been a hotbed for Bulgarian bands. It w as one o f  the 
eight m ilitary regions fixed  by IM RO. A  sch ool w as created in Fiorina by M arko
Lerinski in 1900 or 1901, so as to train the voyvodas, i.e., the band leaders*'*. Fiorina
w as also one o f  the districts, where major battles o f  1903 Ilinden-Preobrazhenski
Uprising were fought. Perry states that there is abundant data concerning band
attacks in Fiorina reg ion ‘s. After the appearance o f  G reek bands in 1904, Fiorina
became a major battleground for the Greek and Bulgarian bands. These two camps 
w ere still present in 1906, w h ile  there w as no sign o f  Serbian or V lach  bands in this 
region.
II. Bulgarian activities in Fiorina in 1906 16
Bulgarian movement had lost the power it had enjoyed before the Ilinden uprising. 
IMRO and Bulgarian bands had been continuously losing ground and forced into 
defensive vis-à-vis to rival nationalist bands. The two major reasons of this 
situation, as shown in the previous chapters, was firstly the inclusion of Greek and 
Serbian bands, which were hostile to the idea of autonomy that was being 
championed by IMRO and the Bulgarians. The second cause was the internal 
divisions in IMRO that led to formations of rival fractions, which were bitterly
See related section below.
Perry, The P olitics o f  Terror, p. 158.
ibid, p. 139.
In tins section, tire bands wliich were closer to Bulgarian cause or Macedonian cause will not be 
differentiated because the documents do not contain any such segragation. In the documents only 
‘Bulgariim bmids’ appear. Thus, tliese bands are referred to as ‘Bulgarian bands’ here, as well.
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hostile to each other. Moreover, Ottoman troops and officers had gained quite a deal 
of experience in guerrilla warfare , and were hostile above all to Bulgarians .
Nevertheless, in 1906, the Bulgarian movement and IMRO were still active 
in Macedonia, although they did not enjoy the advantage of being the sole active 
group in the field. Bands were still roaming the villages, and occasional skirmishes 
occurred between the Bulgarian and Greek bands.
The documents of Rumeli Inspectorship, which had come from or sent to the 
kaza of Fiorina, show that Bulgarians were fairly active in the kaza in 1906. Apart 
from recording actual events, these documents also give hints on the nature and 
characteristics of the Bulgarian movement. They also let the researcher learn about 
the most active bands and their leaders.
In 1906, the bands that were wandering in the kaza generally consisted of 
small numbers of fighters, except for two occasions. A telegram from the 
kaimmakam of Filorina Tahsin, addressed to the Inspector General, dated 28 April 
1906, informs that Dedo K090 from ‘Bulgarian bandits’, came to the village of 
Armenceka'^ in the company of his nine men, and stabbed to death the villager 
Resto Tome from the Greek millet, who was ploughing his field near the village^°. 
Again another telegram from kaimmakam Tahsin, dated 5 May 1906, informs that 
four Bulgarian bandsmen killed Ma§o, Yane, and Vasil of the village Nefvan, all 
from Greek millet, while they were working in their fields outside the village^*. 
Three of the Bulgarians were disguised as Albanians, and the other was wearing 
gendarme cavalry uniform. On another occasion, in 16 September 1906, a Bulgarian
For example, tliere were small platoons stationed in villages. Moreover, tlie troops were now 
patrolling die field day and night, and were ambusliing die terrorists.
* Tliis led, according to some audiors such as Lange-Akliund, Dakin, İrtem, Ottomans to tolerate 
pardcularly Greeks.
^  Armensko; right south of the town Fiorina.
Başbakanlık Osmaidi Arşivi (hereafter BOA.) Rumeli Müfettişliği Manastır Evrakı (hereafter 
TFR.1.MN), 91/9097, 1324.3.4 (25 April 1906).
-* BOA. TFR.1.MN, 93/9205, 1324.3.16 (10 May 1906).
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band of six killed twenty years old istefo Mi(?e from the village Setne, a village 
which returned to Patriarchate after several years of being adherent to the 
Exarchate.^^ This time, the band had to escape because the villagers defended 
themselves, and the troops were swift in coming after them. Apart from certain 
disadvantages that the Bulgarian bands possessed against Greek bands which 
generally consisted of big numbers, small units had certain advantages. They could 
be mobilised more easily, and it was easier for them to disappear in cases of 
emergency. One example of that is evident in the telegram of kaimmakam Tahsin 
dated 1 July 1906, which informs the Inspector General that a band of six under the 
order of Zorle of Banige had survived the ambush of Ottoman soldiers around the 
village of Leskof^a, by splitting into two groups of three, while leaving their horses 
and donkeys^^. Nevertheless, there were occasions when bigger numbered Bulgarian 
bands operated. For instance, in 4 January 1906, a Bulgarian band of forty to fifty 
went to the Greek monastery, which was half an hour away from the Pisoder village, 
and did beat five men from the monastery and a woman heavily, and burned most of 
the monastery^''. Ottoman troops chased them afterwards but they were 
unsuccessful. On another incident, a Bulgarian band of sixty men attacked a 
Patriarchist village, which had been Exarchist before, on 16 September Sunday 
afternoon. All the same, it appears that Bulgarian bands generally preferred small 
bands in Fiorina, as many other examples confirm this situation^^.
The Bulgarians bands that were active in Filorina region in the year 1906 in 
general consisted of native locals. Not only ordinary bandsmen but also the
-- BOA. TFR.1.MN, 105/10405, 1324.7.27 (16 September 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 97/9683, 1324.5.9 (2 July 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 82/8154, 1323.11.9 (4 January 1906).
For e.xample, BOA. TFR.1.MN, 105/10441, 1324.8.1 (20 September 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN. 
105/10457, 1324.8.3 (22 September 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 112/11136, 1324.11.2 (18 December 
1906).
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bandleaders were from villages of Macedonia. For example, Dedo K050, who was 
the most active bandleader at the time, was from Zelnic village of Fiorina. Another 
prominent figure of the region was Luka, who, according to the tahrirat which was 
sent to the Inspector General by kaimmakam Tahsin^^, had been active in Vodina 
region and now gone to Kesriye, was originally from the village Mahzik(?)-i Bal9e 
of the Razhk kaza. Luka was previously the director of the Bulgarian schools in 
Siroz^ ,^ then in Cuma-i Bala, where he was arrested and imprisoned for some time. 
He is an example of a typical IMRO activist, who is portrayed in the previous 
chapter. He was educated, a native of Macedonia, and linked to the Bulgarian 
schooling system in Macedonia. Zorle, mentioned above, was also from Banife, 
Gevgili. Another native bandleader was Naydo from Gorin^ova. On the single 
skirmish that occurred between his band and the Ottoman troops, his band had one
casualty, and that was Reste Vasil from the Cegan village of Filorina“^ . Another 
Bulgarian band, whose identity was unknown to the authorities, was originally 
Köprülü (Veles), and consisted of four members, one of whom was from Buf 
village^^. The Ottoman forces around the same village killed the son of the muhtar 
of Zaberdan village of Filorina, Apostol, on 23 February, who joined Bulgarian 
bands. Another Bulgarian bandleader, Miçe Şişkof, was from Ekşisu^°. It is however 
not safe to claim that all these bands had no connection with Bulgaria. A minute of 
Fiorina kaimmakam, dated 11 September 1906, informs the Inspectorship that a 
band under the leadership of İstoyan came from Bulgaria and entered Fiorina a week 
ago^*. Moreover, plenty of intelligence came to the inspectorship about bands being
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 95/9449, 1324.4.12 (5 June 1906).
Seres, in Thessalonica.
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 109/10842, 1324.9.24 (11 November 1906). 
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 112/11136, 1324.11.2 (18 December 1906). 
^®BOA. TFR.1.MN, 108/10746, 1324.9.11 (29 October 1906). 
BOA. TFR.l.MN, 104/10357, 1324.7.22 (llSeptember 1906).
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organised in Bulgaria^^. Ottoman commissariat in Bulgaria was the office to confirm 
the intelligence. On one particular occasion, recorded in the documents of Rumeli 
Inspectorship, a minute of the Commissariat contains information on prominent 
bandleaders that were present in Bulgaria at the time. Amongst them, there were 
persons who had their brothers or wives and children killed by the Greek bands. 
These bandsmen all originated from Macedonia^^. Yet, the kaimmakam of Filorina 
informed the inspectorship in his telegram dated 25 October 1906, that one of his 
trustworthy informers informed him that a band of nineteen had entered Fiorina 
region the previous night, which consisted solely of men from Bulgaria^''.
As noted earlier, after 1903 Bulgarian activities were directed not only 
against Ottoman forces, as had been mostly the case prior to the Ilinden uprising, but 
also to rival nationals and the adherents of the Patriarchate^^. Hence, not only armed 
bands of Greek or Serbian origins but ordinary peasants who refused to accept the 
Exarchate as the supreme religious authority were the target. This general situation 
was no different in Filorina. Bulgarian bands were frequently conducting murders 
outside or inside the villages. The first murder that was conducted by a Bulgarian 
band in Fiorina in 1906 occurred in the night of 18 February 1906 around two 
o’clock. The army squad that was stationed in the village Nert heard gun shuts from 
the direction of the area where the church was located. When they got there, they 
found a woman from the Greek millet shot and stabbed to death, and left hanging on 
a tree near the church gate^ .^ On 9 May 1906, a Bulgarian band killed three from
ibid.
ibid.
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‘Sırf BulgaristanlI’. BOA. TFR.l.MN, 108/10713, 1324.9.7 (25 October 1906). 
See Chapter Tliree.
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 85/8459, 1323.12,24 (18 February 1906)
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the Greek millei in Nafvan village, who were working at their fields . On 4 
September 1906, Lame, son of Mi^e, from the Greek nation was killed by the Dedo 
K090 band in the forest, which was an hour away from his village Nolyan-i Bala, 
while he was cutting some wood. The Greek priest of Nert and his three companions 
were killed by the Bulgarians in 10 September 1906^ **. A note, signed 
‘Revolutionary Bands of Kesriye’, was left at the scene of murder which said that 
those who were killed were the ‘enemies of the Bulgarian nation’ and that was why 
they were ‘punished’. It was also noted that the degree of violence used in their 
murders was in accodance with the graveness of the ‘crimes they had conducted 
against the Bulgarian nation and its saviour, the committee . To sum up, according 
to the documents of Rumeli Inspectorship, there are twelve verified murders of 
members of the Greek millet by Bulgarian terrorists in Fiorina throughout the year 
1906^".
Bulgarian community in Fiorina was not exempt from Bulgarian terror, 
either. Eight Bulgarians were murdered by Bulgarian bands in 1906“**. The 
inspectorship was informed on 15 May 1906 that, after a siege conducted by the 
troops to the village Tarsiye to capture Dedo K090, it was found out that not only 
the terrorist did escape but he also killed a villager named Mitre Petre right outside 
the village'* .^ Dedo K090 killed a Bulgarian woman at the pastures of the village
37
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 92/9197, 1324.3.15 (9 May 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 93/9205, 1324.3.16 (10 
May 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 104/10339, 1324.7.21 (10 September 1906). 
ibid.
See BOA. TFR.1.MN, 85/8459, 1323.12.24 (18 February 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 99/9811, 
1324.5.25 (18 July 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 91/9097, 1324.3.4 (25 April 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 
92/9197, 1324.3.15 (9 May 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 93/9205, 1324.3.16 (10 May 1906); BOA. 
TFR.1.MN, 103/10277, 1324.7.15 (4 September 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 104/10339, 1324.7.21 (10 
September 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 105/10405,1324.7.27 (16 September 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 93/9246, 1324.3.21 (15 May 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 95/9411, 1324.4.9 (2 
June 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 101/10012, 1324.6.16 (7 August 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 105/10441, 
1324.8.1 (20 September 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 105/10457, 1324.8.3 (22 September 1906); BOA. 
TFR.1.MN, 106/10595, 1324.8.21 (10 October 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 93/9246, 1324.3.21 (15 May 1906).
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Tarsiye for an unknown reason in 8 August 1906“*'^ . After midnight of 20 September, 
a Bulgarian band of four entered Kalnik-i Bala village and burned Tole Niko’s 
hayloft, shot death Kote Tase with rifle in his household, and cut to death ilo §iko
after dragging him outside the village^ *·*. All these three were members of the 
Bulgarian millet. Similarly, Kota son of Lazor from the Sakilova village was killed 
by the Naçe band outside his village on 2 October'* .^ A note was left on his dead 
body, saying he was a spy of the Ottoman authorities, and that is what happens to 
spies. A telegram by the governor of Manastır, dated 2 June 1906, tells that two days 
earlier a Bulgarian band entered the Setne village, which had a completely 
Bulgarian population, and killed three among the villagers'"'. The governor Hazım 
states that the reason of this deed was that the Bulgarian villagers, who were tired 
and sick of Bulgarian bands and their demands, had decided to cooperate with the 
authorities, and defend their villages against the Bulgarian bands. The population of 
Setne village appealed to the authorities on 13 September to adhere back to the 
Patriarchate . This, and many other examples are signs of loss of support among the 
native population. An example of lack of discipline is also present in the documents. 
The bandleader Dedo Koço and his two men got into argument which eventually 
resulted in bad blood between the leader and the men. The reason was that the two 
men heavily criticised Koço about his womanising activities and his low morals in 
those issues. The argument went on and, at the end, the two men tried to kill Koço 
but he escaped. Instead, they killed one of Koço’s lovers in the village Tarsiye'*' .^ 
Later on, as we learn from Tahsin Uzer’s memoirs, this Koço was killed by the
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 101/10012, 1324.6.16 (7 August 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 105/10441, 1324.8.1 (20 September 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 105/10457. 
1324.8.3 (22 September 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 106/10595, 1324.8.21 (10 October 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 95/9411, 1324.4.9 (2 June 1906). Tliis Setne village later on appealed to the 
autliorities to adhere back to the Patriarchate.
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 105/10422, 1324.7.29 (18 September 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 113/11201, 1324.11.9 (25 December 1906).
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Ottoman forces led by the writer of the memoirs in Lopudur village, ‘in the arms of 
his lover poetically’"*'·^.
As Muslims were not the main targets of the Bulgarian terrorists, there are 
only two Muslims killed by Bulgarians in the year 1906, in Filorina. Three deserters 
were caught in an ambush of Bulgarians on the road of Zagoric, around Prekopan, 
on 1 October. One of them was killed at the skirmish^®. The other Muslim was Ömer 
son of Halil, from the Katip Ali quarter of Filorina town. While he was cutting wood 
at Tarsiye Mountain, Dedo Koço and his band killed him on the grounds that he 
informed the officials about the band’s whereabouts. Dedo Koço also threatened the 
Muslims of the Nolyan in a letter dated 24 August. In the letter he says that the real 
target of the Committee is not Muslims but Greeks. However, he says, Muslim Agas 
(big land owners) of Nolyan consistently supported Greek bands and were openly 
hostile to Bulgarians. He threatens that if the Muslims will not stop these sorts of 
activities, he will bomb and burn their houses'*.
The casualties of the Bulgarian bands were limited compared to the 
casualties they inflicted on the population. Only three bandsmen were captured dead 
by the authorities. Although on every occasion of Bulgarian activity, troops chased 
the bands, it cannot be said that they were successful, as the results were limited. 
Still, on one occasion, the platoon under the command of Receb Ağa killed Resto 
Naum on 2 July, who was the murderer of the Greek woman being killed 
ferociously in Nert in February. Along with Naum, there were documents and letters 
and a code key, which must have been of utmost value to the authorities as they 
contained plenty of information^^. Apostol and Miçe Şişkof were the other
Uzer, pp. 197-198.
^®BOA. TFR.1.MN, 106/10540, 1324.8.13 (2 October 1906). 
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 107/10685, 1324.9.3 (21 October 1906). 
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 99/9811, 1324.5.25 (18 July 1906).
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Bulgarian bandsmen that were captured by the authorities^^. On the other hand, 
Greek bands inflicted heavier casualties on Bulgarian bands. One instance was a 
skirmish between Greek and Bulgarian bands that occurred on 8 August at 
Kaymak^alan. The band of Tano fought that night against a Greek band, but after 
losing one man and having another injured, they had to escape as the hostile band 
outnumbered them^ **. At another encounter, on 11 December, a Bulgarian band of 
four lost its three members^^
III. Greek activities in Fiorina in 1906
As noted earlier, after the Ilinden uprising, starting in 1904, bands from Greece 
began to organise incursions into Macedonia. As time went by, Greek bands began 
to succeed over Bulgarian bands. In fact, Greek bands were quite active in Western 
Macedonia. Fiorina was at the centre of the areas where the Greek bands most 
actively operated, such as the kazas of Kesriye and Morihova. The kaza was a 
hotbed of Greek bands, as well as Bulgarian komitadjis. Since 1905, a struggle of 
domination had been going on in Fiorina kaza between Greek and Bulgarian 
bands^^. The year 1906 is marked generally as a year of the decisive Greek 
offensive, in Macedonia as a whole. Flowever, in Fiorina kaza, Greek bands had 
some serious losses.
A major difference of the Greek bands from the Bulgarian ones was that they 
consisted of big numbers in general. A telegram from kaimmakam Tahsin to 
Inspector General, dated 23 March 1906, informs him that a Greek band of sixty had
See above.
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 101/10018, 1324.6.17 (8 August 1906). 
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 112/11136, 1324.11.2 (18 December 1906). 
See Dakin, pp. 223-232.
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been to istrebne^^ that morning and intended to pass to Morihova nahiye of Pirlepe 
kaza^^. According to another telegram, on the early morning of 7 May, a ‘crowded’ 
Greek band attacked Leskof<?a^  ^ village and tried to set it on fire*’°. However, this 
time a troop, which had been patrolling around, arrived more swiftly than they 
generally did. As a result, the band had to escape, leaving three Bulgarians killed, 
one injured, and eight houses burnt down. On the night of 28 June, a Greek band of 
more than fifty men, under the command of Captain Georgi, kidnapped four 
Bulgarian shepherds at Goringova Balkan. The following night, the band led the 
shepherds go as they could not escape the troops at their chase. The kaimmakam 
reports that the band would stay at Kaymak9alan district, which was situated right at 
the border of three kazas, so as to be able to operate in or break out into either one of 
them'’*. Hence, Kaymak9alan was presumably a centre of operations for bands. 
Another large Greek band of eighty, under the command of Makri, who was 
originally from Greece, was wandering around Peristeri, Rakova, and Armensko. A 
telegram, dated 4 August, notifies the Inspectorship that a big Greek band with more 
than a hundred men was at Strebeno**^ . In conclusion, unlike the Bulgarian bands, 
the Greek bands always consisted of large numbers. This would obviously had 
advantages, as large number meant more power. Yet, this situation was not risk-free 
at all since large number might also mean large casualties. This was exactly the case 
at Strebeno in 11 June'’^ .
Strebeno.
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 88/8747, 1324.1.27 (23 March 1906). 
Lechovo.
^  BOA. TFR.1.MN, 93/9211. 1324.3.16 (10 May 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 97/9680, 1324.5.8 (1 July 1906).
“  BOA. TFR.1.MN, 100/9989, 1324.6.13 (4 August 1906). 
See below, section “Strebeno Battle”.
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Dakin states, ‘the continual trek around the villages and the occasional 
skirmishes were the essentials of the Macedonian war’^ '*. This was what the Greek 
bands were doing most of the time in Fiorina in 1906. The major breeding grounds 
of Greek bands were villages of Strebeno, Prekopan, Belkameni, Rakova, and 
Morihova, which was bordering Fiorina. The main targets of these bands were 
Exarchist communities. Greek bands constantly tried to keep Exarchist villages 
under pressure. The attack on Leskofça, on 7 May, was not completely successful 
for the Greek bands as they were interrupted by the Ottoman troops. On 16 May, 
Greeks murdered the Bulgarian village guard of the same village*"^ . Lieutenant 
General De Giorgis, who was in charge of the reorganisation of the gendarme, wrote 
a letter to the Inspector General Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, dated 15 May. In his letter, he 
states that he has information that various Greek bands in Fiorina were on move 
with their objective being the village Buf, which was an Exarchist stronghold. This 
was an accurate intelligence as two weeks later a Greek band, which came from 
Rakova Mountain of Manastır, murdered five Bulgarians from Buf village in their 
cabin, located ten minutes away from the village^''. Then, they got away back to 
Rakova Balkan. On 4 June, a Greek band went into another Bulgarian village, 
Frapeştina at night and killed the village priest and two villagers, and wounded three 
others^^. On 12 August, a Greek band went in Soviç village, killed two villagers 
from Bulgarian millet, and kidnapped four others^®. The band came from 
Kaymakçalan, and went back to that direction. Five days later, two of the hostages 
escaped from the band and provided the authorities with the band’s whereabouts, 
and as a result, six days later the band let the remaining two hostages go.
Dakin, p. 263.
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“  BOA. TFR.1.MN. 94/9396, 1324.4.7 (31 May 1906). 
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The primary purpose of the Greek bands with all these murders and acts of 
terror in general was to force Exarchist villages to re-adhere to the Patriarchate. In 
1906, in Fiorina, their efforts produced the desired outcome on only one occasion. 
The villagers of Setne applied to the kaimmakam of Fiorina on 12 September, and 
demanded the recognition of their re-adherence to the Patriarchate by the official 
authorities^^. This was the village that was attacked by a Bulgarian band a few 
months ago. They say in their application that they had submitted to the Exarchate 
for the previous two years but this had done no good to them at all. Hence, they 
requested for the ratification of their demands. As far as the documentation reveals, 
this is the only village that gave petition to change church in 1906 in Fiorina. Thus, 
this was a relative success for the Greeks as no other village requested such a thing 
in favour of the Exarchate. An interesting point is that the ones who signed the 
petition in the name of the village used Cyrillic script in their signatures.
Besides attacking villages, killing and kidnapping villagers or burning their 
houses, Greek bands’ real foe on the field was the Bulgarian bands. In a report dated 
10 September, kaimmakam Tahsin Bey vigilantly warns the centre about an 
expected rise of band fighting in autumn. He states that Bulgarian bands decided to 
get into offensive against the Greek bands, and at the same time the Greek bands 
were increasing their numbers. He notes that Greeks being killed in Bulgaria had 
increased the religious and national tensions considerably. Moreover, he writes that 
the Greek consul came to Fiorina two days ago, and gave some secret instructions to 
the Greek bands there^ *’. In spite of everything, on only one occasion a skirmish 
between a Greek and a Bulgarian band occurred. At the end of the year, on 18 
December, a Bulgarian band from Köprülü fought against the band of Panayotis,
®^BOA. TFR.I.MN, 105/10422, 1324.7.29 (18 September 1906). 
’’’ BOA. TFR.1.MN, 104/10357, 1324.7.22 (11 September 1906).
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which was operating in Pirlepe as weirV Bulgarians had three losses and had to flee 
because of the numerical superiority of their opponents’ .^
Apart from usual methods of terror, there was an economic warfare, which 
must have been equally effective. In a telegram from the kaimmakam of Fiorina, 
dated 17 September 1906, it is stated that in a letter signed by various Greek 
bandleaders, the villagers of Gorin^ova, who happened to be Bulgarians, were 
warned against using the mills of Setne .
IV. The Battle of Istrebiie
The most outstanding event in 1906 in Fiorina is the battle of İstrebne (Strebeno). 
The development of this event right from the start to the end contains the main 
characteristics of the war in Macedonia. Moreover, the documents’'* enclose plenty 
of information about social aspects of the nature of Greek bands’ anatomy.
The kaimmakam of Fiorina, Tahsin Bey, had been to Noska, to meet the 
nahiye müdürü Zeynel Bey, around 10 June. While they were visiting a Vlach priest 
in his house, a letter from a Bulgarian informer arrived, notifying the presence of a 
large Greek band at istrebne Balkan, with the intention of burning Zelnic village, 
which was an Exarchist stronghold. On the morning of 29 May 1322/11 June 1906, 
they moved with a troop to that direction. The battle started at nine o’clock. The 
position of the Greek band, which was reckoned to consist of 150 men, was at the 
upper hills of the istrebne Balkan. Detachments from Fiorina, Kesriye, and Soroviç 
coordinated efficiently and the Greeks were besieged. Throughout the course of the 
battle, telegrams demanding more troops and artillery were sent to Manastır. During
” See Dakin, p. 253.
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 112/11136, 1324.11.2 (18 December 1906).
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 105/10422, 1324.7.29 (18 September 1906).
Tlie documents on istrebne Battle is in BOA. TFR.1.MN, 98/9731, 1324.5.15 (7 July 1906).
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the day some of the demanded help arrived. Kol Ağası Ali Fethi’  ^ from the General 
Staff was in command of the operation.
At around half past twelve the battle was over. Douglas Dakin states that ten 
were killed from the Greek band, and twelve were captured, meanwhile three 
hundred were killed from the troops and six hundred were wounded out of two 
thousand soldiers^^. On the other hand, Tahsin Uzer, the kaimmakam of Fiorina at 
the time, remembers that the Greek band consisted of 250 men and seventy-five of 
them were killed and fifty-seven were captured, and from the troops twenty soldiers 
were lost, and had thirty-five wounded. All these numbers, especially Dakin’s 
figures on the Ottoman troops, seem to be exaggerated in the light of official 
documents. According to the telegram reporting the results of the battle, dated 12 
June and was sent to the Inspectorship, signed by Tahsin, Ali Fethi, and Major 
Abdülkadir, twenty terrorists were captured alive, some of them being wounded, 
while twenty-five were dead. Losses of the troops were even much smaller; five 
were killed and four were wounded. Austro-Hungarian documents present the very 
same figures^’. Nevertheless, these figures should not be underestimated. The loss of 
Greeks, forty-five men, was truly grave, and Greek bands could hardly pull 
themselves together for a long time in Fiorina. Civil Agent Oppenheimer observed a 
notable decrease in the activities of Greek bands in Fiorina and Kastoria (Kesriye), 
in his telegram dated 31 July 1906^ .^ Dakin states that after the battle of İstrebne 
only one Greek band, that of Foufas remained at full strength’ .^
In actual fact, the bands’ total was ninety-three. This large group was 
essentially a combination of four smaller bands. These were the band of
”  Fetlii Okvar. 
Dakin, p.’ 266.
Documents no. 206, 207, 208. 
Document no. 214.
79 ■Dakin, p.266.
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Kanelopoulos, with twenty-one men, all from Greece; the band of Pavle was 
comprised of fifteen men, the band of Barba Andreya contained twenty men, both 
bands were Cretan bands essentially; and finally, there was the mixed band of Yorgi 
Bulanaki that contained forty men from both Greece and Crete.
It can be asserted that the document which contains the statements of twelve 
of the captured bandsmen, which is amongst the documents that are being utilised 
here, reveals various points that are characteristics of the Greek activities in 
Macedonia, at least for the year 1906. First of all, unlike Bulgarian bands, which 
chiefly consisted of native elements, the four Greek bands that attended the istrebne 
battle were made almost completely of elements out of Macedonia. On the 
administrative level, we know for sure that Pavle was a Cretan , and Yorgi Bulani 
was a Captain of the Greek army®^ \ There was only one bandsman who originated 
from Macedonia, and was from Bogaçko village, a Patriarchist stronghold. Out of 
twelve captured men, eight were from Greece, five of those being from Athens, and 
two were from Crete. Among the dead the situation was no different. Although, it 
should well be presumed that these bands were getting aid from Patriarchist villages, 
the results of the Battle of istrebne put forth or at least indicate strongly that Greeks 
did still not overcome the problem of necessity of local recruitment in 1906, in 
Fiorina. Their rivals, on the other hand, had already been well spread among the 
native population as has already been noted.
The other difference that can be observed is related to the backgrounds of the 
Greek partisans. Among the dead and captured bandsmen in the Battle of istrebne, 
the most obvious group is the Athenians. There are shopkeepers, workers, a café 
worker, and a waiter. Although there are people with agricultural occupations like a
Dakin, p. 266. 
*' Uzer, p. 195.
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shepherd, the majority were from urban occupations. There was even a graduate of 
the University of Athens amongst the dead. The band also had a doctor. As 
mentioned above, the leaders and the members of the Bulgarian bands that were 
operating in Fiorina in 1906 almost always originated from the villages of Fiorina or 
a neighbouring kaza, and hence, had rural backgrounds.
Another common feature of the captured Greek bandsmen is that they were 
aged between eighteen and twenty-five. The idea of protecting compatriots or co­
religionists, and the offer of adventure must have attracted young souls throughout 
the course of the Macedonian war. All the captured band members stated that they 
crossed the frontier with the aspiration of killing Bulgarians and taking revenge 
from them. Nevertheless, romantic feelings could not have been sufficient to enter 
such a course, as these man also had to feed themselves, arm themselves, dress 
themselves, and earn some money. Flence, that was why the bandleaders also had to 
offer some material things so as to attract these young men. The story of the 
captured bandsmen is more or less the same, how they joined the band of this or that 
leader, how they crossed the border. The story of Yani son of Bulana9e is fairly 
indicative. Fie was originally from Hanya. He had been working as a reji kolcusu 
before he joined the band of Yorgi Bulanaki, who was also from Hanya, Crete. He 
said that their purpose was to kill Bulgarian bandsmen and hence to take revenge of 
his compatriots. He was promised and paid 2.5 Napoleon gold liras for each month 
that exchanged fifty francs according to the Austro-Hungarian documents*^. Then 
from Crete, they went to Pire, Athens, and to Golos next. After landing at Golos, the 
band went to Kalambaka^^ and met the other three bands. They were given cloths
Document no. 208.
Kalambaka was one of the last stops for the Greek bands before crossing the border. Tlie others 
were TirliaJa, Golos (Volos), and Larissa. Dakin tells that tlie bands were assisted by Greek police
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and rifles, which were Garra rifles and Mannlichers. They departed from Kalambaka 
in 5 or 6 May, and crossed the border on 9 May. He said that they did not stop in 
any village and passed from halkan to halkatf'*. They obtained a man from each 
village they passed in order to be guided. The villagers, who brought bread outside 
their villages, fed them. At the end they reached istrebne, where they suddenly met 
the Ottoman troops. He added that he knew all their expenses were afforded by the 
Greek government. The others’ statements are almost the same.
An interesting note on the materials of the Greek bands that attended the 
Battle of istrebne is that they were dressed with Greek infantry private uniform®*^ . 
Bulgarian bandsmen also had a distinctive dress coloured grey.
V. Unidentifiable crimes
There are also documents that are on crimes committed by e^has-i meçhule 
(unknown persons). In 1906, in Fiorina, eight individuals were killed and two were 
wounded by unidentified persons. Of the dead, seven were from Bulgarian 
community, one of them being a priest, and one of the wounded was a Bulgarian, as 
well. Two individuals were missing .
officers in these towns, and Miuitchokis was the most prominent figure that undertakes the assistance 
to bands, in Kalambaka. See Dakin, pp. 253-254.
*■' Balkan means tliickly wooded mountain nmge.
In the documents it says: “efzon elbisesi labis”.
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 85/8407, 1323.12.17 (12 February 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 90/8959, 1324.2.21 
(16 April 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 97/9694, 1324.5.10 (2 July 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 100/9972, 
1324.6.11 (2 August 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 100/9981, 1324.6.13 (4 August 1906); BOA. 
TFR.1.MN, 100/9990, 1324.6.14 (5 August 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 101/10056, 1324.6.21 (12 
August 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 103/10275, 1324.7.14 (3 September 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 
105/10483, 1324.8.7 (26 September 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 106/10589, 1324.8.20 (9 October 
1906).
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Muslims in Macedonia did not have any organisation or bands such as the Macedo- 
Bulgarians, Greeks, or Serbians, initially. However, there were individual bands in 
the field. Moreover, particularly in the Albanian regions, especially in the vilayet of 
Kosova, the Albanians were fighting the Serbians. Also, there was some restlessness 
in Albanian regions in the first phase of reforms, in 1904 particularly, which was 
solved after some time**^ .
It is widely accepted that there were some Turks who were fighting
alongside with Greeks against the Bulgarians. Hanioglu quotes from a memorandum
that Dr. Nazim wrote to Bahaeddin Şakir^ ** in early September 1907 that Turks;
provided invaluable services to Greek committees; Greek committees 
that did not have Turkish members were rare. Since the Turks who 
joined these bands received Greek money, what they did was not 
something to be proud of from the point of view of our nationalism.
Since the Greeks’ interest in this matter is similar to that of the Turks, 
however, the Turkish nation benefited directly from the efforts of those 
Turks**'-’.
Hanioglu states that although the Ottoman authorities persistently denied the 
existence of any Turkish or Muslim bands in Macedonia, beginning in 1905 their 
existence became impossible to deny^°. Nevertheless, it was not until 1907 that the 
Turkish bands appear in number in the published Austro-Hungarian documents*’*. 
Dr. Nazim states in his memorandum that there were four or five Turkish bands
VI. M uslim s
For detailed infonnation see Bozbora.
** Dr. Nazim and Baliaeddin Şakir were two of the most important leaders of the Coimnittee of 
Progress and Union.
Hanioğlu, p. 222.
^  Hanioğlu, p. 221.
See Bridge.
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under the command of Hasan the Sailor, Martin Mustafa, Arab, and others . 
Committee of Progress and Union (CPU) leaders were contemplating about 
recruiting these Muslim bands, and convert the bands into CPU bands working 
under the instructions of the CPU’s military members. But certainly these 
Muslim bands were different from the Macedo-Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian bands 
in essence, as they did not get any aid from an irredentist circle of the neighbouring 
Balkan states.
There is no sign of a Turkish or Muslim band that was active in Fiorina in 
1906 amongst the documents of Rumeli Inspectorship. This is only natural as 
officially there was no Muslim band in Macedonia. However, the are two Muslims 
who were claimed to be operating in a Greek band. They were Süleyman son of 
Osman from the village Zelnic, and Muharrem son of Veli from Jarfan village of 
Kolonya and previously working in a farm in Fiorina. Although they were captured 
in istrebne village after a siege, and arrested and sent to court, the court freed them 
on the basis of lack of sufficient evidence '^*. This is the only instance in which a 
Muslim was involved in any band activity. Hence, it might be claimed that Muslims 
of Fiorina were not involved in band activities as offenders, when official 
documents about this particular district in a certain year have been examined.
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Hanioglu, p. 223.
For detailed infomiation see Hanioglu pp. 221-227.
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 83/8203, 1323.11.15 (11 Januaiy 1906); BOA. TFR.1.MN, 83/8283, 1323.11.25 
(21 Januaiy 1906).
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V II. A n in teresting report o f the kaim m akam  o f  F iorina
The phenomenon of migration has been noted before^^. Emigration from the 
Balkans, particularly to North America, was an important economic factor along 
with seasonal migration to other Balkan countries, Asia Minor, and Egypt. This 
phenomenon had outstanding results such as a decrease in the supply of labour force 
in the domestic market. Another result was the emergence of a new class with the 
homecoming of emigrants, who had enough cash to buy lands and properties, or to 
engage in commerce and start new businesses in towns.
The kaimmakam of Fiorina, Tahsin Bey, had recently been appointed to the 
kaza of Fiorina, when he undertook a research on the rate of land and property 
exchange between the Muslim population and the Christians of Fiorina. He 
composed a report dated 16 April 1906, which he submitted to the Governorship of 
Manastir^^, He was alerted with the constantly increasing extent of land and 
propeny selling by Muslims to Christians during the last three-four years. He states 
that Christians, who had worked in foreign countries, were coming back home with 
large amounts of money and they were willing to pay even two times of the actual 
value of lands and properties that belonged to Muslims. He adds that Muslims, who 
were struggling in debt because of taxes or extravagance, were selling their 
properties ‘thoughtlessly’, and spending their money mindlessly^^. He reckons that 
there are five thousand individuals, who were currently engaged in commerce with 
abroad, and they were earning two hundred liras annually, on the average. Hence, he 
concludes, in eight or ten years time all lands and properties that belong to the 
Muslims of Fiorina will change hands in favour of Christians. Even in the previous
95 See chapter 1.
BOA. TFR.1.MN, 86/8540, 1324.1.2 (26 February 1906). 
“... aldıkları parayı yemekte olduklanndan...”
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week, half of the shares of Katori-i Bâlâ çiftlik were bought by the Christians, and 
bargaining had been going on for the shares of Keleştene-i Bâlâ and Kaladerop 
farms. He complains that even one of the most prominent and respected members of 
the society, İzzet Paşa, was selling'·^ ** some of his possessions to the Christians, and 
he believes this sets a bad example for the ‘second strata’ of the Muslim society. 
According to Tahsin Bey, this state of affairs was utterly preferable for the ones who 
had bad intentions for future of the country.
Tahsin Bey attachs to his report two tables so as to put his point forth more 
firmly and clearly. One of the two tables shows the buying and selling transactions 
in the town and kaza of Fiorina in one month, in March 1322. In that month half a 
dönüm of pasture and one house was bought by Christians in Fiorina town. In the 
rest of the kaza, 243 döniims and three evleks '^  ^ of fields, eleven dönüms of pasture, 
and eight houses were bought by Christians from Muslims. For all these transactions 
a total of 331,200 liras were spent in March 1322.
The second table has a wider scope. It shows transactions for years 1319 
(1903), 1320 (1904), and 1321 (1905). It demonstrates that eleven shops, thirty- 
three houses, fifty dönüms of pasture, and twenty-six dönüms and three evleks of 
fields were sold to Christians in the town of Fiorina in three years. In the rest of the 
kaza, eighty houses, sixteen dönüms and one evlek of vineyards, 204 dönüms and 
one evlek of pastures, and 2137 dönüms and two evleks of fields were bought by 
Chistians. For all these transactions, 1,635,880 liras were spent in total. One 
conspicuous point this table illustrates is that over the course of three years, the 
volume of transactions increased constantly. For example, while only three houses 
were bought by Christians in 1903, in 1905 sixty-two houses were sold to them. One
March 1322 is 16 February 1906 -  17 March 1906. 
^  Evlek is a quiuler of a dönüm.
106
reason must have been the turmoil that was created in that year by the Bulgarian 
bands. After all, Fiorina was one of the districts, where the effects of the ilinden 
Uprising and its subsequent results must have been felt most heavily. Although there 
is no evidence that the volume of terror decreased during the following years, the 
constant increase in all transactions might be attributed to a higher degree of 
security. One additional reason could be a modification in the strategy of rival 
nationalisms, which might be linked to the article 3 of the Mürzteg Reform 
Programme'^*^
The notes of the Governor of Manastır, Hazım Bey‘^ ‘, on Tahsin Bey’s 
report are also interesting. He states that although travelling to America is 
forbidden’^ ", people obtain passports for other foreign countries and go to America 
via that method. He thinks that banning Muslims from selling their lands and 
properties to the Christians is neither sensible nor possible. However, he proposes to 
encourage Muslims to spend the money they obtained from selling their possessions 
on more profitable activities such as commerce. He adds that the majority of the 
land in Fiorina still belongs to Muslims and Christians are using the fields as 
sharecroppers'®^. A remarkable point that grabs attention is that he recommends the 
tables to the Inspector General as an indicator of the amount of wealth that 
Bulgarians acquired by working in America. In other words, he labels the Christians 
in Tahsin Bey’s report and in the table as Bulgarians. It is not certain whether all 
those land and properties were being bought by Bulgarians. Hence, the words of 
Hazım Bey could be interpreted as an example of how the minds of Ottoman
Article 3: ‘As soon as an appeasement of the country will be noted, tlie Ottoman govermnent will 
be asked for a modification in the administrative division of the territory in view of a more regular 
pouping of different nationalities’. See Chapter Tlnee.
Ebubekir Hazım Tcpeyran.
Travelling to America for work and emigration must liave been forbidden.
Talisin Bey is not saying that Clmstians obtain tlie majority of the lands. He simply points to a 
pattern tliat might result in such a situation in eight or ten year’s time.
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authorities, at least of Hazım Bey, were preoccupied with Bulgarians. Hazım Bey 
must have been expecting all the danger from Bulgarians.
VIIL Conclusions
After the examination of the records of the Rumeli Inspectorship about Fiorina some 
conclusions might be reached:
On Macedo-Bulgarian activities in Fiorina in 1906, the following can be said: 
Bulgarian bands were generally consisted of small numbers. These small units had 
certain advantages, such as mobilising more easily, or disappearing in cases of 
emergency. The Bulgarian bands that were active in Fiorina in 1906 consisted of 
native locals generally. Not only ordinary bandsmen, but the bandleaders were 
originally from Macedonia; from villages that were not so far away from the region 
in which they were active. Not only armed Greek bands, but also ordinary peasants 
who were Patriarchists were the targets of Bulgarian bands. The same is true for the 
Greek bands as they were also targeting Exarchist villagers. Bulgarian terror was 
also directed to the Exarchist community as well. The casualties of the Bulgarian 
bands were limited compared to the casualties they inflicted upon the population. 
Greek bands killed more Bulgarian bandsmen than the Ottoman troops.
The examination of the documents also reveals the following points on Greek 
activities in Fiorina in 1906: Fiorina was at the centre of the areas where the Greek 
bands most actively operated. Greek bands consisted of large numbers of men in 
general. They were continually trekking around the villages in the area. The major 
bases of the Greek bands were Strebeno, Prekopan, Belkameni, and Rakova
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villages. One village adhered back to the Patriarchate. Greek consul had links with 
the bands. Greek bands were also trying to conduct economic warfare. Greek bands 
originate outside of Macedonia, particularly from Crete and Athens. Greeks did not 
overcome the issue of local recruitment in 1906 in Fiorina.
Some general points are: The most used weapons by Greek or Macedo- 
Bulgarian bands alike were Gras (Garra)^®“* and Mannlicher”^^ rifles. Greek 
bandsmen were dressed with Greek army infantry private uniform in the battle of 
istrebne. Bulgarian bandsmen were wearing a special dress coloured grey.
The most outstanding fact, which is revealed by the examination of the 
documents, is that the Greek terrorists were not tolerated by the Ottoman 
administration in Fiorina in 1906. Hence, the general assumption of Ottomans 
allowing Greek bands to undertake their activities more freely at least until 1907 
does not hold by any means for Fiorina in 1906. Greek bands were inflicted big 
casualties in Fiorina.
The Gras rifle was firing one shot and produced in France. Initially, the Supreme Coimnittee 
bought tlie Gras rifles in Greece. Then tltey were routed secretly into Macedonia by ground or sea. 
See Lange-Akliund, p. 99.
Tire Mannlicher was a 6-shot rifle. It was made in Austria and it was tlie most demanded weapon 
for its accuracy. Lange-Akhund also notes that it was reserved to the chiefs o f gangs until 1902. See 
Lange-Aklmnd, p. 100.
109
CONCLUSION
From the Berlin Congress to the World War I, the Macedonian Question was one of 
the primary problems in the diplomatic arena, occupying the minds of Ottoman and 
European statesmen alike. The major cause of the problem was the aspirations of the 
Balkan neighbours of the Ottoman Empire, namely, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. 
Especially after 1885, when Bulgaria annexed East Rumelia and Greece had already 
obtained Thessaly, the competition for Macedonia amongst these three Balkan states 
gained momentum. Moreover, the Great Powers were also interested in Macedonia, 
each having its own interests to defend and develop, and each having supported this 
or that Balkan state according to the requirements of the day.
Nevertheless, it might be misleading to explain the Macedonian Question 
merely within the context of the dynamics in international relations. Internal 
dynamics also contributed to the problem. The development in urbanisation and 
accumulation of wealth particularly by the Slav population had been going on 
throughout the nineteenth century in Macedonia, and this constituted the necessary 
rudiments for a nationalistic struggle. Hence, it was no coincidence that the men 
power in Macedo-Bulgarian organisations was supplied from educated petite 
bourgeoisie circles in Macedonia, except for Seres region. Moreover, in the 
struggling Balkan states it was urban circles that composed the backbone of 
nationalist currents, which championed the irredentist cause.
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The role of the churches should also be mentioned in this respect as the 
rivalry between the Exarchate and the Patriarchate was one of the main reasons of 
distress in Macedonia. Since the official establishment of the Exarchate in 1870 and 
its being declared as a schismatic church by the Patriarch in 1872, these two 
churches had been conducting a nationalist war on the ecclesiastical grounds. Later 
on, they provided the nationalist organisations and the terrorist bands with the 
necessary means to infiltrate the local communities whose chief definition of self- 
identity was Christianity.
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the means of this rivalry 
amongst different nationalist claims started to gain a more terrorist nature as IMRO 
was founded in 1893 in Macedonia and the Supreme Committee of Macedonia was 
established in 1895 in Sofia. The turn of the century in Macedonia was marked with 
a constantly increasing terror, especially conducted by the Macedo-Bulgarian 
organisations, which culminated in the Ilinden uprising of 1903. This ultimately 
unsuccessful trial of insurrection led to important consequences. Starting with 1904 
Greeks and Serbians, who were alarmed by the influence of Bulgarians in 
Macedonia, started to organise band incursions to Macedonia. Thus, Greek and 
Serbian bands began to appear more frequently in Macedonia; with the latter’s main 
field of operation being in the northwest in the Kosova vilayet. In other parts of 
Macedonia, fighting was fierce between Greeks and Macedo-Bulgarians, and this 
quarrel was the essence of the increasing chaos and disorder, which created a 
vicious cycle of terror after some time until 1908. In addition, the period after 1903 
is marked by increasing interference of the Great Powers in the Macedonian 
Question under the pretext of pressuring for reforms and demanding for 
improvements in the lives of the Christian community in Macedonia.
I l l
In this dissertation, I have endeavoured to study the Macedonian Question 
and to construct an analytical micro-history of a particular district -Fiorina- in a 
specific year -1906- according to the records of Rumeli Inspectorship, within the 
context of the Macedonian Question. The records of Rumeli Inspectorship constitute 
the main primary source of this work. These documents, which have been hitherto 
scarcely used, are one of the most important and not much explored sources 
concerning the subject. The kaza of Fiorina had been selected for the reason that it 
was one of the hotbeds of terrorist activities. Although Fiorina was too small a 
region to reach common conclusions for Macedonia, it was still representative, to 
some extent, of the situation in Macedonia as Muslims -Albanians and Turks-, 
Slavs, Greeks, and Vlachs inhabited in the district. On the other hand, 1906 was the 
year in which the war in Macedonia was at its peak, and it was sort of a decisive 
year for the Greeks as they started to dominate in most parts of Macedonia over the 
Macedo-Bulgarians after 1906.
The developmental structure of this dissertation puts forth a process that 
moves toward the more specific from the general. The first chapter is on the wider 
subject of the Macedonian Question, which aims to endow the reader with a 
framework that is necessary to appreciate the information given in the following 
chapters in a more perceptive way. The second chapter is on the more specific 
subject of the rival terrorisms and reforms. In other words, the situation in the field 
is presented. This is followed by the third chapter in which a history of the Greek 
and Macedo-Bulgarian band activities in Fiorina in 1906 is imparted in the light of 
official documents.
Some general conclusions have been drawn throughout the study. For 
instance, each Great Power had its own calculations and conducted policies vis-à-vis
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the Ottoman Empire and the Macedonian Question. Accordingly, the European 
powers had pursued two controversial policies with regard to the Ottoman Empire. 
The first policy was of interventionist nature. This policy had accelerated the 
disintegration and collapse of the empire, by encouraging the national movements. 
The second policy contributed to the maintenance of the sultan’s sovereignty over 
the integrity of its territories, hoping to exercise a major influence there and defend 
their economic and political interests, and avoiding a flill-scale war by preserving 
the teiritorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The implications of their hesitant and 
hypocritical approach induced endeavours to solve the problem futile. Furthermore, 
the assistance each Great Power provided to different Balkan states not only caused 
the problem to last longer but also gave confidence to Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia 
to pursue their particular aspirations in an aggressive manner.
The interventions of Great Powers only worsened the situation in 
Macedonia. Although some progress had been achieved through the period of 
reforms from 1902 until 1908, the so-called reforms contributed to the chaotic 
situation essentially as the aspirations of opposing protagonists in Macedonia were 
only triggered. The results of the article 3 of the Mürzteg agreement constitute a 
typical example in this respect.
The examination of the records of Rumeli Inspectorship on Fiorina for the 
year 1906 reveals several points'. For example, although it is generally believed that 
the Ottoman authorites tolerated and even supported the Greek bands against the 
Macedo-Bulgarian bands at least until 1907,it is obvious that the Greeks were not 
tolerated in Fiorina at all, and they gave important casualties there in 1906. The fight 
was mainly between the Greek and Macedo-Bulgarian bands in the district in 1906.
See Cluipter Four, last section.
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These bands, both Greek and Macedo-Bulgarian ones, possessed different 
characteristics in terms of the size of bands or the origins of the bandsmen. An 
examination of the records also lets the researcher learn about some interesting 
details, as in the case of the kaimmakatifs report on the immoveable transactions 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. This report shows that non-Muslims were 
trying to buy land and property from Muslims at an increasing scale over the course 
of time. The records also let the researcher to grasp the system of thinking and 
perceptions of the administrators.
The Macedonian Question, which emerged towards the nineteenth century, 
still exists though in different dimensions. The study of history would definitely 
help the establishment of better policies in the present. Accordingly, the study of the 
essence of the problem and its development would shed light upon contemporary 
arguments not only concerning the Balkans but also other parts of the world where 
similar quarrels and problems exist.
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APPENDIX A
ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN OF THE THREE PROVINCES
SELANİK
I) Central Sancak (S.)
a) Selanik (Central) K.: Vardar N., Gelemriye N. 
Kazas and Nahives:
1) Doyran Kaza (K.)
2) Ustrumca (Stroumnitza) K.
3) Yenice K.
a) Karacaabad N.
4) Avrethisari (Kılkış) K. 
a) Karadağ N.
5) Kesendire (Poliroz) K.
6) Tikveş (Kavadar) K.
a) Dernova N.
b) Roşden N.
7) Langaza (Sirşin) K.
8) Gevgili K.
a) Mayadağ N.
b) Nutiye N.
9) Katerin K.
a) Lithor (Leftehor) N.
b) Gelendir N.
10) Karaferye K. 
a) Ağustos N.
11) VodinaK.
a) Karacaâbâd N.
b) Ostrova N.
12) Aynaroz K.
13) Köprülü (Veles) K.
a) Nikodim N.
b) Bogomil N.
II) Siroz (Serez) S.
a) Siroz (Central) K. ; Robcoz (Roycoz, Devlin) N. 
Kazas and Nahives:
1) NevrekopK.
2) Menlik K.
3) Zihne (Zelhova) K.
4) PetriçK.
5) DemirhisarK.
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6) Cuma-i Bâlâ K.
7) RazhkK.
III) Drama S.
a) Drama (Central) K.: Drama: (^ 19 N., Piirsi9an (Persican) N., Pravi§te 
N.
Kazas and Nahives:
1) KavalaK.
2) Sari§aban (Sari9oban)K.
IV) Ta§oz S.
MANASTIR
0 Manastır S.
Kazas and Nahives:
1) Manastır K.
a) Resne N.
b) ismilova N.
c) Prespa N.
d) Kırşova N.
e) Demirhisar N.
2) OhriK.
a) Esteroga N.
b) Debrece N.
3) Fiorina K.
a) Rudinik (Soroviç) N.
b) Noska N.
c) Veştoran N.
4) PirlepeK.
a) Morihova N.
b) VebeşnaN.
5) KırçovaK.
II) Serfice S.
Kazas and Nahives:
1) Serfice K.
a) Volondos N.
2) AlasonyaK.
a) Livâdî N.
b) Dumnik (Dömenek, Domanik) N.
c) Dışkata N.
3) Kayalar (Cuma, Cuma Pazarı) K.
a) Saruhanlar N.
b) Katranca N.
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4) NasliçK.
a) Siçeşte N.
b )  Jopan N.
5) Kozana K. 
a) Vençe N.
6) Grebene K.
III) Görce (Koritza) S.
Kazas and Nahives:
1) Görce K.
a) Bihlişte (Behişte) N.
b) Opar N.
2) Kesriye K.
a) Horpeşte N.
b) Küsura N.
c) Borbocko (Boğaçko, Bogatsiko, Borborciko) N.
3) Astrava K. 
a) Kökes N.
4) Kolonya K.
IV) Debre S,
V)
Kazas and Nahives:
1) Debre-i bâlâ K. 
a) Kocacık N.
2) Debre-i zır K.
3) Kakalar K.
4) MatK.
İlbasan (Elbassan) S.
Kazas and Nahives:
1) İlbasan K. 
a) Certika N.
2) Garamış K.
3) Peklin K.
KOSOVA
I) Kosova (Üsküb) S.
Kazas and Nahives:
1) Üsküp (Centre) K.
2) Orhaniye (Kaçanik) K.
3) İştipK.
a) Bereketli N.
4) Koçana K.
a) Beyanca (Çarva) N.
5) Osmaniye K.
6) Kratova K.
7) KumanovaK. 
a) Mezraa N.
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8)
9)
Radovişte K. 
Palanka K.
II) Priştine S.
Kazas and Nahiveş·.
1) Priştine K.
2) Firzovik (Verisoviç) N.
3) Geylan K.
4) PreşovaK.
5) Mitroviçe K.
6) Vılçıtrin K.
III) Yenipazar (Seniçe) S.
Kazas and Nahiveş·.
1) Yenipazar K.
2) IColaşinK.
a) Viraneş N.
b) Moykovac N.
c) Revânerika N.
3) Yenivaroş K.
4) Akova K.
a) Beşteriçe N.
b) Behur N.
c) Kamrat N.
d) Brezâva N.
IV) İpek S.
Kazas and Nahives:
1) İpekK.
2) YakovaK.
3) BerâneK.
4) Gosine K.
5) TırgovişteK.
V) Taşlıca S.
Kazas and Nahives:
1) Taşlıca K.
2) PrepolK. 
a) Peribovi N.
VI) Prizren S.
Kazas and Nahives:
1) Prizren K. 
a) Rakofça N.
2) Kalkandelen K. 
a) Gostivar N.
3) LumaK. 
a) Kalis
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APPENDIX B
DOCUMENT EXAMPLES
BOA. TFR.l.MN, 86/8540, 1324.1.2 (26 Februiiry 1906)
yfu
v\
■ck ¿ ^  \ i :;' · ' '  ^
'"'y*v V -· "^-^-¿¿^1-;
. ■ <" ^  < \ J U  , ' i  ' l l  ^  C 'r ' '* '  t> li> |
^ y - l  - I *  '  <v ly».l . , ·  , "  '  ■■ ■ ^  - 'V ^ ' . a l i l  , /
„ ■ ■ i^ x  · ·  JC r ·  • ^ ‘"
119
BOA. TFR.l.M N, 86/8540, 1324.1.2 (26 February 1906) (cont’d)
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APPENDIX C
THE TREATY OF BERLIN: ARTICLE 23
The Sublime Porte undertakes scrupulously to apply on the island of Crete the 
organic law of 1868 with such modifications as may be considered equitable.
Organic Laws. Laws similar to Organic Law for Crete to be introduced into 
other parts of Turkey in Europe, except exemption from Taxation.
Similar laws adapted to local requirements, excepting as regards the exemption 
from taxation granted to Crete, shall also be introduced into other parts of 
Turkey in Europe for which no special organization has been provided by the 
present Treaty.
Organic Laws. Special Commission to settle details of new Laws.
The Sublime Porte shall depute special commissions, in which the native 
element shall be largely represented, to settle the details of the new laws in each 
province.
The schemes of organization resulting from these labours shall be 
submitted for examination to the Sublime Porte, which, before promulgating the 
Acts for putting them in force, shall consult the European Commission 
instituted for Eastern Roumelia.
Source: Duncan M. Perry, The Politics of Terror, The Macedonian Liberation 
Movements, 1893-1903 (Durham and London; Duke University Press, 1988), 
pp. 213-214.
APPENDIX D
MACEDONIA CIRCA 1900
Source: Fikret Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, Oluşumu ve 1908'e Kadar Gelişimi, trans, 
by İhsan Catay, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001), p.xvi.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Unpublished Primary Sources'.
T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire 
Başkanlığı.
Rumeli Müfettişliği Manastır Evrakı (TFR.1MN)·. 82/8154, 83/8203, 
83/8283, 85/8407, 85/8459, 86/8540, 88/8747, 90/8959, 91/9097, 92/9197, 93/9205, 
93/9211, 93/9246, 94/9396, 95/9411, 95/9446, 95/9449, 97/9680, 97/9683, 97/9694, 
98/9731, 99/9811, 100/9972, 100/9981, 100/9989, 100/9990, 101/10012,
101/10018, 101/10056, 102/10190, 103/10275, 103/10277, 104/10339, 104/10357, 
105/10405, 105/10422, 105/10441, 105/10457, 105/10483, 106/10514, 106/10540, 
106/10589, 106/10595, 107/10685, 108/10713, 108/10746, 109/10842, 112/11136, 
113/11201
Published Primary Sources·.
Bridge, F. R., ed., Austro-Hungarian Documents Relating to the Macedonian 
Struggle, 1896- 1912 (Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976)
‘Macedonian Financial “Reglement.” 1906. “Reglement” for the Financial Service 
of the three Vilayets of Roumelia’, American Journal o f International Law, 1 
(1907), 209-213
Bozhinov, Voin, and L. Panayotov, eds, Macedonia, Documents and Material 
(Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1978)
Re ference Works'.
Akbayar, Nuri, Osmanlı Yer Adlan Sözlüğü (Istanbul; Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınlan,
2001)
Simovski, Todor Hristov, Atlas o f the Inhabited Places o f the Aegean Macedonia 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999)
Şemseddin Sami, Kâmûsü’l-Âlâm, 6 vols (İstanbul: Maarif Nezareti, 1306-1316; 
repr. Ankara: Kaşgar Neşriyat, 1996)
126
Secondary Sources:
Adanır, Fikret, ‘The Macedonian Question; The Socio-economic Reality and 
Problems of its Historiographic Interpretation’, International Journal o f 
Turkish Studies, 3 (1984-85), 43-64
-, ‘The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1912’, in The Formation o f 
National Elites, ed. by Andreas Kappeler and Fikret Adanır and Alan O’Day 
(Darmouth: New York University Press, 1992), pp. 161-191
-, ‘The National Question and the Genesis and Development of Socialism in the 
Ottoman Empire: the Case of Ottoman Macedonia’, in Socialism and 
Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, ed. by Mete Tunçay and Eric Jan Ziircher 
(London; British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 27-48
-, ‘The Socio-political Environment of Balkan Nationalism; the Case of 
Ottoman Macedonia 1856-1912’, in Regional and National Identities in 
Europe in the XIXth and XXth Centuries, ed. by Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, 
Michael G. Müller and Stuart Woolf (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1998), pp. 221-254
-, Makedonya Sorunu, Oluşumu ve 1908'e Kadar Gelişimi, trans, by İhsan 
Catay, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001)
Adanır, Fikret, and Suraiya Faroqhi, eds, The Ottomans and the Balkans, A 
Discussion o f Historiography, The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage: 25 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002)
Anderson, M. S., The Eastern Question, 1774 -  1923, A Study in International 
Relations (London; Macmillan, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966)
Angelopoulos, Athanasios, ‘Relations Between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the 
Church oi SevhxX, Balkan Studies, 13 (1972), 119-127
Aydın, Mahir, ‘Arşiv Belgeleriyle Makedonya’da Bulgar Çete Faaliyetleri’, 
OsmanlI Araştırmaları, 9 (1989), 209-234
Barker, Elisabeth, Macedonia, Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1950)
Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi Cilt: I  Kıstm: I, 4th edn (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu, 1991)
Bekir Fikri, Balkanlarda Tedhiş ve Guerilla, Grebene (İstanbul; Belge Yayınları, 
1976)
127
Beydilli, Kemal, ‘II. Abdülhamit Devrinde Makedonya Mes’elesine Dair’, Osmanlı 
Arapırmalan, 9 (1989), 77-99
Blanchard, Raoul, ‘The Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey’, 
Geographical Review, 15 (1925), 449-456
Bozbora, Nuray, Osmanlı Yönetiminde Arnavutluk ve Arnavut Ulusçuluğu'nun 
Geliçimi, Boyut Kitapları Araştırma Dizisi: 3 ([İstanbul]: Boyut Yayın, 1997)
Brailsford, H. Yi., Macedonia, Its Races and their Future (London: Methuen, 1906; 
repr. New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1971)
Braude, Benjamin, and Bernard Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, 
The Functioning o f a Plural Society (New York and London: Holmes & 
Meier, 1982)
Bridge, F, R., From Sadowa to Sarajevo (London: Routledge & Keagan, 1972)
Crampton, R. J,, Bulgaria, 1878 -  1918, A History (Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 1983)
Çetik, Mete, ‘Osmanlı Solundan Bir Portre, Yane Sandanski’, Tarih ve Toplum, 128 
(1994), 13-17
Çetin, Erol, ‘1878-1908 arasında Makedonya Sorunu’ (unpublished master’s thesis, 
İstanbul University, 1995)
Dakin, Douglas, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913 (Thessalonica: 
Society for Macedonian Studies and the Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966; 
repr. Thessalonica: Museum for the Macedonian Struggle, Institute for Balkan 
Studies, 1993)
Deliorman, Altan, ‘Birinci Cihan Savaşı’nm sonuna kadar Makedonya’da Türk 
Nüfusu Meselesi’, Türk Kültürü, 33 (1965), 589-593
Durham, M. Edith, Twenty Years o f Balkan Tangle (London: Allen & Unwin, 1920)
Fazlı Necib, Rumeli'yi Neden Kaybettik, Hayat Tarih Mecmuası İlavesi, ([n.p.]: 
Hayat Tarih, 1972)
Findley, Carter Vaughn, ‘Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late 
Ottoman Empire’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 28 (1986), 81- 
106
Fraser, John Foster, Pictures from the Balkans (London: Cassell, 1912)
Gounaris, Basil C., ‘Greco-Turkish Railway Connection’, Balkan Studies, 30 
(1989), 311-332
128
Steam over Macedonia, 1870 -  1912, Socio -  Economic Change and the 
Railway Factor (Boulder; East European Monographs, 1993)
- ‘Reassessing Ninety Years of Greek Historiography on the “Struggle for 
Macedonia” (1904-1908)’, Journal o f Modern Greek Studies, 14.2 (1996), 
237-251
, ‘From Peasants into Urbanities, from Village into Nation; Ottoman Monastir 
in the Early Twentieth Century’, European History Quarterly, 31 (2001), 43- 
63
Graves, Sir Robert, Storm Centres o f the Near East (London; Hutchinson, 1933)
Hanioglu, M. Şükrü, Preparation for a Revolution, The Young Turks, 1902 -  1908 
([New York]; Oxford University Press, 2001)
Issawi, Charles, ‘Wages in Turkey, 1850-1914’, in Social and Economic History o f 
Turkey, {1071 -  1920), ed. by Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık (Ankara; 
Meteksan Limited, 1980), pp. 263-270.
Işıksak Turgut, ‘Makedonya Üzerinde Oynanan Oyunlar ve Bilinmeyen Bir Nüfus 
Sayımı’, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 43 (1971), 13-19
İnalcık, Halil, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Ankara; Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve 
Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi, 1943; repr. İstanbul; Eren, 1992)
İrtem, Süleyman Kani, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Makedonya Meselesi, Balkanlar’m 
Kördüğümü, ed. by O. S. Kocahanoğlu ( Ankara; Temel, 1999)
Jelavich, Barbara, The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814 -  1918 
(Chicago; McNally, 1969)
-, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1991)
-, History o f the Balkans, 2 vols. (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
1984)
Jelavich, Charles, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism (Westport, Connecticut; 
Greenwood Press, 1978)
Karakasidou, Anastasia N., Fields o f Wheat, Hills o f Blood, (Chicago; The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997)
Karal, Enver Ziya, Osmanlı Tarihi VIII. Cilt, 5th edn (Ankara; Türk Tarih Kurumu, 
2000)
Karpat, Kemal H., ‘The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908’, 
InternationalJournal o f Middle East Studies, 3 (1972), 243-281
129
An Inquiry Into the Social Foundations o f Nationalism in the Ottoman State: 
From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations, Research Monograph 
No. 39 (USA; Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1973)
-, ‘The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: The Young Turks and Nationalism', 
Internationaljournal o f Middle East Studies, (1975), 276-299
-, ‘Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82-1893’, International 
Journal o f Middle East Studies, 9 (1978), 237-274
-, ‘The Social and Political Foundations of Nationalism in South East Europe 
after 1878: A Reinterpretation’, in Der Berliner Kongress von 1878, Die 
Politik der Grossmachte und die Probleme der Modernisierung in 
Südosteuropa in der Zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhundrets (Wiesbaden; Steiner, 
1982), pp. 385-410
Ottoman Population, 1830 -  1914, Demographie and Social Characteristics 
([Wisconsin]: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985)
Kent, Marian, ed, The Great Powers and the End o f the Ottoman Empire, 2nd edn 
(Norwich, Norfolk: Cass, 1996)
Koliopoulos, Giannes S., Brigands with a Cause, Brigandage and Irredentism in 
Modern Greece, 1821 -  1912 (Oxford; Clarendon, 1987)
Lange-Akhund, Nadine, The Macedonian Question, 1893 -  1908, From Western 
Sources, trans, by Gabriel Topor (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1998)
Langer, William L., The Diplomacy o f Imperialism, 1890 - 1902 (New York; Knopf, 
1968)
Laqueur, Walter, ‘Interpretations of Terrorism; Fact, Fiction and Political Science’, 
Journal o f Contemporary History, 12(1977), 1-42
LeQueux, William, An Observer in the Near East (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907)
Livanios, Dimitri, ‘ ‘Conquering the Souls’: nationalism and Greek guerrilla warfare 
in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904-1908’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 23 
(1999), 195-221
Mazower, Mark, ‘Introduction to the Study of Macedonia’, Jour?ial o f Modern 
Greek Studies, 14.2 (1996), 229-235
May, Arthur J., ‘The Novibazar Railway Project’, The Journal o f Modern History, 
10 (1938), 496-527
-, ‘Trans-Balkan Railway Schemes’, The Journal o f Modern History, 24 (1952), 
352-367
130
McCarthy, Justin, ‘Greek Statistics on Ottoman Greek Population’, International 
Journal o f Turkish Studies, 2 (1980), 66-76
Neuburger, Mary, ‘Bulgaro-Turkish Encounters and the Reimaging of the Bulgarian 
Nation, \%12>-\995', East European Quarterly, 31 (1997), 1-20
Orhun, Hayri, and others, tâs, Me.^hur Valiler ([Ankara]; İçişleri Bakanlığı Merkez 
Valileri Bürosu, 1969)
Ortaylı, İlber, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Alman Nüfuzu (İstanbul: Kaynak 
Yayınları, 1983)
Ortaylı, İlber, Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri (1840-1880) (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000)
Palairet, Michael, The Balkan Economies, c. 1800 -  1914, Evolution without 
Development (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1997)
Perry, Duncan M., The Politics o f Terror, The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 
1893 -  1903 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988)
-, Stefan Slamholov and the Emergence o f Modern Bulgaria, 1870 -  1895 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993)
Poğdan, M. Sadık, Bulgar Sadık, ed. by M. R. Yalkm, 2nd edn (Istanbul: Gün 
Basımevi, 1944)
Quataert, Donald, ‘The Economic Climate of the “Young Turk Revolution” in 
1908’, The Journal o f Modern History, 51 (1979), D1147-Dl 161
Roudometof, Victor, ‘The Social Origins of Balkan Politics: Nationalism, 
Underdevelopment, and the Nation-State in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 
\%%Q-\920\ Mediterranean Quarterly, 11 (2000), 144-163
Shaw, Stanford, and Ezel Kural Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modern 
Turkey, 2 vols. (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1977; repr. 1997)
Smith, Arthur D. Howden, Fighting the Turk in the Balkans (New York and 
London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1908)
Somel, Selçuk Akşin, The Modernization o f Public Education in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1839-1908, Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline, The Ottoman 
Empire and its Heritage: 22 (Leiden: Brill, 2001)
Stoianovich, Traianan, ‘Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 
1600-1800’, The Journal o f Economic History, 13 (1953), 398-411
-, ‘Factors in the Decline of Ottoman Society in the Balkans’, Slavic Review, 21 
(1962), 623-632
131
Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin, ‘İttihat ve Terakki Hareketinin oluşumunda 
Selanik’in Toplumsal Yapısının Belirleyiciliği’, in Social and Economic 
History o f Turkey, {1071 -  1920), ed. by Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık 
(Ankara: Meteksan Limited, 1980)
Tokay, Gül, Makedonya Sorunu, Jön Türk İhtilalinin Kökenleri, {1902 -  1908), 
Türkiye Üzerine Araştırmalar: 15 (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996)
Trumpener, Ulrich, ‘Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire’, in The Great 
Powers and the End o f the Ottoman Empire, ed. by Marian Kent, 2nd edn 
(Norwich, Norfolk: Cass, 1996), pp. 111-140
Uzer, Tahsin, Makedonya E.^kiyalik Tarihi ve Son Osmanli Yönetimi (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu, 1979)
Ünlü, Mucize, ‘Manastır Vilayeti’nin İdari ve Sosyal Yapısı (1873-1912)’ 
(Unpublished master’s Thesis, On dokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, 1996)
Woods, Randall B,, ‘Terrorism in the Age of Roosevelt: The Miss Stone Affair, 
1901-1902’, American Quarterly, 31 (1979), 478-495
132
